NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________
No. 19-3589 _____________
WILLIAM L. RODGERS, Appellant
v.
LINCOLN BENEFIT LIFE COMPANY; ROBERT MARTINI; MARTINI FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC _____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 2-19-cv-00350) District Judge: Honorable Marilyn J. Horan ______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) October 19, 2020 ______________
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: February 5, 2021) ______________
OPINION * ______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
In this case, we must decide whether the District Court erred in granting summary
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. judgment on the ground that Plaintiff William Rodgers failed to file suit within
Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations period. For the reasons set forth below, we will
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 1999, pro se Plaintiff-Appellant William L. Rodgers (“Rodgers”)
purchased a life insurance policy with a face amount of $500,000 issued by Lincoln
Benefit Life Company (“Lincoln Benefit”) from Robert Martini (“Martini”), Rodgers’s
friend and financial advisor. At Martini’s recommendation, Rodgers paid $20,000 to
Lincoln Benefit so that the return on his investment would pay for his life insurance
policy. However, in October 2004, Lincoln Benefit requested an additional premium
payment of $40,000. Martini informed Rodgers that Lincoln Benefit had requested this
payment because the stock market had not produced enough return on his initial
investment to pay for the policy. He also informed Rodgers that Rodgers could pay $600
per month to keep his policy in effect. Rodgers agreed and started making monthly
payments of $600 to Lincoln Benefit.
In April 2016, Rodgers received another payment request from Lincoln Benefit in
the amount of $4,072.14. Martini informed Rodgers that he would now have to pay
$1,241.50 per month to keep the policy in effect and that the cost of the policy would
keep going up. After additional correspondence about Rodgers’s options, Rodgers
elected to stop making payments. On July 6, 2016, Lincoln Benefit informed Rodgers
that his policy would terminate unless he paid $3,958.96.
On February 28, 2019, Rodgers sued Defendants-Appellees Lincoln Benefit,
2 Martini, and Martini Financial Services, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) for negligent
misrepresentation and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law (the “UTPCPL”). Rodgers initially filed suit in state court,
and Defendants removed to the District Court. In his complaint, Rodgers contended that
Defendants provided him with incorrect information about the “actual nature of the
Policy and misrepresented its terms and conditions before Rodgers purchased the Policy.”
Suppl. App. 36. Specifically, he claimed that Defendants first falsely informed him that
his initial $20,000 payment would cover the policy and then falsely informed him that the
monthly $600 payments would be sufficient. He also alleged that Defendants failed to
inform him that the premiums would increase in the future.
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c) on the ground that Rodgers’s claims were barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations. Rodgers then submitted an affidavit and moved to convert
Defendants’ motions to motions for summary judgment. The District Court then granted
Rodgers’s motion to convert and granted Defendants’ motions. This appeal followed.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conduct a plenary review of a district
court’s grant of summary judgment. Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146
(3d Cir. 2016). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We draw all reasonable inferences from the record
3 in favor of the nonmoving party. MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204,
209 (3d Cir. 2005).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that we should affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment because Rodgers’s claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
We agree.
Under Pennsylvania law, a two-year statute of limitations applies to a negligent
misrepresentation claim. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(7). A six-year statute of
limitations applies to a UTPCPL claim. Morse v. Fisher Asset Mgmt., LLC, 206 A.3d
521, 526 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019). “[T]he statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the
right to institute and maintain a suit arises.” Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa.
2005). “It is the duty of the party asserting a cause of action to use all reasonable
diligence to properly inform him-[ ]or herself of the facts and circumstances upon which
the right of recovery is based and to institute suit within the prescribed period.” Gleason
v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011). Pennsylvania law favors “the strict
application of statutes of limitation.” Booher v. Olczak, 797 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2002).
Rodgers purchased his life insurance policy in 1999. Lincoln Benefit’s request for
an additional $40,000 premium payment and Martini’s explanation that the initial
investment was insufficient to maintain the policy put Rodgers on notice that his initial
understanding that his $20,000 payment would fund the policy was incorrect and that
subsequent payments would be required. Thus, it was in 2004 that Rodgers first became
4 aware of the alleged misrepresentations regarding the payments he would have to make
to keep his policy in effect. It was also in 2004 that Rodgers first had the right to institute
and maintain a suit against Defendants. Rodgers, however, did not file suit against
Defendants until February 28, 2019, approximately fifteen years later. Rodgers therefore
did not bring suit within the applicable limitations period.
Rodgers argues that his claims are not time-barred based on the application of
Pennsylvania’s discovery rule. He avers that he did not bring suit because he “took
Martini at his word” due to their personal relationship. Opening Br. 9. He admits that he
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________
No. 19-3589 _____________
WILLIAM L. RODGERS, Appellant
v.
LINCOLN BENEFIT LIFE COMPANY; ROBERT MARTINI; MARTINI FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC _____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 2-19-cv-00350) District Judge: Honorable Marilyn J. Horan ______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) October 19, 2020 ______________
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: February 5, 2021) ______________
OPINION * ______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
In this case, we must decide whether the District Court erred in granting summary
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. judgment on the ground that Plaintiff William Rodgers failed to file suit within
Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations period. For the reasons set forth below, we will
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 1999, pro se Plaintiff-Appellant William L. Rodgers (“Rodgers”)
purchased a life insurance policy with a face amount of $500,000 issued by Lincoln
Benefit Life Company (“Lincoln Benefit”) from Robert Martini (“Martini”), Rodgers’s
friend and financial advisor. At Martini’s recommendation, Rodgers paid $20,000 to
Lincoln Benefit so that the return on his investment would pay for his life insurance
policy. However, in October 2004, Lincoln Benefit requested an additional premium
payment of $40,000. Martini informed Rodgers that Lincoln Benefit had requested this
payment because the stock market had not produced enough return on his initial
investment to pay for the policy. He also informed Rodgers that Rodgers could pay $600
per month to keep his policy in effect. Rodgers agreed and started making monthly
payments of $600 to Lincoln Benefit.
