William I. Siegmeister v. Joyce D. Hellard

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: March 13, 2024
• Docket: 2023-0869
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed March 13, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-0869 Lower Tribunal No. 16-20239 ________________

William I. Siegmeister, Appellant,

vs.

Joyce D. Hellard, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marcia B. Caballero, Judge.

Richard Siegmeister, P.A., and Richard Siegmeister, for appellant.

Law Offices of Karen J. Haas, and Karen J. Haas, for appellee.

Before SCALES, LOBREE, and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM. In this marriage dissolution proceeding, appellant William Siegmeister

(Husband) appeals an April 11, 2023 equitable distribution order in favor of

appellee Joyce Hellard (Wife).

In Hellard v. Siegmeister, 305 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“Hellard

I”), we affirmed the trial court’s order that partially distributed the parties’

marital assets but remanded for further proceedings to allow the trial court to

determine and equitably distribute certain post-reconciliation1 assets,

pertaining particularly to a condominium located in South Miami, Florida, and

two investment accounts. Id. at 45. Consistent with our Hellard I remand

instructions, after the Hellard I mandate issued, the trial court conducted a

four-day evidentiary hearing,2 and determined that the South Miami

condominium and the two investment accounts, all titled in Husband’s name,

indeed constituted marital property of the couple, subject to equitable

distribution.

1 The parties first separated in 2000, and Wife filed for divorce. They entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA). They reconciled soon thereafter, and Wife dismissed her divorce petition. In 2016, Wife again filed a divorce petition. In Hellard I, this Court held that the reconciliation abrogated the executory provisions of the MSA; in other words, the marital assets acquired by the parties after their 2001 reconciliation were subject to equitable distribution. Hellard I, 305 So. 3d at 48. 2 We have been provided only a partial transcript from one day of this hearing.

2 In this appeal, Husband argues that he met his evidentiary burden to

establish that the subject property was not marital property. See Jahnke v.

Jahnke, 804 So. 2d 513, 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“’The burden of proof is

on the spouse who wishes to show that an asset or liability acquired during

the marriage is not . . . marital . . . .’” (quoting Gladstone v. Gladstone, 733

So. 2d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999))). He further argues that the trial

court’s marital property determinations are not supported by competent,

substantial evidence. See § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat. (2023) (“[A]ny distribution

of marital assets or marital liabilities shall be supported by factual findings in

the judgment or order based on competent substantial evidence with

reference to the factors enumerated in [section 61.075(1)]”); Apesteguy v.

Keglevich, 319 So. 3d 150, 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).

The trial court’s order comes to us with a presumption of correctness.

Pardes v. Pardes, 335 So. 3d 1241, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). Having been

provided only a limited record of the trial court’s evidentiary hearing, we are

unable to conclude that the trial court’s marital property factual findings are

erroneous. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150,

1152 (Fla. 1980). We, therefore, affirm the challenged order.

Affirmed.