IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
WILLIAM LITTLES,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D22-944 LT Case No. 2019-CF-001894-A
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed February 7, 2023
Appeal from Circuit Court for Seminole County, Melanie Chase, Judge.
Robert R. Berry, of Law Office of Robert R. Berry, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
MAKAR, J. At issue is whether an officer’s mistaken belief that he was in a left-turn
lane, which led to the invalid traffic stop in this case, was objectively
reasonable under the specific circumstances presented.
In the predawn hours, William Littles was driving a rented car
southbound on Ronald Reagan Boulevard near Lake Mary, Florida, when he
stopped at a traffic signal at the intersection with US-17. Both roadways
consist of multiple lanes. At the same time, Deputy Jonathan Jusino was on
his way to grab morning coffee at a Wawa store located adjacent to the
intersection. The officer regularly patrols this area and was familiar with the
intersection.
The officer stopped at the red light behind Littles. When the traffic
signals for the two left-turn lanes changed to green, Littles—who was in the
thru lane and had not engaged his car’s left-turn signal—did not move. The
officer did not honk at Littles or otherwise try to prod Littles to proceed while
the left-turn signals were operative.
After the left-turn signals cycled back to red, the traffic signals for the
thru lanes turned green. Littles then proceeded through the intersection in a
lawful manner. Deputy Jusino followed Littles through the intersection and
initiated a traffic stop based on his belief that Littles had changed lanes from
a left-turn lane to the thru lane in the intersection itself. During the
2 interchange with Littles, the officer contended that Littles had been stopped
in the rightward most of the two left-turn lanes at the intersection; Littles
insisted that the officer was mistaken, and that he was in the thru lane.
Littles’s vehicle was subsequently subjected to a K-9 search an hour later
that resulted in the discovery of illegal drugs.
Littles moved to suppress the evidence that was discovered,
contending that the traffic stop was unlawful. An evidentiary hearing was held
at which the officer and Littles testified. Video taken from dashcams of the
officer’s vehicle as well as a backup officer’s vehicle were admitted and
shown; Littles was also allowed to admit videos he had taken within a few
days of the incident. In its written order, the trial court concluded that Littles
“was not in a turn lane and therefore could not have missed a green-lighted
turn cycle and did not illegally change lanes in the intersection.” The trial
court, however, concluded that the intersection was “confusing” due to
nearby construction and that “different visual angles produce[d] different
appearances.” On this basis, and though it found the question an
exceedingly close one, the trial judge ruled that the officer’s mistake was an
objectively reasonable one and thereby denied the motion to suppress.
Review of the trial court’s ruling is twofold; we defer to the trial court’s
factual findings if supported by competent substantial evidence, but we
3 independently determine whether the trial court’s legal conclusion is
sustainable. State v. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d 116, 119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).
“However, to the extent that the trial court’s findings are based on viewing
[video evidence], which this court of course has also viewed, we utilize a
much less deferential standard.” Black v. State, 59 So. 3d 340, 344 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2011); see State v. Thornton, 286 So. 3d 924, 927 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)
(citing Black). Applying these standards, we agree with the trial court that the
officer was mistaken in his belief that Littles was in a left-turn lane, but we
disagree that the mistake was objectively reasonable under the specific
circumstances of this case.
As to the officer’s mistaken view, the entirety of the evidence clearly
demonstrates, as the trial court concluded, that Littles was in a thru lane, not
a left-turn lane. The evidence also clearly shows that Littles did nothing illegal
at the intersection or while proceeding through it. The officer’s subjective
view, that he and Littles were in a left-turn lane, was demonstrably incorrect;
unclear is why the officer persisted in his view despite the clearly
contradictory evidence. In any event, an officer’s subjective view is not
relevant where the evidentiary record demonstrates it is untenable. As a
factual matter, the entire record unequivocally establishes that Littles was in
4 the thru lane and did nothing wrong as his car moved through the
Next is whether the officer’s mistake was objectively reasonable under
the circumstances. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d at 119 (“An officer’s mistake of fact
may provide the objective basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause
under the Fourth Amendment because of the intensely fact-sensitive nature
of reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations.”); see also
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). The reason that
deference is given to officers in the field for mistakes of fact is due to the
difficult and dangerous situations they encounter, which often require snap
judgments. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987) (“[T]he Court has
also recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are
made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and
executing search warrants.”). Police officers are people, and people make
mistakes all the time. That said, mistaken beliefs are not automatically
forgiven simply because officers are human and make mistakes; if that were
the standard, all mistakes would be overlooked and there would be little
reason to exercise care and avoid misjudgments. For this reason, courts give
leeway to allow for mistakes, provided they are objectively reasonable.
Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (“Because many situations which
5 confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly
to their conclusions of probability.”).
The analytical focus is whether an objectively reasonable basis exists
for the officer’s mistaken belief, which is determined on a case-by-case
basis. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d at 119 (“[A]n officer’s mistake of fact does not
necessarily render his actions unreasonable, because what is reasonable
will be dependent on the specific circumstances presented by each case.”).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
WILLIAM LITTLES,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D22-944 LT Case No. 2019-CF-001894-A
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed February 7, 2023
Appeal from Circuit Court for Seminole County, Melanie Chase, Judge.
Robert R. Berry, of Law Office of Robert R. Berry, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
MAKAR, J. At issue is whether an officer’s mistaken belief that he was in a left-turn
lane, which led to the invalid traffic stop in this case, was objectively
reasonable under the specific circumstances presented.
In the predawn hours, William Littles was driving a rented car
southbound on Ronald Reagan Boulevard near Lake Mary, Florida, when he
stopped at a traffic signal at the intersection with US-17. Both roadways
consist of multiple lanes. At the same time, Deputy Jonathan Jusino was on
his way to grab morning coffee at a Wawa store located adjacent to the
intersection. The officer regularly patrols this area and was familiar with the
intersection.
The officer stopped at the red light behind Littles. When the traffic
signals for the two left-turn lanes changed to green, Littles—who was in the
thru lane and had not engaged his car’s left-turn signal—did not move. The
officer did not honk at Littles or otherwise try to prod Littles to proceed while
the left-turn signals were operative.
After the left-turn signals cycled back to red, the traffic signals for the
thru lanes turned green. Littles then proceeded through the intersection in a
lawful manner. Deputy Jusino followed Littles through the intersection and
initiated a traffic stop based on his belief that Littles had changed lanes from
a left-turn lane to the thru lane in the intersection itself. During the
2 interchange with Littles, the officer contended that Littles had been stopped
in the rightward most of the two left-turn lanes at the intersection; Littles
insisted that the officer was mistaken, and that he was in the thru lane.
Littles’s vehicle was subsequently subjected to a K-9 search an hour later
that resulted in the discovery of illegal drugs.
Littles moved to suppress the evidence that was discovered,
contending that the traffic stop was unlawful. An evidentiary hearing was held
at which the officer and Littles testified. Video taken from dashcams of the
officer’s vehicle as well as a backup officer’s vehicle were admitted and
shown; Littles was also allowed to admit videos he had taken within a few
days of the incident. In its written order, the trial court concluded that Littles
“was not in a turn lane and therefore could not have missed a green-lighted
turn cycle and did not illegally change lanes in the intersection.” The trial
court, however, concluded that the intersection was “confusing” due to
nearby construction and that “different visual angles produce[d] different
appearances.” On this basis, and though it found the question an
exceedingly close one, the trial judge ruled that the officer’s mistake was an
objectively reasonable one and thereby denied the motion to suppress.
Review of the trial court’s ruling is twofold; we defer to the trial court’s
factual findings if supported by competent substantial evidence, but we
3 independently determine whether the trial court’s legal conclusion is
sustainable. State v. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d 116, 119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).
“However, to the extent that the trial court’s findings are based on viewing
[video evidence], which this court of course has also viewed, we utilize a
much less deferential standard.” Black v. State, 59 So. 3d 340, 344 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2011); see State v. Thornton, 286 So. 3d 924, 927 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)
(citing Black). Applying these standards, we agree with the trial court that the
officer was mistaken in his belief that Littles was in a left-turn lane, but we
disagree that the mistake was objectively reasonable under the specific
circumstances of this case.
