William Harvey Ellis, Sr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 22, 2017
• Docket: 02A05-1611-CR-2609
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 22 2017, 10:01 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court

the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE William H. Ellis, Sr. Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

William H. Ellis, Sr., March 22, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 02A05-1611-CR-2609 v. Appeal from the Allen Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable John F. Surbeck, Appellee-Plaintiff. Jr., Judge Trial Court Cause No. 02D04-9505-CF-250

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1611-CR-2609 | March 22, 2017 Page 1 of 4 Case Summary [1] Appellant-Defendant William H. Ellis, Sr. was convicted of murder, a felony,

in 1996. He was subsequently sentenced to a sixty-year term of imprisonment

in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). In October of 2016, Ellis filed a

motion to correct an erroneous sentence, alleging that the trial court’s 1996

judgment of conviction was facially deficient because it did not specify the

amount of “good time” credit to which Ellis was entitled for the time he spent

incarcerated prior to sentencing. The trial court denied Ellis’s motion in an

order dated October 21, 2016.

[2] Ellis appeals from the denial of his motion to correct an erroneous sentence.

Because we conclude that any error in the trial court’s 1996 judgment of

conviction is deemed to have been corrected by the presumption set forth by the

Indiana Supreme Court in Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. 2004), we

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] Ellis was charged with murder, a felony, on May 15, 1995. He was

subsequently found guilty and sentenced to a term of sixty years of

imprisonment. On June 27, 1996, the trial court entered a judgement of

conviction in which the trial court indicated that Ellis was “granted credit for

416 days served in jail.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 35. The judgment of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1611-CR-2609 | March 22, 2017 Page 2 of 4 conviction did not specify the amount of good time credit to which Ellis was

entitled for the time he spent incarcerated prior to sentencing.

[4] On October 17, 2016, Ellis filed a motion to correct an erroneous sentence. In

this motion, Ellis asserted that his sentence was erroneous because the

judgment of conviction entered by the trial court stated only that he was

granted credit for the 416 days spent incarcerated prior to sentencing and did

not specify the amount of good time credit to which he was entitled to receive

for the time he spent incarcerated prior to sentencing. The trial court denied

Ellis’s motion in an order dated October 21, 2016. This appeal follows.

Discussion and Decision [5] Ellis contends on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

correct an erroneous sentence, thus deferring the question of good time credit

earned to the DOC. Specifically, Ellis argues that the trial court erred in

denying his motion because the judgment of conviction entered by the trial

court at the time of sentencing did not specify the amount of good time credit to

which he was entitled for time spent incarcerated prior to sentencing. We

disagree.

[6] It is undisputed that the version of Indiana Code section 35-38-3-2 that was in

effect at the time Ellis was sentenced required that a judgment of conviction

must include the amount of credit, including good time credit, earned for time

spent in confinement before sentencing. See Ind. Code § 35-38-3-2(b)(4) (1986).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1611-CR-2609 | March 22, 2017 Page 3 of 4 In an effort to facilitate the fair and expeditious resolution of appellate litigation

arising from sentencing judgments, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted the

following appellate presumption in Robinson:

Sentencing judgments that report only days spent in pre-sentence confinement and fail to expressly designate credit time earned shall be understood by courts and by the [DOC] automatically to award the number of credit time days equal to the number of pre- sentence confinement days. In the event of any pre-sentence deprivation of credit time, the trial court must report it in the sentencing judgment. Because the omission of designation of the statutory credit time entitlement is thus corrected by this presumption, such omission may not be raised as an erroneous sentence.

805 N.E.2d at 792 (Ind. 2004) (footnote omitted).

[7] In this case, the trial court’s judgement of conviction indicated that Ellis was

“granted credit for 416 days served in jail.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 35. It

did not report any deprivation of credit time. As such, the trial court’s

judgment of conviction is entitled to the Robinson presumption and any error

contained therein is accordingly corrected by this presumption. See Robinson,

805 N.E.2d at 792; Pettiford v. State, 808 N.E.2d 134, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying Ellis’s motion to correct an

erroneous sentence.

[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1611-CR-2609 | March 22, 2017 Page 4 of 4