William Hoelting v. Hadley Grove Subdivision Homeowners Association

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 11, 2025
• Docket: ED112652
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FIVE

WILLIAM HOELTING, et al., ) No. ED112652 ) Respondents, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lincoln County vs. ) ) Honorable David H. Ash HADLEY GROVE SUBDIVISION ) HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, ) ) Appellant. ) FILED: February 11, 2025

Hadley Grove Subdivision Homeowners Association appeals the circuit court’s grant of

partial summary judgment in favor of William Hoelting, Lisa Hoelting, Jerome Hoelting and

Patricia Hoelting on Count I of the Hoeltings’ petition, which sought injunctive relief for trespass.

Because there is no final, appealable judgment, we dismiss the appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Hoeltings brought a trespass action against the City of Moscow Mills, Houston Homes,

LLC (“Houston Homes”) and Hadley Grove Subdivision Homeowners Association (“Hadley

Grove”) after Houston Homes installed a stormwater drainage pipe on the Hoeltings’ property

without permission. The pipe, which was constructed as part of Houston Homes’s development

of the Hadley Grove subdivision, exits a detention basin on the subdivision’s common ground,

enters the Hoeltings’ property and discharges stormwater directly onto their farmland. In their

petition for trespass, the Hoeltings requested injunctive relief (Count I) and damages (Count II). The Hoeltings filed a motion for summary judgment against Houston Homes “on the issue

of liability” and against Hadley Grove “for liability and an injunction.” After a hearing, the circuit

court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Hoeltings, finding that Houston Homes

was “liable to [the Hoeltings] for construction of the storm sewer line on [their] property without

permission and for damages to [the Hoeltings] accruing while Houston Homes, LLC owned the

storm sewer line.” The circuit court also ordered Hadley Grove to remove the pipe from the

property. The circuit court expressly reserved for trial the issue of the Hoeltings’ damages and the

resolution of various cross-claims among the defendants.

The circuit court certified its partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Rule

74.01(b),1 finding no just reason for delay, and it is from this judgment that Hadley Grove appeals.

After ordering Hadley Grove to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a

final, appealable judgment, this Court directed the parties to brief the jurisdictional issue and took

it with the case.

Discussion

Before we can reach the merits of Hadley Grove’s points on appeal, we have a duty to

determine whether we have the authority to do so. See First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich v. Pointe

Royale Prop. Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 515 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 2017). “The right to appeal

is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.” Wilson v.

City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich,

515 S.W.3d at 221). As relevant here, section 512.020(5)2 provides that “[a]ny party to a suit

aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause . . . may take his or her appeal to a

1 All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024). 2 All statutory references are to RSMo (2016).

2 court having appellate jurisdiction from any: . . . [f]inal judgment in the case . . . .” Generally, a

final judgment is “one that resolves all issues in a case, leaving nothing for future determination.”

First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 221 (internal quotation omitted). “As a result, any

judgment that resolves only part of a claim, or that resolves some of the claims pending in a lawsuit

but leaves others unresolved, [] is not a ‘final judgment’ for purposes of section 512.020(5).” Id.

Rule 74.01(b) “provides a limited exception to this finality requirement.” Id. Where

multiple claims are presented in an action, “[t]he rule authorizes the trial court to enter an

appealable final judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties in the case and to certify that there

is no just reason to delay the appeal of that judgment.” Buemi v. Kerckhoff, 359 S.W.3d 16, 20

(Mo. banc 2011). “[T]he effect of Rule 74.01(b) is to permit severance of any unrelated

substantive claim for relief of the parties and to allow appeal of a final judgment on those severed

claims.” First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 222 (emphasis and internal quotation

omitted). Thus, a circuit court’s designation of a judgment as final is effective only if it disposes

of a “judicial unit” of claims. Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 770-71.

The Supreme Court of Missouri has articulated “two alternate methods for determining if

a judgment disposes of a judicial unit.” Topping Ests. v. Spalitto Living Tr., 680 S.W.3d 144, 150

(Mo. App. E.D. 2023). “Under the first method, a judicial unit is created when a judgment

‘disposes of all claims by or against one or more—but fewer than all—of the parties.’” Id. (quoting

Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 769). “Such a judgment is considered ‘final’ in that it ‘resolves all of the

claims in a lawsuit from the point of view of at least one party, even though other claims by or

against other parties remain to be resolved.’” Id. (quoting Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 769). This

method is inapplicable here because the circuit court’s judgment did not summarily dismiss any

of the parties from the litigation.

3 “The second method does not address the parties to the litigation and instead finds a judicial

unit is disposed of when a judgment ‘resolves one or more claims that are distinct from those

claims that remain to be resolved.’” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 770).

“Claims are ‘distinct’ where they do not arise from the same set of facts, transactions, or

occurrences.” Id. “It is ‘differing,’ ‘separate,’ ‘distinct’ transactions or occurrences that permit a

separately appealable judgment, not differing legal theories or issues presented for recovery on the

same claim.” Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc 1997). Thus, “[a] judgment that

resolves fewer than all legal issues as to any single claim” or “that fails to dispose of all remedies

asserted as to the same legal rights, leaving some remedies open for future adjudication, does not

constitute a final judgment under Rule 74.01(b).” Bannister v. Pulaski Fin. Corp., 255 S.W.3d

538, 541 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008).

Here, the circuit court’s entry of partial summary judgment in favor of the Hoeltings did

not dispose of one claim or a distinct judicial unit. The Hoeltings’ prayer for injunctive relief in

Count I (which the judgment resolved) and their prayer for money damages in Count II (which the

judgment did not resolve and expressly reserved for later adjudication) both arose out of the same

set of facts and the same transaction or occurrence—the unauthorized installation of the

stormwater drainage pipe on their property. Stated another way, the damages the Hoeltings alleged

in Count II did not arise independently of the trespass for which the circuit court found Houston

Homes liable and for which it granted injunctive relief against Hadley Grove. Thus, the two counts

set forth in the Hoeltings’ petition are merely different legal theories seeking to recover relief for

a single claim of trespass. See McClain v. Landmark Equity Grp., LLC, 584 S.W.3d 383, 388-89

(Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (holding that partial summary judgment on three counts of the plaintiff’s

eight-count petition “did not resolve a distinct, judicial unit,” and therefore could not be certified

4 for appeal pursuant to Rule 74.01(b), where all eight counts were “merely different legal theories

seeking to recover damages for the same underlying transaction”).

Because the circuit court’s entry of partial summary judgment “did not resolve a single,

judicial unit,” certification pursuant to Rule 74.01(b) was not proper, and the partial summary

judgment is not a final, appealable judgment. See Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244-45. Therefore, we

have no authority to hear Hadley Grove’s appeal.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

_______________________________ MICHAEL E. GARDNER, Judge

Thomas C. Clark II, C.J., concurs. S. Cotton Walker, Sp.J., concurs.