In April 2016, Rodgers received another payment request from Lincoln Benefit in
the amount of $4,072.14. Martini informed Rodgers that he would now have to pay
$1,241.50 per month to keep the policy in effect and that the cost of the policy would
keep going up. After additional correspondence about Rodgers’s options, Rodgers
elected to stop making payments. On July 6, 2016, Lincoln Benefit informed Rodgers
that his policy would terminate unless he paid $3,958.96.
On February 28, 2019, Rodgers sued Defendants-Appellees Lincoln Benefit,
2 Martini, and Martini Financial Services, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) for negligent
misrepresentation and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law (the “UTPCPL”). Rodgers initially filed suit in state court,
and Defendants removed to the District Court. In his complaint, Rodgers contended that
Defendants provided him with incorrect information about the “actual nature of the
Policy and misrepresented its terms and conditions before Rodgers purchased the Policy.”
Suppl. App. 36. Specifically, he claimed that Defendants first falsely informed him that
his initial $20,000 payment would cover the policy and then falsely informed him that the
monthly $600 payments would be sufficient. He also alleged that Defendants failed to
inform him that the premiums would increase in the future.
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c) on the ground that Rodgers’s claims were barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations. Rodgers then submitted an affidavit and moved to convert
Defendants’ motions to motions for summary judgment. The District Court then granted
Rodgers’s motion to convert and granted Defendants’ motions. This appeal followed.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conduct a plenary review of a district
court’s grant of summary judgment. Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146
(3d Cir. 2016). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We draw all reasonable inferences from the record
3 in favor of the nonmoving party. MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204,
209 (3d Cir. 2005).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that we should affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment because Rodgers’s claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
We agree.
Under Pennsylvania law, a two-year statute of limitations applies to a negligent
misrepresentation claim. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(7). A six-year statute of
limitations applies to a UTPCPL claim. Morse v. Fisher Asset Mgmt., LLC, 206 A.3d
521, 526 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019). “[T]he statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the
right to institute and maintain a suit arises.” Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa.
2005). “It is the duty of the party asserting a cause of action to use all reasonable
diligence to properly inform him-[ ]or herself of the facts and circumstances upon which
the right of recovery is based and to institute suit within the prescribed period.” Gleason
v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011). Pennsylvania law favors “the strict
application of statutes of limitation.” Booher v. Olczak, 797 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2002).
Rodgers purchased his life insurance policy in 1999. Lincoln Benefit’s request for
an additional $40,000 premium payment and Martini’s explanation that the initial
investment was insufficient to maintain the policy put Rodgers on notice that his initial
understanding that his $20,000 payment would fund the policy was incorrect and that
subsequent payments would be required. Thus, it was in 2004 that Rodgers first became
4 aware of the alleged misrepresentations regarding the payments he would have to make
to keep his policy in effect. It was also in 2004 that Rodgers first had the right to institute
and maintain a suit against Defendants. Rodgers, however, did not file suit against
Defendants until February 28, 2019, approximately fifteen years later. Rodgers therefore
did not bring suit within the applicable limitations period.
Rodgers argues that his claims are not time-barred based on the application of
Pennsylvania’s discovery rule. He avers that he did not bring suit because he “took
Martini at his word” due to their personal relationship. Opening Br. 9. He admits that he
did not read his insurance policy and “saw no reason to investigate further” when Martini
explained that the market was not performing well enough to cover the operating cost of
his policy payments. Id. at 11-12. Rodgers contends that it was only when he was
conducting legal research for a separate case in 2018 that he learned he had a claim
against Defendants.
The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations where the injured party is unable,
“despite the exercise of due diligence, to know of the injury or its cause.” Pocono Int’l
Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983) (emphasis
omitted). However, “[m]istake, misunderstanding, or lack of knowledge in themselves
do not toll the running of the statute.” Fine, 870 A.2d at 857. Pennsylvania law requires
“reasonable diligence . . . from a party who has been given reason to inform himself of
the facts upon which his right to recovery is premised.” Id. at 858. Reasonable diligence
is an objective test, and “a party’s actions are evaluated to determine whether he
exhibited ‘those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment which
5 society requires of its members for the protection of their own interest and the interest of
others.’” Id. (quoting Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745 A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. 2000)).
Rodgers’s lack of legal knowledge and lack of reasonable diligence in reviewing
his insurance policy do not mean that his injury was “neither known nor reasonably
knowable” before 2018. Id. at 859. To the contrary, it is undisputed that Rodgers learned
of his injury in 2004. As soon as he learned that the initial information provided by
Martini was inaccurate, as confirmed by Martini’s explanation that the initial $20,000
was insufficient to pay for the cost of the policy, Rodgers had reason to investigate
further. The fact that in 2018 he came across legal research suggesting he had a viable
claim does not mean that he was unable to learn of his injury and its cause at an earlier
date.
Rodgers has not alleged that Defendants took any action to prevent him from
learning about the terms of his insurance policy; he has conceded that he simply did not
read it. Nor has Rodgers provided any other persuasive reason for his lack of reasonable
diligence. Rodgers, who graduated from law school, is a sophisticated party who was
able to further investigate at any time. For these reasons, “no two reasonable minds
could differ” that through the exercise of reasonable diligence, Rodgers “knew or should
have known of his . . . injury and its cause during the limitations period.” Gleason, 15
A.3d at 487. The District Court, therefore, did not err in granting summary judgment to
Defendants because the statute of limitations had run before Rodgers filed suit in 2019.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s order.