William Norrie v. Coastline Ventures, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 23, 2024
• Docket: 23-55428
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 23 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM ROBERT NORRIE, No. 23-55428

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-04130-JFW-PVC

v. MEMORANDUM * COASTLINE VENTURES, LLC; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 16, 2024**

Before: SILVERMAN, R. NELSON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

William Robert Norrie appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60

challenging bankruptcy proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Appling v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Norrie’s claims

against Coastline Ventures, LLC because Norrie failed to allege facts sufficient to

show that Coastline engaged in misconduct that harmed the integrity of the judicial

process. See id. (explaining the basis for an independent action to set aside a

judgment for fraud on the court).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Norrie’s claims

against the United States because those claims are barred by sovereign immunity.

See Balser v. Dep’t of Just., Off. of the U.S. Tr., 327 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003)

(explaining that the “United States . . . is immune from suit unless it has waived its

immunity”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Norrie’s

complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile.

See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir.

2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave

to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by setting aside the entry of

2 23-55428 default against the United States because this ruling was supported by good cause.

See Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000) (standard of review);

Mendoza v. Wight Vineyard Mgmt., 783 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A decision

on a motion to set aside a default is not an abuse of discretion unless the [district]

court is ‘clearly wrong’ in its determination . . . .”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Norrie’s motion for

default judgment in light of the lack of merit of the substantive claim, the

insufficiency of the complaint, the amount of money at stake, and the possibility

that defendants would dispute the material facts. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d

1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (providing the standard of review and setting forth

factors that courts may consider in determining whether to enter default judgment).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Norrie’s motion for

reconsideration because Norrie failed to set forth any basis for relief. See Sch.

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th

Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and bases for reconsideration).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

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