William R. Heady v. Brenda Sue Wilcox-Heady
This text of William R. Heady v. Brenda Sue Wilcox-Heady (William R. Heady v. Brenda Sue Wilcox-Heady) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RENDERED: JANUARY 24, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0207-ME
WILLIAM R. HEADY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE KIMBERLY WINKENHOFER SHUMATE, SPECIAL JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-D-00021-001
BRENDA SUE WILCOX-HEADY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: William Heady brings this appeal from a February 5, 2024,
domestic violence order of protection (DVO) entered by the Hardin Family Court.1
We affirm.
1 Brenda Sue Wilcox-Heady filed a petition for order of protection in the Hardin Circuit Court, Family Court Division. As both family court judges recused, District Judge Kimberly Winkenhofer Shumate was appointed as special judge to preside over the matter by order entered January 22, 2024. On January 10, 2024, Brenda Sue Wilcox-Heady filed a petition for
order of protection in the family court against her husband William Heady. The
parties had been married for over fifty-five years and Brenda was seventy-six years
of age. In the petition, Brenda alleged:
I fear for my life, [William] has threatened[,] abused and beaten me over the course of the last 56 [years]. I left 3 months ago after refusing to sign the [sale] agreement of our business, for fear [William] would hurt me. I have been in Naples, Florida[,] trying to get away from him. But I am tired of being away from my home, family, and friends. I need this order of protection so I can continue my life.
The family court entered an emergency order of protection (EPO) on
behalf of Brenda on January 10, 2024. A hearing on the petition was subsequently
conducted on February 5, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, the family court
found that an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse had occurred and may
again occur. By order entered February 5, 2024, a domestic violence order (DVO)
was issued for a period of one year. This appeal follows.
William contends the family court erred by finding that an act or acts
of domestic violence had occurred and may occur again. More particularly,
William asserts that “[a] threat to put another individual in a mental health
institution, even if made, is not domestic violence as defined by [Kentucky
Revised Statutes] KRS 403.720.” William’s Brief at 6.
-2- Domestic violence in Kentucky is governed by KRS Chapter 403,
which provides that the trial court may enter a DVO “if a court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and
may again occur.” KRS 403.740(1). “Domestic violence and abuse” is defined as:
Physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, strangulation, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, strangulation, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried couple[.]
KRS 403.720(2)(a). And, “[t]he preponderance of the evidence standard is met
when sufficient evidence establishes that the alleged victim ‘was more likely than
not to have been a victim of domestic violence.’” Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385,
387 (Ky. App. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278
(Ky. 1996)).
Our review of a family court’s decision to grant or deny a DVO “is
not whether we would have decided it differently, but whether the court’s findings
were clearly erroneous or that it abused its discretion.” Gomez v. Gomez, 254
S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008). Because the family court is in the best position
to judge the credibility of the witnesses and evidence, we will not substitute our
opinion for that of the family court with regard to the weight given to certain
evidence, including the testimony of witnesses. Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 52.01; B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 219-20 (Ky. App. 2005).
-3- In the case sub judice, Brenda testified at the hearing that during their
entire marriage, until William’s recent cancer diagnosis, William had been abusive
toward her. Brenda specifically testified that William had engaged in the
following abusive behaviors: “knocking me down,” “slapping me around,”
“getting me on the floor and kind of pummel[ing] me” and “dragging me around
by the hair of my head.” These acts clearly constitute acts of domestic violence
pursuant to KRS 403.720.
Brenda further testified that in the fall of 2023, William repeatedly
requested that she sign a sale agreement for the parties’ business. Brenda believed
the business needed to be appraised before she could agree to a sale price. When
Brenda refused to sign the sale agreement without an appraisal, William became
very aggressive. William specifically told Brenda that she would sign it or she
would be sorry. Brenda further asserted that William threatened to have her
involuntarily committed to a mental institution if she did not sign the sales
agreement. As a result of William’s threat, and in light of William’s past abusive
behavior, Brenda was fearful of William’s threat to have her put in a mental
institution. Brenda testified that she was “scared to death” by William’s threat.
William, on the other hand, testified that there had only been two incidents of
violence during their marriage like those described by Brenda. By so testifying,
William acknowledged that he had engaged in acts of domestic violence against
-4- Brenda. Again, as the family court was in the best position to judge the credibility
of the witness, we will not substitute our opinion for that of the trial court with
regard to weight given to their testimony. See CR 52.01; B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d
213, 219-20 (Ky. App. 2005). Accordingly, we believe there was sufficient
evidence to support the family court’s finding that an act or acts of domestic
violence have occurred and may occur again. Therefore, we are of the opinion that
the family court did not err by entry of the DVO against William.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Hardin Family Court
entered February 5, 2024, is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeremy S. Aldridge Phyllis K. Lonneman Elizabethtown, Kentucky Elizabethtown, Kentucky
-5-
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