William Roe v. Shirley S. Chater

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedAugust 9, 1996
Docket95-3201
StatusPublished

This text of William Roe v. Shirley S. Chater (William Roe v. Shirley S. Chater) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
William Roe v. Shirley S. Chater, (8th Cir. 1996).

Opinion

___________

No. 95-3201 ___________

William Roe, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * of the Social Security * Administration, * * Appellee. *

__________

Submitted: February 15, 1996

Filed: August 9, 1996 __________

Before WOLLMAN, HEANEY, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

William E. Roe appeals the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's (Commissioner) decision denying him disability benefits. Roe contends that the administrative law judge (ALJ) improperly failed to precisely state Roe's mental condition when posing a hypothetical question to a vocational expert. We disagree and affirm.

I.

Roe was born on November 14, 1941, in Davenport, Iowa. He attended school until eighth grade when he was expelled. Roe completed his General Equivalency Diploma while in the navy. Following his military service, Roe worked in a variety of jobs.

On June 11, 1990, at the age of forty-eight years, Roe filed applications under the Social Security Act for supplemental security income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d, and disability insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Roe claimed he became disabled on August 2, 1989, due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, asthma, a degenerative knee condition, and high blood pressure. The Commissioner initially denied Roe disability benefits on August 1, 1990. On March 29, 1994, after several administrative appeals, Roe had a second hearing before an ALJ.

The ALJ evaluated Roe's claim according to the five-step analysis prescribed by the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f) (1990).1 At step four, the ALJ determines the nature of Roe's past relevant work and evaluates whether Roe is capable of performing this work in light of his residual functional capacity. If the claimant is found to be sufficiently able to perform any of his past relevant work, he is not considered to be

1 Under the sequential five-step analysis, a claimant is not disabled if (1) he is working and the work qualifies as substantial gainful activity, or (2) he does not have an impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits his ability to do basic work activities. Further, a claimant is not disabled if (3) he does not have an impairment which is presumptively considered to be disabling, (4) his residual functional capacity allows him to meet the demands of past relevant work, and (5) considering his residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience, he can perform other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f).

In Roe's case, the ALJ found, in the first step, that while Roe was currently working on a relatively regular basis, he was not engaged in substantial gainful activity due to the variability of his income. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b) (1990). At the second step, he found that, cumulatively, Roe had a severe impairment. At the third step, the ALJ held that Roe's impairments did not meet the statutory criteria for an impairment presumed to be disabling. Admin. Tr. at 19-20. At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Roe was capable of performing past relevant work and, therefore, not disabled.

-2- disabled and, therefore, ineligible for benefits. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471 (1986).

In determining whether Roe could perform his past relevant work, the ALJ considered work that Roe had performed over the past fifteen years that lasted long enough for Roe to learn to do the work and that constituted a substantial gainful activity. See Nimick v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 887 F.2d 864, 866 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989). Under this criteria, Roe's past relevant work included positions as a garbage collector, a garbage collection driver, a janitor, a product assembler, a security guard, a yard worker, and a wooden toy assembler. Admin. Tr. at 15.

The ALJ also considered Roe's residual functional capacity which is defined as "what [the claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) (1990). Assessing Roe's residual functional capacity requires the ALJ to consider all of the relevant evidence to determine the claimant's ability to meet certain mental, physical, sensory, and other demands of a job. Id. Based on the medical and psychological testimony presented at the hearing, as well as the testimony of Roe and his wife, the ALJ concluded that Roe possessed the residual functional capacity to:

perform work-related activities except for work involving lifting and carrying more than 20 pounds occasionally or 10 pounds frequently; standing or walking for more than one hour at a time; repetitive stooping, squatting, kneeling, crawling, or climbing; exposure to concentrations of dust, fumes, smoke, or extremes of heat, humidity, or cold; work which is very complex or technical in nature, though he can perform more than simple, routine, repetitive tasks which do not rely on written instruction or material; work which requires constant, close attention to detail; work which does not provide for occasional supervision; or work which must be performed faster than at a regular work pace.

Admin. Tr. at 27.

-3- The ALJ posed a hypothetical question2 incorporating these limitations to a vocational expert (VE), who responded that such an individual would be able to work as a janitor or as a security guard. Id. at 227. Based on the VE's response and the other evidence presented at the hearing,3 the ALJ held that Roe was capable of past relevant work as a

2 The hypothetical question was as follows:

The first assumption is that we have an individual who is currently 52 years old, was 44 years old as of the alleged onset date of disability. He's a male. He has a high school general equivalency diploma. He has past relevant work as a garbage collector/driver and collector, janitor, product assembler and security guard, and he has the following impairments. He has bronchial asthma, degenerative changes of the knees and feet with complaints of pain, obesity, hypertension, history of bipolar affective disorder, low average intelligence, developmental dyslexia, history of conversion reaction, and medically determinable disorders resulting in complaints of multiple joints, and as a result of a combination of those impairments, he has the physical and mental capacity to perform work related activities, except for lifting of no more than 20 pounds, routinely lifting 10 pounds, with no standing or walking of more than 1 hour at a time, with no repetitive stooping, squatting, kneeling, crawling or climbing. This individual should not work in the presence of extreme heat or cold, or excessive dust, fumes or smoke. He is not able to do very complex or technical work, but is able to do more than simple, routine, repetitive work, not relying on written instruction or on written matter, and not requiring constant, close attention to detail.

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Related

Bowen v. City of New York
476 U.S. 467 (Supreme Court, 1986)

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William Roe v. Shirley S. Chater, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-roe-v-shirley-s-chater-ca8-1996.