William Kenneth Ball v. the State of Texas
Opinion
Opinion issued August 13, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
The State later filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision and adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated his community supervision terms. Appellant pleaded true to the State’s allegations and executed a waiver of his right to appeal in exchange for the State's recommendation that punishment be assessed at four years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and, consistent with the State's recommendation, assessed punishment at four years’ confinement. The trial court certified both that appellant had waived the right of appeal and that this was a case in which he had no right of appeal. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) restricts a defendant’s right to appeal in a plea-bargain case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 44.02. But that rule does not restrict a defendant's right to appeal from a proceeding adjudicating guilt following deferred adjudication community supervision. See Hargesheimer v. State, 182 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Nevertheless, this case involves a separate agreement in which appellant expressly waived his right to appeal in exchange for separate consideration from the State at the revocation hearing. Courts have enforced such waivers under ordinary waiver principles. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, No. 01-14-00358-CR, 2015 WL
1778605, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Nickerson v. State, No. 01-14-00683-CR, 2015 WL 1407855, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Mendez v. State, 558 S.W.3d 823, 824 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Radford v. State, No. 05-18-00764-CR, 2018 WL 6616896, at *1 (Tex. App.––Dallas Dec. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
When a defendant waives his right to appeal in exchange for consideration from the State, and the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the defendant may not appeal. Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The record here reflects that appellant signed and swore to a stipulation of evidence and judicial confession in which he pleaded true to the allegations in the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt. The document recites the parties’ agreement that the State would recommend revocation of appellant's community supervision, four years’ confinement, and no fine. It also contains a separate waiver provision stating:
As part of my agreement with the prosecutor to plead true, I AGREE TO WAIVE any right to appeal I may have concerning any issue or claim in this case, including my plea of true or admission of guilt.
Appellant separately initialed the waiver provision. The trial court then found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant’s guilt, and assessed punishment in accordance with the agreed recommendation.
We acknowledge one arguable ambiguity in the record. During the adjudication hearing, after confirming appellant's waiver of appeal, the trial court stated:
THE COURT: As part of this plea, did you waive your right to appeal?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Do you understand you still have a limited right to appeal to the Court of Appeals in Houston, Texas? If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you. If you cannot afford a copy of this record, one will be provided.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
The trial court was likely referencing that “no appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims.” Ex parte Castillo, 664 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 237, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744, 203 L. Ed. 2d 77 (2019) (internal quotations omitted). In any event, the trial court’s general admonition concerning appellate rights did not negate appellant’s express oral and written waivers. The record contains a clear, specific, and bargained-for waiver of appeal that appellant acknowledged both in writing and orally. See Broadway, 301 S.W.3d at 697-99; Blanco, 18 S.W.3d at 219-20.
Because appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal in exchange for the State’s punishment recommendation, appellant has no
right of appeal in this case. See Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 12 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. All pending motions are dismissed as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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