William Merryman v. Town of Orange Park

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: March 25, 2026
• Docket: 25-13654
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13654 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 1 of 3

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13654 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

WILLIAM GREGORY MERRYMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus

TOWN OF ORANGE PARK, WILLIAM WHITSON, RANDY ANDERSON, WINNETTE SANDLIN, GLEN TAYLOR, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:25-cv-00730-MMH-MCR ____________________

Before BRANCH, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. USCA11 Case: 25-13654 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 25-13654

PER CURIAM: William Merryman, pro se, appeals from the district court’s September 17, 2025 order denying several of his motions, including a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and two mo- tions for clarification. He also appeals from the court’s October 6, 2025 order denying his request to submit filings electronically. We lack jurisdiction over Merryman’s appeal because the designated orders are not final or otherwise appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (providing that appellate jurisdiction is generally lim- ited to “final decisions of the district courts”); id. § 1292 (providing that appellate jurisdiction includes specific interlocutory orders made appealable by statue or jurisprudential exception). First, the orders are not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because they did not end the litigation on the merits, as Merryman’s complaint re- mains pending in the district court. See Acheron Cap., Ltd. v. Muk- amal, 22 F.4th 979, 986 (11th Cir. 2022) (providing that an appeala- ble final order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute its judgment). Additionally, these interlocutory orders are not appealable under the collateral order doctrine because they are not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Plaintiff A v. Schair, 744 F.3d 1247, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a ruling that does not con- clude the litigation may be appealed under the collateral order doc- trine if, among other things, it would effectively be unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment). USCA11 Case: 25-13654 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 3 of 3

25-13654 Opinion of the Court 3

Furthermore, the portion of the September 17, 2025 order denying Merryman’s motion for a TRO is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because it did not deny a request for injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1472 (11th Cir. 1986) (providing that the denial of a TRO is not ap- pealable). Merryman explicitly sought a TRO, there was no notice or hearing associated with the injunctive relief, and there was no indication that the court’s denial of Merryman’s motion resulted in irreparable harm. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1) (providing that a dis- trict court “may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party”); AT&T Broadband v. Tech Commc’ns, Inc., 381 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a TRO may be ap- pealable under § 1292(a)(1) if, among other things, “the notice and hearing sought or afforded suggest that the relief sought was a pre- liminary injunction”); Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the denial of a TRO may be immediately ap- pealable if it could have a serious or irreparable consequence). Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction.