Apr 22 2015, 10:02 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Gregory W. Moore John David Hoover Clark Hill PLC Laurie E. Martin Birmingham, Michigan Hoover Hull, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William I. Babchuk, M.D., P.C., April 22, 2015 d/b/a Babchuk Imaging, P.C., Court of Appeals Case No. and William I. Babchuk, 80A04-1409-PL-447 Appeal from the Tipton Circuit Court Appellants-Plaintiffs, The Honorable Thomas R. Lett, v. Judge
Indiana University Health Cause No. 80C01-1207-PL-265 Tipton Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Indiana University Health Tipton Hospital, Appellee-Defendant.
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] William I. Babchuk, M.D., P.C. d/b/a Babchuk Imaging, P.C. and William I.
Babchuck (collectively “Babchuck”) appeal the trial court’s order dismissing
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 1 of 7 Babchuk’s complaint against Indiana University Health Tipton Hospital, Inc.,
d/b/a Indiana University Health Tipton Hospital (“the Hospital”) for failure to
prosecute under Trial Rule 41(E). Babchuk presents a single issue for our
review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed
this action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On September 4, 2008, the Hospital and Babchuk executed a contract whereby
Babchuk agreed to provide radiology services for the Hospital. The contract
term was five years with the option to renew for one-year terms thereafter. In
June 2012, after learning that Dr. Babchuk had allegedly directed two hospital
staff members to delete or destroy hospital records, the Hospital terminated its
contract with Babchuk. The Hospital also suspended Dr. Babchuk’s privileges
to practice medicine at the Hospital.
[3] On July 17, 2012, Babchuk filed his complaint against the Hospital and other
defendants1 alleging breach of contract, tortious interference with a contract,
and defamation. And on November 26, in response to a partial motion to
dismiss,2 Babchuk filed an amended complaint alleging only breach of contract
1 Babchuk has not included a copy of his complaint or amended complaint in the appendix on appeal. There is no dispute, however, that Babchuk initially named other defendants who were subsequently dismissed from this action and are not parties to this appeal. 2 Neither party included a copy of the September 2012 partial motion to dismiss in their appendices on appeal. In its brief, the Hospital states that, in the amended complaint, Babchuk “drop[ped] his claims of tortious interference and defamation leaving solely his breach of contract claim” against the Hospital and “remov[ed] the other individual defendants from the caption.” Appellee’s Br. at 2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 2 of 7 against the Hospital. On December 18, the Hospital filed its answer to the
amended complaint.
[4] On August 29, 2013, Babchuk filed a complaint against the Hospital and other
defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana (“federal court”) alleging “deprivation of property under color of state
law without due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Appellants’ App. at
33. And on May 28, 2014, Babchuk’s attorney “asked whether [the Hospital]
would stipulate to [an] amendment [of the complaint in federal court] which
added [a] breach of contract claim.” Id. at 21. The hospital “represented that
[it] would consider it and asked if [Babchuk] would dismiss th[e] pending state
court action if the amendment was approved. [Babchuk] responded in the
affirmative.” Id.
[5] On May 29, Babchuk filed, with the federal court, a motion to amend his §
1983 complaint to include the breach of contract claim and, with the trial court,
a “Motion to Stay or, in the Alternative, for Setting of Scheduling Conference.”
Id. at 11. Also on May 29, the Hospital filed a motion to dismiss Babchuk’s
state court action for failure to prosecute under Trial Rule 41(E). The trial court
granted a motion to stay the state court action pending the federal court’s ruling
on Babchuk’s motion to amend his complaint. And on July 10, after Babchuk
notified the trial court that the federal court had denied his motion to amend his
complaint, the trial court set the Hospital’s motion to dismiss for a hearing on
August 12, 2014. After that hearing, the trial court dismissed Babchuk’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 3 of 7 complaint against the hospital for failure to prosecute under Trial Rule 41(E).
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision [6] Babchuk contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed his
complaint for failure to prosecute. Indiana Trial Rule 41(E) provides:
Whenever there has been a failure to comply with these rules or when no action has been taken in a civil case for a period of sixty [60] days, the court, on motion of a party or on its own motion shall order a hearing for the purpose of dismissing such case. The court shall enter an order of dismissal at plaintiff’s costs if the plaintiff shall not show sufficient cause at or before such hearing. Dismissal may be withheld or reinstatement of dismissal may be made subject to the condition that the plaintiff comply with these rules and diligently prosecute the action and upon such terms that the court in its discretion determines to be necessary to assure such diligent prosecution.
[7] We set out the applicable standard of review in Baker Machinery, Inc. v. Superior
Canopy Corp., 883 N.E.2d 818, 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied:
We review dismissal of a cause of action under T.R. 41(E) for an abuse of discretion. Beard v. Dominguez, 847 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. In so doing, we consider whether the trial court’s decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances; “‘we will affirm the trial court if any evidence supports the trial court’s decision.’” Id. at 1059 (quoting Gray v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 624 N.E.2d 49, 55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied).
[8] And our supreme court has held that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 4 of 7 [a] motion to dismiss for want of prosecution should not be granted if the plaintiff resumes diligent prosecution of his claim, even though, at some prior period of time, he has been guilty of gross negligence. See Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 918; and Rollins v. United States, (9th Cir., 1961), 286 F.2d 761; United States v. Myers, (1964, D.C.Cal., N.D.), 38 F.R.D. 194; Ayers v. D. F. Quillen & Sons, Inc., (Del. 1963), 188 A.2d 510; Smirlock v. Ballard, (Del. 1971), 280 A.2d 739.
The burden is clearly on the defendant to timely file a motion to dismiss pursuant to T.R. 41(E).
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Apr 22 2015, 10:02 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Gregory W. Moore John David Hoover Clark Hill PLC Laurie E. Martin Birmingham, Michigan Hoover Hull, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William I. Babchuk, M.D., P.C., April 22, 2015 d/b/a Babchuk Imaging, P.C., Court of Appeals Case No. and William I. Babchuk, 80A04-1409-PL-447 Appeal from the Tipton Circuit Court Appellants-Plaintiffs, The Honorable Thomas R. Lett, v. Judge
Indiana University Health Cause No. 80C01-1207-PL-265 Tipton Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Indiana University Health Tipton Hospital, Appellee-Defendant.
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] William I. Babchuk, M.D., P.C. d/b/a Babchuk Imaging, P.C. and William I.
Babchuck (collectively “Babchuck”) appeal the trial court’s order dismissing
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 1 of 7 Babchuk’s complaint against Indiana University Health Tipton Hospital, Inc.,
d/b/a Indiana University Health Tipton Hospital (“the Hospital”) for failure to
prosecute under Trial Rule 41(E). Babchuk presents a single issue for our
review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed
this action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On September 4, 2008, the Hospital and Babchuk executed a contract whereby
Babchuk agreed to provide radiology services for the Hospital. The contract
term was five years with the option to renew for one-year terms thereafter. In
June 2012, after learning that Dr. Babchuk had allegedly directed two hospital
staff members to delete or destroy hospital records, the Hospital terminated its
contract with Babchuk. The Hospital also suspended Dr. Babchuk’s privileges
to practice medicine at the Hospital.
[3] On July 17, 2012, Babchuk filed his complaint against the Hospital and other
defendants1 alleging breach of contract, tortious interference with a contract,
and defamation. And on November 26, in response to a partial motion to
dismiss,2 Babchuk filed an amended complaint alleging only breach of contract
1 Babchuk has not included a copy of his complaint or amended complaint in the appendix on appeal. There is no dispute, however, that Babchuk initially named other defendants who were subsequently dismissed from this action and are not parties to this appeal. 2 Neither party included a copy of the September 2012 partial motion to dismiss in their appendices on appeal. In its brief, the Hospital states that, in the amended complaint, Babchuk “drop[ped] his claims of tortious interference and defamation leaving solely his breach of contract claim” against the Hospital and “remov[ed] the other individual defendants from the caption.” Appellee’s Br. at 2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 2 of 7 against the Hospital. On December 18, the Hospital filed its answer to the
amended complaint.
[4] On August 29, 2013, Babchuk filed a complaint against the Hospital and other
defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana (“federal court”) alleging “deprivation of property under color of state
law without due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Appellants’ App. at
33. And on May 28, 2014, Babchuk’s attorney “asked whether [the Hospital]
would stipulate to [an] amendment [of the complaint in federal court] which
added [a] breach of contract claim.” Id. at 21. The hospital “represented that
[it] would consider it and asked if [Babchuk] would dismiss th[e] pending state
court action if the amendment was approved. [Babchuk] responded in the
affirmative.” Id.
[5] On May 29, Babchuk filed, with the federal court, a motion to amend his §
1983 complaint to include the breach of contract claim and, with the trial court,
a “Motion to Stay or, in the Alternative, for Setting of Scheduling Conference.”
Id. at 11. Also on May 29, the Hospital filed a motion to dismiss Babchuk’s
state court action for failure to prosecute under Trial Rule 41(E). The trial court
granted a motion to stay the state court action pending the federal court’s ruling
on Babchuk’s motion to amend his complaint. And on July 10, after Babchuk
notified the trial court that the federal court had denied his motion to amend his
complaint, the trial court set the Hospital’s motion to dismiss for a hearing on
August 12, 2014. After that hearing, the trial court dismissed Babchuk’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 3 of 7 complaint against the hospital for failure to prosecute under Trial Rule 41(E).
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision [6] Babchuk contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed his
complaint for failure to prosecute. Indiana Trial Rule 41(E) provides:
Whenever there has been a failure to comply with these rules or when no action has been taken in a civil case for a period of sixty [60] days, the court, on motion of a party or on its own motion shall order a hearing for the purpose of dismissing such case. The court shall enter an order of dismissal at plaintiff’s costs if the plaintiff shall not show sufficient cause at or before such hearing. Dismissal may be withheld or reinstatement of dismissal may be made subject to the condition that the plaintiff comply with these rules and diligently prosecute the action and upon such terms that the court in its discretion determines to be necessary to assure such diligent prosecution.
[7] We set out the applicable standard of review in Baker Machinery, Inc. v. Superior
Canopy Corp., 883 N.E.2d 818, 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied:
We review dismissal of a cause of action under T.R. 41(E) for an abuse of discretion. Beard v. Dominguez, 847 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. In so doing, we consider whether the trial court’s decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances; “‘we will affirm the trial court if any evidence supports the trial court’s decision.’” Id. at 1059 (quoting Gray v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 624 N.E.2d 49, 55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied).
[8] And our supreme court has held that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 4 of 7 [a] motion to dismiss for want of prosecution should not be granted if the plaintiff resumes diligent prosecution of his claim, even though, at some prior period of time, he has been guilty of gross negligence. See Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 918; and Rollins v. United States, (9th Cir., 1961), 286 F.2d 761; United States v. Myers, (1964, D.C.Cal., N.D.), 38 F.R.D. 194; Ayers v. D. F. Quillen & Sons, Inc., (Del. 1963), 188 A.2d 510; Smirlock v. Ballard, (Del. 1971), 280 A.2d 739.
The burden is clearly on the defendant to timely file a motion to dismiss pursuant to T.R. 41(E). That is to say, the defendant must file his motion after the sixty-day period has expired and before the plaintiff resumes prosecution.
State v. McClaine, 261 Ind. 60, 300 N.E.2d 342, 344 (1973) (emphasis added).
[9] Here, after an approximate eighteen-month period of inactivity, on May 29,
2014, Babchuk filed his motion to stay or, in the alternative, for setting of
scheduling conference. That same day, the Hospital filed its motion to dismiss
for failure to prosecute. No Indiana case has addressed whether a Trial Rule
41(E) motion filed the same day that a plaintiff resumes prosecution of its case
is timely. But, as our supreme court held in McClaine, it is the defendant’s
burden to timely file a Trial Rule 41(E) motion to dismiss, and the motion must
be filed before the plaintiff resumes prosecution. Id.; see also Baker Mach., 883
N.E.2d at 822 (citing McClaine). Accordingly, we hold that the Hospital’s
motion to dismiss, which was not filed before Babchuk resumed prosecution of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 5 of 7 his case, was not timely.3 See McClaine, 300 N.E.2d at 344.
[10] Still, the Hospital contends that Babchuk’s May 29 motion “did not constitute
resumption of prosecution for purposes of [Trial Rule] 41(E).” Appellee’s Br. at
14. In particular, the Hospital maintains that Babchuk’s “Motion to Stay was
inherently delaying . . . and was nothing more than a tool to further stall
prosecution of his breach of contract claim—belated [sic] attempt to avoid the
consequences of his already lengthy delay.” Id. The Hospital points out that a
plaintiff must resume diligent prosecution of his claim in order to prevent a Trial
Rule 41(E) dismissal. (Citing McClaine, 300 N.E.2d at 344). The Hospital
appears to suggest that anything less than a motion for a trial date would have
been insufficient to resume prosecution in this case. We cannot agree.
[11] Babchuk not only requested a stay pending his motion to amend his complaint
with the federal court, but he requested, in the alternative, a scheduling
conference “to establish discovery and other deadlines in this matter.”
Appellants’ App. at 13. Our research reveals no Indiana precedent squarely
addressing what constitutes diligent prosecution under Trial Rule 41(E). But a
request for a scheduling conference indicates a party’s intent to move forward
with litigation. And we hold that where, as here, a plaintiff requests a
scheduling conference, even in the alternative to a stay, that is sufficient to
constitute resumption of prosecution for purposes of Trial Rule 41(E).
3 Neither party’s motion was time-stamped.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 6 of 7 [12] In sum, while the trial court would have had discretion to dismiss Babchuk’s
case for failure to prosecute had a timely motion been filed, the Hospital did not
file its motion to dismiss before Babchuk had resumed prosecution of his case.
Thus, we hold that the Hospital’s Trial Rule 41(E) motion was untimely and
that trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Babchuk’s complaint.
[13] Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Baker, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 80A04-1409-PL-447| April 22, 2015 Page 7 of 7