NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-495
WILLIAM HOWARD
vs.
MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Plaintiff William Howard is a court officer who alleges
that he suffered debilitating injuries on the job on multiple
dates beginning in 1998. In 2022, he brought a complaint
related to such injuries. In count one of the complaint, he
sought so-called "assault pay" pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 58, to
make up the difference between what he was receiving in workers'
compensation payments and his salary. In count two, he sought
treble damages and attorney's fees pursuant to the Wage Act,
G. L. c. 149, § 148, based on the Commonwealth's failure to pay
him assault pay. On the defendant's motion to dismiss, a
Superior Court judge ruled in the Commonwealth's favor and
dismissed the complaint in its entirety. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm in part and vacate in part. Count one. The judge dismissed count one on statute of
limitations grounds. As the defendant now appropriately
concedes, this was error. See Flaherty v. Sheriff of Suffolk
County, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 157, 161 (2015), quoting Chambers v.
Lemuel Shattuck Hosp. 41 Mass. App. Ct. 211, 213 (1996) ("[W]e
consider each alleged violation of the continuing weekly payment
obligation a new claim for statute of limitations purposes").
However, the defendant requests that we affirm the dismissal of
count one on the alternative ground that Howard's complaint
fails to state a claim. Specifically, the defendant argues that
the complaint does not sufficiently allege that the injuries at
issue (the ones for which Howard was eligible for workers'
compensation) were covered by the assault pay statute, that is,
were ones that "result[ed] from acts of violence in the
courtroom or public areas, holding areas and other designated
areas of the courthouse or from subduing or apprehending
escaping prisoners." G. L. c. 30, § 58. The defendant had
raised that argument in its motion to dismiss, but the judge did
not reach it.
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, a complaint must include "factual 'allegations plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to
relief." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636
(2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557
2 (2007). In determining whether the complaint meets that
standard, "[w]e accept as true the facts alleged in the
plaintiffs' complaint as well as any favorable inferences that
reasonably can be drawn from them." Galiastro v. Mortgage
Electronic Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 164 (2014).
We turn to the specific allegations of the complaint.
Howard alleges that over the course of his employment as a court
officer, he "suffered multiple and recurrent injury to both
hands, the digits of both hands and both wrists resulting from
the physical and/or violent acts of prisoners in his custody
and/or being transported." After referencing ten specific such
incidents between 1998 and 2018 and describing in detail the
nature of the injuries and treatment he received, his complaint
alleges that he has been out of work receiving workers'
compensation since June 5, 2020, "[a]s a result of his work
injuries." It also references the fact that, in 2021, a medical
examiner retained by the trial court concluded -- after
reviewing Howard's medical records -- "that the current
condition and need for treatment is most likely a result of his
34 years as a court officer and repeated trauma and sprains to
the base of both hands. These prior work injuries are a major
cause for the need for treatment, including surgery."
Reading the allegations of the complaint as a whole, along
with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, we
3 conclude that the complaint sufficiently pleads that Howard was
out of work because of, and receiving workers' compensation for,
injuries that qualified under the assault pay statute. In
arguing that the complaint nevertheless fails as a matter of
law, the defendant goes outside the allegations of the
complaint. Specifically, the defendant points to the fact that
when Howard filled out his application for workers'
compensation, he stated that he was injured when he "tripped on
the stair tread." The defendant appears to treat that answer as
a binding admission that the injury for which he was seeking
workers' compensation was caused in a manner that is not
compensable under the assault pay statute (based on Howard's
failure to mention prisoner violence when he applied for
worker's compensation).
Putting aside whether the completed application form was
even properly before the judge on a motion to dismiss,1 we do not
view it as negating the allegations in the complaint that
Howard's injuries were caused by incidents involving violent
1 The workers' compensation application form was not attached to the complaint or referenced in it, and it is doubtful that Howard properly could be said to have relied on it "in framing the complaint." Contrast Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 n.4 (2004) (submittal of contractual documents with defendant's motion to dismiss did not convert motion to one for summary judgment where "plaintiff had notice of these documents and relied on them in framing the complaint"). We need not resolve whether the workers' compensation application form was properly before the judge.
4 prisoners. Even if we were to assume that Howard's most recent
absence from work was precipitated by a noncompensable incident,
that does not preclude Howard from alleging that the incident
served to aggravate the "repeated trauma and sprains" that
Howard sustained from prior incidents that do appear to fit
comfortably within the assault pay statute. Applying the
standards appropriate to motions filed pursuant to Mass. R. Civ.
P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), we conclude that the
allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state an assault
pay claim. To the extent that there is evidence that
potentially contradicts or precludes Howard's claim, that may be
addressed through summary judgment or other appropriate
mechanisms.
In sum, the judge erred in dismissing count one on statute
of limitations grounds, and that ruling cannot be upheld on the
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-495
WILLIAM HOWARD
vs.
MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Plaintiff William Howard is a court officer who alleges
that he suffered debilitating injuries on the job on multiple
dates beginning in 1998. In 2022, he brought a complaint
related to such injuries. In count one of the complaint, he
sought so-called "assault pay" pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 58, to
make up the difference between what he was receiving in workers'
compensation payments and his salary. In count two, he sought
treble damages and attorney's fees pursuant to the Wage Act,
G. L. c. 149, § 148, based on the Commonwealth's failure to pay
him assault pay. On the defendant's motion to dismiss, a
Superior Court judge ruled in the Commonwealth's favor and
dismissed the complaint in its entirety. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm in part and vacate in part. Count one. The judge dismissed count one on statute of
limitations grounds. As the defendant now appropriately
concedes, this was error. See Flaherty v. Sheriff of Suffolk
County, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 157, 161 (2015), quoting Chambers v.
Lemuel Shattuck Hosp. 41 Mass. App. Ct. 211, 213 (1996) ("[W]e
consider each alleged violation of the continuing weekly payment
obligation a new claim for statute of limitations purposes").
However, the defendant requests that we affirm the dismissal of
count one on the alternative ground that Howard's complaint
fails to state a claim. Specifically, the defendant argues that
the complaint does not sufficiently allege that the injuries at
issue (the ones for which Howard was eligible for workers'
compensation) were covered by the assault pay statute, that is,
were ones that "result[ed] from acts of violence in the
courtroom or public areas, holding areas and other designated
areas of the courthouse or from subduing or apprehending
escaping prisoners." G. L. c. 30, § 58. The defendant had
raised that argument in its motion to dismiss, but the judge did
not reach it.
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, a complaint must include "factual 'allegations plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to
relief." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636
(2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557
2 (2007). In determining whether the complaint meets that
standard, "[w]e accept as true the facts alleged in the
plaintiffs' complaint as well as any favorable inferences that
reasonably can be drawn from them." Galiastro v. Mortgage
Electronic Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 164 (2014).
We turn to the specific allegations of the complaint.
Howard alleges that over the course of his employment as a court
officer, he "suffered multiple and recurrent injury to both
hands, the digits of both hands and both wrists resulting from
the physical and/or violent acts of prisoners in his custody
and/or being transported." After referencing ten specific such
incidents between 1998 and 2018 and describing in detail the
nature of the injuries and treatment he received, his complaint
alleges that he has been out of work receiving workers'
compensation since June 5, 2020, "[a]s a result of his work
injuries." It also references the fact that, in 2021, a medical
examiner retained by the trial court concluded -- after
reviewing Howard's medical records -- "that the current
condition and need for treatment is most likely a result of his
34 years as a court officer and repeated trauma and sprains to
the base of both hands. These prior work injuries are a major
cause for the need for treatment, including surgery."
Reading the allegations of the complaint as a whole, along
with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, we
3 conclude that the complaint sufficiently pleads that Howard was
out of work because of, and receiving workers' compensation for,
injuries that qualified under the assault pay statute. In
arguing that the complaint nevertheless fails as a matter of
law, the defendant goes outside the allegations of the
complaint. Specifically, the defendant points to the fact that
when Howard filled out his application for workers'
compensation, he stated that he was injured when he "tripped on
the stair tread." The defendant appears to treat that answer as
a binding admission that the injury for which he was seeking
workers' compensation was caused in a manner that is not
compensable under the assault pay statute (based on Howard's
failure to mention prisoner violence when he applied for
worker's compensation).
Putting aside whether the completed application form was
even properly before the judge on a motion to dismiss,1 we do not
view it as negating the allegations in the complaint that
Howard's injuries were caused by incidents involving violent
1 The workers' compensation application form was not attached to the complaint or referenced in it, and it is doubtful that Howard properly could be said to have relied on it "in framing the complaint." Contrast Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 n.4 (2004) (submittal of contractual documents with defendant's motion to dismiss did not convert motion to one for summary judgment where "plaintiff had notice of these documents and relied on them in framing the complaint"). We need not resolve whether the workers' compensation application form was properly before the judge.
4 prisoners. Even if we were to assume that Howard's most recent
absence from work was precipitated by a noncompensable incident,
that does not preclude Howard from alleging that the incident
served to aggravate the "repeated trauma and sprains" that
Howard sustained from prior incidents that do appear to fit
comfortably within the assault pay statute. Applying the
standards appropriate to motions filed pursuant to Mass. R. Civ.
P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), we conclude that the
allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state an assault
pay claim. To the extent that there is evidence that
potentially contradicts or precludes Howard's claim, that may be
addressed through summary judgment or other appropriate
mechanisms.
In sum, the judge erred in dismissing count one on statute
of limitations grounds, and that ruling cannot be upheld on the
alternative ground that the defendant now presses.
Count two. The judge dismissed Howard's Wage Act claim
based on sovereign immunity. That ruling is supported by
Donahue v. Trial Court, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 183-187 (2021)
(affirming dismissal of court officer's Wage Act claim on
sovereign immunity grounds). Howard seeks to distinguish
Donahue on the ground that it involved an overtime claim, while
here the predicate violation involved the assault pay statute.
We are unpersuaded that this distinction matters. The reasoning
5 of Donahue turned on the fact that the circumstances of a court
officer who is injured while working in a court house do not fit
within the relevant terms of the statute that effected a limited
waiver of sovereign immunity for Wage Act claims. See Donahue
at 185-186 (court officer "is not a mechanic, workman, or
laborer," and "court houses are not penal institutions"). The
same reasoning applies to the case before us. The dismissal of
count two therefore was correct.
We vacate the judgment insofar as it dismissed count one of
the complaint and remand the matter to the Superior Court for
further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.
We affirm the dismissal of count two.
So ordered.
By the Court (Milkey, Massing & Neyman, JJ.2),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: March 14, 2024.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.