William H. Cook III v. Colette Peters, et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

William H. Cook III, Case No. 3:24-cv-727

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Colette Peters, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On April 22, 2024, pro se Plaintiff William H. Cook III filed this in forma pauperis civil rights action against Colette Peters, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”); David LeMaster, Warden of Ashland Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI Ashland”); FCI Ashland employees S. Gibson (Camp Administrator) and Gregory Patton (Team Counselor); Michelle Fulgum, Manager of the BOP’s Nashville Residential Re-entry Center; Alan Fabry, Kim Ludwig, and Kristen Cooper, Director, Assistant Program Director, and Intake Manager of Volunteers of America OHIN Residential Re-entry Center; Chris Gomez, Regional Director of the BOP; and the BOP’s Office of General Counsel. (Doc. No. 1). On January 17, 2020, I sentenced Plaintiff to a term of 28 months in prison and 2 years of supervised release following his conviction on charges of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and mail fraud. United States v. William H. Cook, III, Case No. 3:16-cr-284 (N.D. Ohio). Plaintiff reported to the BOP on March 1, 2022, and was in custody at FCI Ashland from March 1, 2022 until January 12, 2023. He was released to home confinement on January 28, 2023, and began Service in Cleveland. In his complaint, Plaintiff contends in various counts that Defendants violated his civil rights by failing to release him from prison earlier than he was under BOP guidelines for Home

Confinement, the First Step Act, the CARES Act, and guidelines with respect to Compassionate Release, resulting in him spending more time in prison than he contends he should have. (Doc. No. 1 at 2, 4-12). He seeks equitable relief and damages for “each day of additional and unnecessary” time he contends he spent incarcerated (totally $1,995,800.00). (Id. at 12-13). II. DISCUSSION Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). That statute requires that I review Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss it before service if I find it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which he may be granted relief, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). To survive a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (holding that the dismissal standard for

determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) governs dismissals of in forma pauperis complaints under § 1915(e)(2)). Upon review, I find that Plaintiff’s complaint warrants dismissal under § 1915(e)(2). First, Plaintiff filed a prior lawsuit against virtually the same defendants on the same legal grounds he asserts here, i.e., that his rights were violated on the basis he was not released from prison under the FSA, the CARES Act, and BOP guidelines. Before Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, my colleague, United States District Judge James R. Knepp II dismissed his prior lawsuit on the merits pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). See Cook v. Peters, et al., No. 3:23-cv-2211, 2024 WL 778134 (N.D. Ohio insufficient to state a plausible claim, is duplicative, barred by res judicata, and subject to dismissal as frivolous. See Hill v. Elting, 9 F. App’x 321, 321 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of pro se complaint as frivolous where plaintiff had filed two nearly identical actions that were dismissed

pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)). Second, even if Plaintiff’s claims in this case were not barred by res judicata, his complaint fails to state a plausible federal civil rights claim for the same reasons Judge Knepp stated in his decision dismissing Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit. There is no private right of action under the provisions of federal law Plaintiff cites; Plaintiff’s complaint that he was denied earlier release from prison fails to state a plausible constitutional claim because the Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of [his] valid sentence”; and Plaintiff’s claims do not fall within the specific contexts in which claims against federal officials have been recognized under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Cook, 2024 WL 778134, at *2-3 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)). There is no basis for implying a Bivens claim in the circumstances here. Finally, Plaintiff’s claims are also barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck held that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a prisoner must show that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87. Heck applies to Bivens actions. Cook v. Chief, U.S. Marshal, No. 17-3095, 2018 WL 3655916, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2018) (citing cases). Success on Plaintiff’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement; therefore, he is unable to establish a Bivens of the ways set forth in Heck. He has not done so. III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) in this matter is

granted, and for the foregoing reasons, I dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). I further certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

So Ordered. s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick United States District Judge