William Robert Smith v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: April 23, 2025
• Docket: 23-1658
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1658 Filed April 23, 2025

WILLIAM ROBERT SMITH, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John D. Telleen,

Judge.

An applicant for postconviction relief appeals the district court’s denial of his

application. AFFIRMED.

Jesse A. Macro of Macro Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., Buller, J., and Carr,

S.J.* Telleen, S.J., takes no part.

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

CARR, Senior Judge.

William Smith appeals the district court’s denial of his application for

postconviction relief (PCR), arguing the district court erred in denying his

application claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Smith was accused of three first-degree robberies and one first-degree theft

in 2021. He reached a plea agreement with the prosecutor and pled guilty to two

second-degree robberies, reducing his potential sentence from a maximum period

of incarceration of ninety years with a mandatory fifty-five-and-one-half-year

minimum to a maximum sentence of twenty years with a mandatory ten years. The

parties agreed the sentences would run consecutively. The guilty plea contained

a circled paragraph “17” which stated, “the judge can order each sentence to be

served consecutively or concurrently to each other,” with the words “consecutively

or concurrently” being underlined in pen. At his sentencing hearing, after hearing

four witnesses testify seeking lenity, the trial court gave him the agreed-upon

sentence, ordering that the defendant’s two ten-year sentences run consecutively

with each other. The court also imposed the mandatory minimum agreed to as

part of the plea agreement. Smith pursued a direct appeal. By unpublished order

on January 14, 2022, the Iowa Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as frivolous.

Smith applied for PCR in May 2022, arguing (1) trial counsel was ineffective

in failing to inform him concerning the sentencing aspects of his plea agreement,

and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in not speaking up when the district court

stated it would comply “with the plea agreement because I think that’s the least 3

amount of sentence I can provide you.” The district court denied Smith’s

application. He only renews his first argument on appeal.

II. Standard of Review

We review denials of applications for PCR for correction of errors of law, but

our review is de novo when a constitutional claim is asserted. Ledezma v. State,

626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).

III. Discussion

On appeal, Smith argues “trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for

failing to properly advise [him] on his sentencing options pursuant to the plea

agreement.” “In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

a defendant must prove: (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and

(2) prejudice resulted.” State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). We

may affirm dismissal upon the applicant’s failure to prove either ground. Ledezma,

626 N.W.2d at 142. A breach of duty is established when the trial attorney’s

representation “falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Lado v.

State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Iowa 2011).

At the PCR hearing, Smith admitted he knew that “the judge had the option

to run it consecutive or concurrent,” and before us, Smith advances that “trial

counsel failed to properly explain the subtleties of the court having the ultimate

sentencing authority and how that authority relates to a joint sentencing

recommendation pursuant to a plea agreement.”

The record before us belies Smith’s argument related to an alleged breach

by trial counsel. Trial counsel recalled specifically explaining to Smith the interplay

between the sentence he agreed to and the generic paragraph seventeen in the 4

plea of guilty document. He told Smith the chance of the court to give concurrent

time was “an extremely unlikely situation to happen.” Smith’s allocution before his

sentence was imposed demonstrated a clear understanding of the court’s options.

The plea agreement was binding on the district court if it accepted the

agreement. There was a legal, but very unlikely possibility that the court would

make the sentences concurrent instead of the consecutive sentences they had

agreed to, as permitted by rule 2.10(3)(a). All of this was explained to Smith. As

such, his trial counsel breached no duty in advising him. In the absence of a

breach of duty, we must affirm.

AFFIRMED.