William L. Signaigo and Judith Signaigo, Individually and as Trustees of the Signaigo Family Revocable Trust v. Myrna Grinstead a/k/a Myrna Boubede Grinstead

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: May 21, 2024
• Docket: 2022-CA-01212-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-CA-01212-COA

WILLIAM L. SIGNAIGO AND JUDITH APPELLANTS SIGNAIGO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEES OF THE SIGNAIGO FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST

v.

MYRNA GRINSTEAD A/K/A MYRNA APPELLEE BOUBEDE GRINSTEAD

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/04/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARGARET ALFONSO COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HANCOCK COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: ROBERT THOMAS SCHWARTZ CHRISTIAN STRICKLAND ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: KELLY MICHAEL RAYBURN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 05/21/2024 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND McCARTY, JJ.

GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. William and Judith Signaigo filed an adverse possession action against Myrna

Grinstead for property located in Hancock County. Both parties moved for summary

judgment. The Hancock County Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Grinstead, finding that the Signaigos could not prove each element of adverse possession by

clear and convincing evidence. The chancery court also found that title to the property was

vested in Grinstead as a matter of law. On appeal, we agree that the Signaigos could not

prove the element of claim of ownership and affirm the chancery court’s order in part. However, the chancery court’s finding that title to the property was vested in Grinstead as

a matter of law was beyond the scope of the summary judgment motion. Therefore, we

reverse and remand to allow proceedings for that issue.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. The real property (“subject property”) is located in Hancock County, Mississippi, and

is particularly described as:

Lots 36 & 37, Square 33, SHORELINE ESTATES SUBDIVISION, UNIT NO. 6, Hancock County, Mississippi, as per plat of said subdivision of record in the office of the Chancery Clerk of Hancock County, Mississippi.

Helene A. Boubede, the former owner of the subject property, is deceased. Her daughter,

Appellee Myrna Grinstead, lived in New London, Iowa at the onset of this case. Grinstead

claims to be one of two legal heirs of Boubede, the other being her sister Linda Boubede who

is deceased.1 Grinstead claims to be the sole legal heir to inherit the subject property.2

¶3. Appellants William and Judith Signaigo owned property adjacent to the subject

property, described as:

Lots 32, 33, 34, and 35, Square 33, SHORELINE ESTATES SUBDIVISION, UNIT NO. 6, Hancock County, Mississippi, as per plat of said subdivision of record in the office of the Chancery Clerk of Hancock County, Mississippi.

The Signaigos, individually, possessed title to this property (“Signaigo property”) from

August 18, 1997, to March 4, 2019, when they conveyed this property to their family trust

1 The record does not include a will for Helene Boubede or Linda Boubede. 2 That Grinstead has an ownership interest in the real property is not contested.

2 with themselves as trustees.

¶4. The Signaigos claim that they possessed the subject property from 1997 to the date

of this appeal. In 1997, the Signaigos built and maintained a fence that enclosed a portion

of their property and all the subject property. In addition, they claim that they performed all

upkeep on the subject property, including mowing the grass, removing debris following

hurricanes, removing trees, and providing fill material. The Signaigos never received

permission from Grinstead or her family to build the fence around the subject property or to

maintain the property.

¶5. The Signaigos filed a complaint against Helene Boubede, Linda Boubede, and

Grinstead on September 15, 2021, for title to the subject property. They claimed that they

adversely possessed the subject property for an uninterrupted period of occupancy in excess

of ten years and should be awarded full and complete title to the subject property pursuant

to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-13 (Rev. 2019). Grinstead filed an answer on

November 12, 2021. On February 3, 2022, the Signaigos filed a motion for summary

judgment. Grinstead filed her response and a counter-motion for summary judgment on

October 8, 2022, asserting that the Signaigos failed to prove the element of a claim of

ownership over the subject property.

¶6. During a deposition of Judith Signaigo, counsel for Grinstead asked Ms. Signaigo

about a fence. Judith stated that they put up the fence with the help of local friends and not

with a fencing company. When asked if she considered whether they fenced someone else’s

3 property, Judith replied, “No. The only thing I was concerned about was the fact that there’s

water here and there is a street there and the dogs were bringing stuff back from other places

and we wanted to fence it in.” She testified that she and her husband knew the property was

not theirs when they built the fence. Grinstead’s counsel asked Judith when they began to

claim the property as their own:

Q. I’m asking: When was – when did you and your husband make a determination that you wanted to claim [the subject property] to the exclusion of the people who actually owned it. A. Oh, I guess it would have been a few years ago. I mean, ten, five years ago, seven years ago, something like that. Q. Okay. A. I don’t know. Q. Prior to – A. When I – when – when I tried to reach her. Q. Is that when you tried to reach Ms. Boubede? A. Uh-huh (indicating yes). Q. Within the last seven years? A. Yeah. I’m going to say it was seven. And I also – I also tried to reach the daughter who – Linda or somebody. And I couldn’t reach her either.

William Signaigo disagreed with his wife during his deposition, stating that they began to

claim the property as theirs ten to fifteen years before the lawsuit.3

¶7. The chancery court conducted a hearing on the opposing summary judgment motions

on October 20, 2022. The chancellor entered both her “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

3 William Signaigo also stated that they did not build the fence in 1997, as his wife testified, but that the fence had been built as early as 1979 and was already there when they moved onto the property. On appeal, the Signaigos reiterate that they built the fence in 1997 after buying the property.

4 Law” and “Final Judgment Granting Summary Judgment” to Grinstead on November 4,

2022. The chancellor found that the Signaigos did not establish the elements of (1) claim of

ownership or (2) open and notorious possession. In addition, the chancellor found that

Grinstead was the proper defendant in the matter and that “title to her mother’s lots is now

vested in her as a matter of law.” The Signaigos filed their notice of appeal on November

30, 2022.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8. “The standard of review for summary judgment motions is de novo.” Loblolly Props.

LLC v. Le Papillon Homeowner’s Ass’n Inc., 368 So. 3d 1283, 1287 (¶18) (Miss. 2023)

(citing Builders & Contractors Ass’n of Miss. v. Laser Line Constr. Co., 220 So. 3d 964, 966

(¶7) (Miss. 2017)). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” M.R.C.P. 56(c).

DISCUSSION

(1) Adverse Possession

¶9. The Signaigos claim that they met every element of adverse possession, but they failed

to show they had a claim of ownership over ten years. Therefore, we affirm the chancery

court’s grant of summary judgment for Grinstead.

¶10. The Mississippi statute that governs adverse possession, section 15-1-13(1), states:

5 Ten (10) years’ actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land, uninterruptedly continued for ten (10) years by occupancy, descent, conveyance, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to persons under the disability of minority or unsoundness of mind the right to sue within ten (10) years after the removal of such disability, as provided in Section 15-1-7. However, the saving in favor of persons under disability of unsoundness of mind shall never extend longer than thirty-one (31) years.

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-13. “To establish a claim of adverse possession, a party must show

that his possession was (1) under claim of ownership; (2) actual or hostile; (3) open,

notorious, and visible; (4) continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years; (5)

exclusive; and (6) peaceful.” Franco v. Ferrill, 342 So. 3d 1176, 1188 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App.

2022). The party claiming adverse possession must prove each element by clear and

convincing evidence. Id.

¶11. “When determining whether an adverse possessor has staked a proper claim of

ownership, the relevant inquiry is whether the possessory acts relied upon by the would-be

adverse possessor are sufficient to fly his flag over the lands and to put the record title holder

on notice that the lands are held under an adverse claim of ownership.” Id. at 1188-89 (¶30)

(quoting O’Neal v. Blalock, 220 So. 3d 234, 240 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). “The claim

of ownership must have existed at the beginning of the statutory period of possession and not

possession with the intent to claim as soon as the statutory period passed.” Revette v.

Ferguson, 271 So. 3d 702, 708 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018); see Blackburn v. Wong, 904 So.

2d 134, 137 (¶19) (Miss. 2004) (“We have also clearly held that one cannot set out to

6 adversely possess the property of another, that is to say, the ‘claim of ownership’ must exist

at the beginning of the ten-year statutory period.”).

¶12. In 1997, the Signaigos purchased lots 32, 33, 34, and 35 in Square 33 of the Shoreline

Estates Subdivision, Unit 6. The Signaigos knew that the neighboring lots 36 and 37

belonged to someone else. Despite that knowledge, the Signaigos built a fence encompassing

a portion of their property and all the subject property, for the benefit of their dogs and with

the intention of one day purchasing the subject property. This fence stood for about twenty-

five years, and the Signaigos maintained the fence and the subject property throughout that

time. The Signaigos sent letters to Boubede hoping to make an offer to purchase the land but

never made contact with her. At some point—seven years prior to the lawsuit, according to

Judith Signaigo—the Signaigos decided to claim the land as their own to the exclusion of all

others. The relevant question is whether the Signaigos’ claim of ownership began when they

built the fence or seven years prior to the lawsuit.

¶13. A review of recent caselaw shows that one’s belief that he owns the property at issue

is a factor in whether the party has a claim of ownership. See Franco, 342 So. 3d at 1189

(¶31); Revette, 271 So. 3d at 708 (¶13); Warehousing Mgmt. LLC v. Haywood Props. LP,

978 So. 2d 684, 688 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); Anderson v. Jackson, 338 So. 3d 629, 641

(¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (analyzing the period of adverse possession based on a

conversation where appellant believed appellee conveyed the property to him); Buford v.

Logue, 832 So. 2d 594, 602 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Belief alone is not dispositive.

7 Indeed, nearly every case analyzing adverse possession looks at a party’s possessory acts to

determine if he sufficiently provided notice to the record title owner that another party is

holding his land under an adverse claim. Franco, 342 So. 3d at 1188-89 (¶30). In this case,

the Signaigos had evidence of possessory acts that support their claim of ownership.4

However, they knew they did not actually own the subject property.

¶14. The instant case is factually similar to Wong, in which the defendant Blackburn

purchased two lots of land next to plaintiff Wong’s property and constructed a building.

Wong, 904 So. 2d at 135 (¶6). Blackburn was told that a portion of his building was built on

Wong’s property. Id. Blackburn attempted to contact Wong to purchase his property but was

unsuccessful. Id. Rather than tear down the building, Blackburn chose to hold the property

adversely until challenged. Id. at (¶7). However, twelve years later, Blackburn erected a

wooden fence that enclosed a seventeen-foot strip of Wong’s land. Id. at (¶8). Blackburn

held this additional fenced-off property until 1999 when Wong sued Blackburn. Id. at 136

(¶11).

¶15. The chancery court ruled in favor of Wong, and the Mississippi Supreme Court

affirmed, holding that Blackburn did not have a claim of ownership. Id. at 137 (¶22). The

supreme court stated that “one cannot set out to adversely possess the property of another,”

and because Blackburn knew that he did not own the land enclosed in the fence, Blackburn

4 One noteworthy fact contrary to the Signaigos claim is that they admit to never paying taxes on the subject property. Paying taxes is strong evidence of a claim of ownership, though it is not dispositive. Nosser v. B.P. Buford, 852, So. 2d 57, 61 (¶17).

8 had no claim of ownership at the beginning of the statutory period. Id. at (¶21). This Court

cited Wong for the same holding in Presley v. Stokes, 290 So. 3d 763, 767 (¶13) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2020). In Presley, this Court held that the party’s adverse possession claim failed

because he knew the land did not belong to him. Id.; see also Warehousing Mgmt., 978 So.

2d at 688 (¶22).

¶16. Older Mississippi cases seem to contradict Wong’s holding to an extent. “There is no

doubt, that the possession of a mere intruder, is protected to the extent of his actual

occupation; whilst one who has color of title, is protected to the extent of the limits of his

title.” Grafton v. Grafton, 16 Miss. 77, 90 (1846); Welborn v. Anderson, 37 Miss. 155, 164

(1859); Levy v. Campbell, 200 Miss. 721, 28 So. 2d 224, 226 (1946). These cases treated

adverse possession differently if the adverse possessor had color of title or not, awarding

someone with color of title essentially whatever land his title claimed, while limiting a mere

intruder to his occupation. See Welborn, 37 Miss. at 163-64 (“The rule is different in regard

to a mere intruder.”). These earlier cases still required that the adverse possessor claim the

land to the exclusion of all others. “Doubtless it is the occupation with an intent to claim

against the true owner, which renders the entry and possession adverse.” Magee v. Magee,

37 Miss. 138, 152 (1859).

¶17. In either case, the Signaigos fail to show their claim of ownership existed for the ten-

year statutory requirement. They admitted in their depositions that when they purchased their

property, they knew the subject property was not theirs. Following Wong’s holding, our

9 analysis ends. The Signaigos had actual knowledge that the subject property was not theirs,

so no claim of ownership existed. However, even if we were to apply the earlier opinions

to this case, the Signaigos still cannot prevail.

¶18. Judith Signaigo testified that they decided to claim the subject property to the

exclusion of others seven years prior to the lawsuit. “Possession is adverse when the holder

intends to claim title . . . .” Rester v. Greenleaf Re. Inc., 198 So. 3d 472, 475 (¶10) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2016). Despite William’s testimony otherwise, the Signaigos cannot as a matter of

law by clear and convincing evidence show that their claim of ownership was ten years long.

The Signaigos admitted that when they fenced the property in 1997, it was not to claim

ownership over it but, rather, for the benefit of their dogs and with the intention to one day

purchase it. The Signaigos attempted to contact the true owners intending to buy the property

but could not reach them. See Eddy v. Clayton, 44 So. 2d 395, 397 (Miss. 1950) (“It is

elemental that an adverse occupancy be hostile from the inception of the period claimed.

Moreover, the request of appellant to purchase the land, which was later repeated, is a

pointed answer to any contention of an adverse claim, since it was an acknowledgment of a

superior title and claim of Mrs. Clayton.” (Citation omitted)). While the Signaigos engaged

in possessory acts on the subject property from 1997 onward, their own testimony defeats

their argument that their claim of ownership began as early as 1997.

¶19. Because the Signaigos could not prove their claim of ownership element by clear and

convincing evidence, the chancery court was correct in awarding Grinstead summary

10 judgment.5

(2) Vesting of Title

¶20. The Signaigos claim the chancery court erred by finding that “title to [Grinstead’s]

mother’s lots is now vested in [Grinstead] as a matter of law.” A review of the record shows

that this issue was not brought before the chancery court by motion or during any hearing.

This case dealt with a claim of adverse possession. It was undisputed that Grinstead has an

ownership interest in the subject property. While adverse possession of the subject property

by the Signaigos was disputed, the chancery court’s finding that sole title was vested in

Grinstead as a matter of law reaches too far. This was an adverse possession action, not an

action to quiet and confirm title or one to determine heirship. We cannot determine that the

process was followed to protect others who might have a claim of title to the subject

property. Therefore, we reverse and remand this issue for proceedings, if proper, to

determine if sole title is held by Grinstead.

CONCLUSION

¶21. The Signaigos cannot prove the claim of ownership element of adverse possession by

clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, we affirm the chancery court’s order in part.

However, the chancery court’s finding that sole title of the subject property vested in

5 The Signaigos claim that the chancery court erred by finding that they did not meet the element of open, notorious, and visible possession. Because we find that the Signaigos failed to meet the first element of claim of ownership, a discussion of this element is unnecessary.

11 Grinstead as a matter of law went beyond the scope of the summary judgment motion;

therefore, we reverse and remand for proceedings, if proper and consistent with this opinion,

to determine if sole title is held by Grinstead.

¶22. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., AND WESTBROOKS, J., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.