As to the officer’s mistaken view, the entirety of the evidence clearly
demonstrates, as the trial court concluded, that Littles was in a thru lane, not
a left-turn lane. The evidence also clearly shows that Littles did nothing illegal
at the intersection or while proceeding through it. The officer’s subjective
view, that he and Littles were in a left-turn lane, was demonstrably incorrect;
unclear is why the officer persisted in his view despite the clearly
contradictory evidence. In any event, an officer’s subjective view is not
relevant where the evidentiary record demonstrates it is untenable. As a
factual matter, the entire record unequivocally establishes that Littles was in
4 the thru lane and did nothing wrong as his car moved through the
Next is whether the officer’s mistake was objectively reasonable under
the circumstances. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d at 119 (“An officer’s mistake of fact
may provide the objective basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause
under the Fourth Amendment because of the intensely fact-sensitive nature
of reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations.”); see also
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). The reason that
deference is given to officers in the field for mistakes of fact is due to the
difficult and dangerous situations they encounter, which often require snap
judgments. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987) (“[T]he Court has
also recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are
made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and
executing search warrants.”). Police officers are people, and people make
mistakes all the time. That said, mistaken beliefs are not automatically
forgiven simply because officers are human and make mistakes; if that were
the standard, all mistakes would be overlooked and there would be little
reason to exercise care and avoid misjudgments. For this reason, courts give
leeway to allow for mistakes, provided they are objectively reasonable.
Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (“Because many situations which
5 confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly
to their conclusions of probability.”).
The analytical focus is whether an objectively reasonable basis exists
for the officer’s mistaken belief, which is determined on a case-by-case
basis. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d at 119 (“[A]n officer’s mistake of fact does not
necessarily render his actions unreasonable, because what is reasonable
will be dependent on the specific circumstances presented by each case.”).
The “principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause will be . . . viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer[.]” Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 696 (1996)).
To begin, nothing about the intersection would confuse an objectively
reasonable person,1 let alone an officer with knowledge of the local roadways
and conditions. The intersection’s signaling had standard left-turn/thru lane
signals; the markings for the lanes and the turn arrows on the roadway
1 Using the definition of a “reasonable person,” and interlineating “officer” for “person,” a “reasonable officer” is an “[officer] who exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgement that society requires of its [officers] for the protection of their own and of other’s interests.” Reasonable Person, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
6 surface were unmistakably defined and visible. Two dedicated lanes for left-
hand turns only onto US-17, each with its own turn signal, were adjacent to
the thru lane; the officer was familiar with these turn lanes as he explained
how they facilitate a right-hand turn into the Wawa located immediately after
the intersection.
The construction at the intersection was in no way a basis for confusion
as to which lanes turn left and which lanes go through the intersection. The
lanes themselves were not under construction or altered in their
configuration in any way; and the traffic control barrels in the median did not
alter the intersection’s laneage or visibility. That the intersection had nearby
construction does not diminish the clarity of the intersection’s lane markings
and signaling at issue at the time of the stop; plus, the officer’s testimony
demonstrated his knowledge of the intersection’s configuration (“That’s my
zone. That’s my area.”). An objectively reasonable police officer, at a
minimum, should know and be aware of the traffic lane in which his vehicle
is traveling, particularly in the absence of factors demonstrating a basis for
error such as poor visibility, a lack of roadway or lane markings, or confusing
signage or signaling; none of these factors is present.
Three additional factors provide support. First, the officer’s insistence
that he was in a left-turn lane, despite all other evidence to the contrary, is
7 not given weight on the scales of objective reasonableness. The subjective
view or motivations of an officer are “irrelevant” in making the legal
assessment of whether an objectively reasonable basis exists for an officer’s
mistake. Ivory v. State, 898 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Second,
the decision to stop Littles was not a split-second, life or death one; nor did
it involve the operation of vehicles at high speeds or dangerous conditions.
Instead, it involved a stopped vehicle at a well-marked intersection with
routine laneage and signaling that the officer was familiar with and had
previously traversed. Third, the officer did nothing when Littles failed to move
when the left-turn signals became green; a motorist who is in a left-turn lane
and fails to heed a turn signal typically is met with a honk of the horn, a flash
of the headlights, or some other immediate means of hastening movement
(who likes to sit needlessly through another cycle of traffic lights?). None of
that occurred.
The trial court “grappled with the issue [of objective reasonableness]
for hours” based on its review of the videos, concluding that the traffic
intersection was confusing due to construction and the different angles in the
videos. As just discussed, nothing in the videos (or testimony) established
that the construction was a basis for confusion about the laneage or signaling
at the intersection; nor are the different angles of the videos relevant in this
8 regard because of the clarity of the intersection’s configuration. In light of the
lesser deference given to trial court’s findings based on video evidence, the
conclusion that the intersection was confusing and that the officer’s mistake
was reasonable is not sustainable. The legal conclusion that the officer’s
mistake was an objectively reasonable one under the circumstances of this
case is erroneous for the reasons previously discussed.
Because the officer’s mistake of fact was not objectively reasonable, the
traffic stop was improper from the outset, making it unnecessary to address
issues related to what occurred thereafter.
REVERSED.
EVANDER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.