William Lee Anderson, I v. Brittany Gross, et al.
This text of William Lee Anderson, I v. Brittany Gross, et al. (William Lee Anderson, I v. Brittany Gross, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
CLERE’S OFFICE U.S. DIST. Cc AT HARRISONBURG, VA FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT May 18. 2026 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA “ ROANOKE DIVISION LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLE] BY: S/J.Vasquez WILLIAM LEE ANDERSON, I, ) DEPUTY CLERK ) Plaintiff, ) Case No. 7:26-cv-00386 ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION } BRITTANY GROSS, ¢ a/, ) By: | Hon. Thomas T. Cullen ) United States District Judge Defendants. )
Plainuff William Lee, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil-rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against several Defendants employed at the Pocahontas State Correctional Center and River North Correctional Center. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee before filing his complaint and instead appears to be seeking leave to proceed with this action 7m forma pauperis. Under the “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (‘PLRA”), a prisoner may not bring a civil action without prepayment of fees, even upon meeting the i forma pauperis requirements, “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brough an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). From the court’s review, Plaintiff has had more than three cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim while incarcerated, including: (1) Anderson v. Woolf, Case No. 7:15-cv-00110 (W.D. Va.) (dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1));
(ii) Anderson v. Lowe, Case No. 7:15-cv-00111 (W.D. Va.) (dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); (iii) Anderson v. Barker, Case No. 7:15-cv-00112 (W.D. Va.) (dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); Because Plaintiff has three “strikes” under § 1915(g), he is only eligible to proceed without prepaying the filing fee if he demonstrates that he “is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This exception to the three-strikes rule “allows a very narrow class of prisoner claims to bypass the ‘three[-]strikes’ rule.” Meyers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 801 F. App’x 90, 95 (4th Cir. 2020). Importantly, “the requisite imminent danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint or the risk that the conduct complained of [must] threaten[] continuing or future injury . . . .” Chase v. O’Malley, 466 F.
App’x 185, 186 (4th Cir. 2012). When a prisoner has three or more strikes and does not show imminent danger, he or she must pay the full filing fee in order to proceed with his or her claims. See Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 407–08 (4th Cir. 2006). Here, Plaintiff’s filings do not show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical harm; his allegations concern only past danger, which occurred at facilities where he is no
longer housed. (See Compl. 2–3 (stating that this action took place at Pocahontas State Correctional Center but that he has since been transferred to Wallens Ridge State Prison).) “[S]omeone whose danger has passed cannot reasonably be described as someone who ‘is’ in ‘imminent’ danger.” Hall v. United States, 44 F.4th 218, 224 (4th Cir. 2022). Although “past danger or past threats of danger may be considered in evaluating whether the danger is imminent at the time of filing . . ., past allegations of danger or threats of harm on their own are
insufficient to satisfy the exception.” Id. (citing Chase, 466 F. App’x at 186) (emphasis in original). Absent specific factual allegations showing that a threat to a plaintiff’s health or safety persists in the present, a prisoner cannot rely on the exception to the three-strikes rule. See Smith v. Stirling, No. 9:20-2359-TMC-MHC, 2020 WL 8713675, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2020)
(citing Johnson v. Warner, 200 F. App’x 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff’s complaint lacks the necessary factual allegations to show that any threat of harm persists in the present. (See Compl. 2–3.) He offers no indication that he perceives any present threat to his safety or wellbeing at the hands of Defendants where he is currently housed. For this reason, Plaintiff is not eligible for the exception to § 1915(g)’s three-strikes provision and cannot proceed with this action without first paying the full filing fee. The court
will therefore deny Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and will order that he pay the full filing fee within 30 days to proceed with his claims in this action. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying Order to Plaintiff. ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2026. /s/ Thomas T. Cullen HON. THOMAS T. CULLEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
William Lee Anderson, I v. Brittany Gross, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-lee-anderson-i-v-brittany-gross-et-al-vawd-2026.