William Richard Dickson v. Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America, et al.

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5

9 Wiliam Richard Dickson, No. CV-23-01906-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 On October 13, 2025, Defendant Travelers Property Casualty Company of America1 16 (“Defendant”) filed a Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. 65). Plaintiff William Richard 17 Dickson (“Plaintiff”) did not file a response. As a result, Defendant filed a Motion for 18 Summary Disposition (Doc. 66) on December 15, 2025, requesting that its Motion for 19 Attorney Fees be summarily granted under LRCiv. 7.2(i). Plaintiff likewise did not file a 20 response to this Motion. 21 Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i) provides: 22 If a motion does not conform in all substantial respects with the requirements of this Local Rule, or if the unrepresented party or counsel does not serve 23 and file the required answering memoranda, or if the unrepresented party or 24 counsel fails to appear at the time and place assigned for oral argument, such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the 25 motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily. 26 LRCiv. 7.2(i). While the Court agrees that Defendant’s Motion can be summarily decided 27 given Plaintiff’s lack of response, it will briefly address a few points.

28 1 Defendant Travelers Property Casualty Company of America was erroneously named “Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America.” 1 Defendant seeks attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Under Arizona law, a trial 2 court may grant a discretionary award of attorney fees to a prevailing party “[i]n any 3 contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied.” A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A); see 4 Assoc. Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (explaining 5 the “broad discretion of the trial court” to award attorney fees under § 12-341.01(A)). To 6 recover attorney fees under § 12-341.01(A), “(1) the moving party must be ‘the successful 7 party,’ and (2) the action must ‘aris[e] out of a contract.’ ” Rindlisbacher v. Steinway & 8 Sons Inc., 2021 WL 2434207, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2021) (quoting § 12-341.01(A)). 9 Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant arise out the insurance policy Plaintiff 10 maintained with Defendant. Defendant successfully moved for partial summary judgment 11 on Plaintiff’s Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing claim as well 12 as Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. (See Doc. 61). And Plaintiff’s remaining claims 13 were later dismissed for failure to prosecute. (See Doc. 64). Based on these outcomes, 14 Defendant is the prevailing party. See Vasquez v. Ameriprise Ins. Co., 2022 WL 801715, 15 at *2 (D. Ariz. 2022) (“[Defendant] was successful in achieving full relief against 16 [Plaintiff] following the Court’s ruling on [Defendant’s] summary judgment and is thus 17 entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01.”); Harris v. Reserve 18 Life Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (“We have held that when a 19 plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to prosecute, the defendant 20 may be considered the successful party for purposes of recovering costs pursuant to A.R.S. 21 § 12–341.”). Moreover, Defendant established that all six of the factors considered in 22 awarding fees under § 12-341.01 militate in its favor (see Doc. 65 at 5–9), and Plaintiff 23 failed to refute any of Defendant’s assertions. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant is 24 entitled to fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). 25 Once entitlement to fees is established, “the burden then shifts to the party 26 challenging the fees to show that the fees are unreasonable.” Best Western Intern., Inc. v. 27 Patel, 2008 WL 544820, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2008). Defendants properly submitted itemized 28 billing lists from its counsel. (See Doc. 65-2). It was then incumbent upon Plaintiff to 1 || object to the reasonableness of the rates or hours worked. Plaintiff failed to raise any such □□ objection. Thus, the Court finds that Defendant’s counsels’ rates and time worked were 3 || reasonable. 4 In sum and pursuant to LRCiv. 7.2(1), the Court finds that Defendant’s requested 5|| fees of $88,938.00? and costs in the amount of $5,024.60 are reasonable and that Defendant 6|| is entitled to these amounts under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). 7 Accordingly, 8 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. 65) and Motion 9|| for Summary Disposition (Doc. 66) are GRANTED. Plaintiff shall pay Defendant || attorney fees in the amount of $88,938.00 and costs in the amount of $5,024.60. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of 12 || Defendant accordingly. 13 Dated this 4th day of May, 2026. 14 15 fe □□ 16 norable'Diang/. Hunfetewa 7 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26|| 2 The Court recognizes that Defendant requested $88,948.00 in attorney fees. Defendant noted that its total fees incurred were $105,444.00, and it subtracted $20,011.00 from this 27 amount in light of the fees already awarded to Defendant Brown. (See Doc. 65-1 □□□ 16). 28 ete what the "$3,505.00 nies ton bropatne ‘the Motion for Attorne □□□□ is added, the final total fees are $88,938.00, not $88,948.00. _3-