William L. Wright v. Shannon Garrigan, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 WILLIAM L. WRIGHT, Case No. 24-cv-07278-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE RENEWED REQUEST 9 v. FOR RECONSIDERATION

10 SHANNON GARRIGAN, et al., Re: ECF No. 15 Defendants. 11

12 13 Plaintiff has filed this pro se action, which the Court dismissed for failure to state a 14 cognizable claim for relief. ECF No. 10. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the 15 renewed request for reconsideration of the dismissal. ECF No. 15. 16 DISCUSSION 17 I. Background 18 In this action, Plaintiff sued San Quentin State Prison physician Shannon Garrigan and San 19 Joaquin General Hospital doctor John Dowbak. Plaintiff alleged that the medical treatment 20 provided by Defendants for his right hand and wrist between January 27, 2023 to November 7, 21 2023 violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on deliberate indifference to an inmate’s 22 serious medical needs. The Court dismissed the initial complaint with leave to amend because the 23 medical treatment detailed in the initial complaint contradicted the claim that Defendants routinely 24 delayed medical treatment or disregarded the ligament tear in Plaintiff’s right hand:

25 The complaint’s allegations indicate that Defendants provided Plaintiff with surgery, physical therapy, multiple diagnostic tests, and 26 a second consult over a ten-month period; and treatment was generally provided within two to three weeks of Plaintiff’s requests. 27 While the treatment provided thus far has not addressed Plaintiff’s ongoing medical need is the result of Defendants’ failure to take 1 reasonable steps to address Plaintiff’s medical needs. The complaint therefore fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim. 2 Because it appears that Plaintiff can correct the above deficiencies, 3 the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court 4 should grant leave to amend unless pleading could not possibly be cured by allegation of other facts). In preparing an amended 5 complaint, Plaintiff should identify why the medical treatment provided by Defendants was unreasonable and how Defendants knew 6 the treatment to be unreasonable. Plaintiff is reminded that neither a difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical 7 authorities regarding medical treatment, nor a difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over another, 8 states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. 9 ECF No. 5 at 8. The Court identified the deficiencies in the initial complaint and provided 10 Plaintiff with guidance regarding the applicable legal principles. ECF No. 5. 11 The amended complaint mostly repeated the initial complaint with some slight changes, 12 none of which addressed the deficiencies identified by the Court:

13 The amended complaint does not address the deficiencies identified by the Court. The additional allegations in the amended complaint 14 are that Plaintiff’s thumb was deformed following the surgery; that Plaintiff lost all mobility following the surgery; that defendant 15 Dowbak appeared to have confused Plaintiff with a different inmate- patient at the April 18, 2023 appointment; and that Plaintiff informed 16 defendant Garrigan that he could not trust defendant Dowbak to provide competent care given his actions at the April 18, 2023 17 appointment. The amended complaint again fails to clarify what reasonable steps Defendants failed to take, and how the treatment 18 provided disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. There is no allegation that Defendants were aware that the January 19 27, 2023 surgery would cause injury to Plaintiff, and the subsequent diagnostic tests state that the surgery did not cause injury to Plaintiff. 20 Plaintiff appears to be alleging that the diagnostic tests are either wrong or were inaccurately read by Defendants and other prison 21 medical staff. But it remains unclear what the diagnostic tests should be showing and how Plaintiff knows that the diagnostic tests are 22 incorrect or being read inaccurately. It appears that Plaintiff believes that his right thumb’s current condition was caused by defendant 23 Dowbak and that defendants Dowbak and Garrigan’s medical treatment thus far has failed to fix the condition. However, at best, 24 this states a claim for state-law negligence. An Eighth Amendment violation requires more than negligence. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 25 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2004). In order for deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a purposeful act or failure 26 to act on the part of the defendant and resulting harm. See Simmons v. G. Arnett, 47 F.4th 927, 935 (9th Cir. 2022). “Under this standard, 27 an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care[ and] 1 ECF No. 10 at 5-6. On July 30, 2025, the Court dismissed the action with prejudice in a detailed 2 order based on the repeated failure to state a claim. ECF No. 10. 3 Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Court should vacate the order 4 of dismissal because the failure to state a cognizable claim was due to his reliance on an 5 “incompetent jailhouse lawyer” who failed to address the deficiencies identified by the Court 6 when drafting the amended complaint. ECF No. 12. The Court denied the motion for 7 reconsideration because Plaintiff had not provided newly discovered evidence that justified 8 vacating the dismissal; because he had not demonstrated that the Court had committed clear error 9 in dismissing the action with prejudice or that the dismissal with prejudice was manifestly unjust; 10 and because there was no intervening change in controlling law that required vacating the 11 dismissal. The Court noted that it was unclear what facts could be alleged that would state a 12 cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. The Court’s denial of the reconsideration motion was 13 without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a renewed motion for reconsideration, accompanied by a 14 proposed second amended complaint so that the Court could evaluate whether Plaintiff could state 15 a cognizable claim. ECF No. 14. 16 Plaintiff has now filed a renewed motion for reconsideration, accompanied by a proposed 17 second amended complaint. ECF No. 15. 18 II. Motion for Reconsideration 19 A. Legal Standard 20 Where the court’s ruling has resulted in a final judgment or order (e.g., after dismissal or 21 summary judgment motion), a motion for reconsideration may be based either on Rule 59(e) 22 (motion to alter or amend judgment) or Rule 60(b) (motion for relief from judgment) of the 23 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 24 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). The denial of a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is 25 construed as a denial of relief under Rule 60(b). See McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 26 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (en banc). “Reconsideration is appropriate if the district 27 court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial 1 Dist. No. 1K, Multnomah Cty, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion 2 for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when 3 they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of 4 Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 5 B. Analysis 6 Plaintiff argues that the Court committed clear error in dismissing the action with prejudice 7 because dismissal with prejudice is an extreme measure where the action was filed pro se and 8 involves complex medical treatment, malpractice issues, state tort law, and federal jurisdiction, 9 and where there had only been one opportunity to amend. Plaintiff cites to various out-of-circuit 10 cases for support for these arguments. ECF No. 15 at 1-3. Plaintiff has also filed a proposed 11 second amended complaint that he states cures the deficiencies identified by the Court. ECF No. 12 15 at 5-16. 13 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s renewed request for reconsideration because he has not 14 demonstrated that the Court committed clear error in dismissing the amended complaint for failure 15 to state a claim or in dismissing the action with prejudice. The Court did not commit clear error in 16 dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice because, despite being given notice of the 17 substantive problems with the complaint and granted leave to amend, Plaintiff’s amended 18 complaint mostly repeated the Court’s summary of the initial complaint with some slight changes, 19 none of which addressed the deficiencies identified by the Court. Compare ECF No. 1 with ECF 20 No. 9; see also ECF No. 10; Simon v. Value Behav. Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir.), 21 amended, 234 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2000), and overruled by Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541 22 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal without leave to amend where plaintiff failed to correct 23 deficiencies in complaint after being given notice of substantive problems). In addition, the 24 proposed second amended complaint attached to the motion for reconsideration again fails to 25 address the deficiencies identified by the Court, indicating that granting leave to amend would 26 have been futile. 27 To state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious 1 the prison official knew that a prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded 2 that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 3 (1994). The key element is that the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from which 4 the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but “must also draw 5 the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the 6 official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. Cty of 7 Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). In order for deliberate indifference to be 8 established, therefore, there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant 9 and resulting harm. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in 10 part on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) 11 (en banc). “Under this standard, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, 12 differences of opinion in medical treatment, and harmless delays in treatment are not enough to 13 sustain an Eighth Amendment claim.” Simmons v. G. Arnett, 47 F.4th 927, 934 (9th Cir. 2022); 14 see also Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (difference of opinion between 15 prisoner-patient and prisoner medical authorities as to treatment does not, by itself, give rise to a 16 Section 1983 claim); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (difference of 17 medical opinion as to treatment does not, by itself, give rise to a Section 1983 claim). Under this 18 standard, a claim of medical malpractice or negligence is also insufficient to make out a violation 19 of the Eighth Amendment. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060-61. 20 The new allegations in the proposed second amended complaint do not address the 21 deficiencies identified by the court. The proposed second amended complaint is similar to the 22 prior complaints but adds one defendant and makes the additional allegations listed below. The 23 proposed second amended complaint names San Joaquin General Hospital doctor Steven Peterson 24 as a defendant but merely repeats the allegations regarding defendant Peterson that were made in 25 the prior complaints: defendant Peterson examined Plaintiff on October 24, 2023; assessed him as 26 having loss of reduction in the scapholunate interval with recurrence of scapholunate dissociation, 27 and EPL tendon dysfunction, which is either secondary to a ruptured tendon at the level of the 1 regarding the right scapholunate ligament. ECF No. 15 at 14. The proposed second amended 2 complaint makes the following allegations that were not made in the prior complaints:

3 • The medical treatment provided by defendant Dowbak was not within the standard of care for a reasonable orthopedic surgeon because defendant Dowbak used the wrong 4 tools during the surgery and nicked Plaintiff’s EPL tendon in his right hand during the February 22, 2023 pin removal procedure. Defendant Dowbak should have realized 5 from Plaintiff’s movements during the pin removal procedure that Plaintiff was in pain. Defendant Dowbak was inexperienced, lacked training, and was unqualified. 6 • Dr. White ordered x-rays of Plaintiff’s right-hand/wrist area, but x-rays could not have 7 detected problems with Plaintiff’s EPL.

8 • Plaintiff’s symptoms were indicative of a torn EPL but Defendants failed to image his EPL or take other steps to determine whether there was a torn EPL, despite knowing 9 that not taking steps to make an accurate assessment would lead to permanent damage and pain. Defendant Dowbak incorrectly diagnosed Plaintiff’s pain as stemming from 10 scapholunate advanced collapse when Plaintiff’s complaints indicated a ruptured EPL.

11 • Defendant Dowbak and defendant Garrigan have been sued in other actions for providing constitutionally deficient medical care. 12 • Defendant Garrigan misrepresented the May 2023 MRI as showing nothing wrong with 13 Plaintiff’s EPL, when the MRI either did not image the EPL well, or did not image the EPL at all. Physical therapist Carlin stated that she could find no MRI images of 14 Plaintiff’s EPL in his file. 15 See generally ECF No. 15 at 5-16. The primary difference between the proposed second amended 16 complaint and the prior complaints is that Plaintiff now alleges that defendant Dowbak nicked 17 Plaintiff’s extensor pollicis longus (“EPL”) during the February 22, 2023 surgery; Defendants 18 insisted that the injury was a scapholunate tear but should have known from Plaintiff’s complaints 19 of pain that Plaintiff likely had an EPL tear; and Defendants failed to acknowledge or treat the 20 EPL tear, and refused to image the EPL area. See generally ECF No. 15 at 5-16. The prior 21 complaints had identified the medical need as a right scapholunate tear due to defendant Dowbak’s 22 February 22, 2023 surgery, and alleged that the scapholunate tear went untreated or was not 23 properly treated. 24 Similar to the prior complaints, the proposed second amended complaint describes, at 25 most, negligence by defendant Dowbak and a difference of opinion between medical professionals 26 as to the cause of Plaintiff’s pain and limited mobility and the appropriate treatment. The physical 27 therapist’s assessment that Plaintiff had an EPL tear, and not a right scapholunate tear, is a 1 state an Eighth Amendment claim. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058-60. The allegation that Defendants 2 should have realized that Plaintiff had an EPL tear and treated him for an EPL tear describe an 3 inadvertent failure to provide care, which does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. Simmons, 4 47 F.4th at 934. The allegation that Defendants knew that Plaintiff had an EPL tear but 5 deliberately chose to only image the scapholunate ligament to hide the damage done by defendant 6 Dowbak; that they misrepresented the results of the MRIs; and that the MRI results are incorrect 7 are speculative. In addition, these allegations are based on the claim that it was clear that Plaintiff 8 had an EPL tear, which is contradicted by the proposed second amended complaint’s allegations. 9 When Plaintiff initially reported the pain, he informed prison medical staff that he had a 10 scapholunate tear and sought treatment based on that diagnosis. The proposed second amended 11 complaint reports that multiple doctors assessed Plaintiff’s pain and mobility issues as stemming 12 from a scapholunate tear. Finally, as discussed previously, the record indicates that prison medical 13 officials, including Defendants, took reasonable steps to address Plaintiff’s concerns, even if these 14 steps did not resolve the issue and even if Plaintiff believes that this was not the appropriate 15 medical treatment. The proposed second amended complaint recounts numerous doctor’s visits, 16 examinations by different doctors, a second opinion, two x-rays, two MRIs, physical therapy, and 17 surgery appointment. See generally ECF No. 15 at 5-16. Even if the Court erred in failing to give 18 Plaintiff an additional opportunity to amend the complaint, any such error was harmless as 19 Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint again fails to state a cognizable Eighth 20 Amendment claim. Granting Plaintiff leave to amend the amended complaint would have been 21 futile. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (futility of 22 amendment is basis for denial of leave to amend). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES the renewed request for 3 reconsideration. ECF No. 15. This case remains closed. 4 This action terminates ECF No. 15. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. ® 6 Dated: June 11, 2026 es 7 JON S. TIGAR g nited States District Judge 9 10 11 a 12

13 14

15 16

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28