William Godby v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided August 14, 2023·No. CH-1221-21-0147-W-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

WILLIAM D. GODBY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-1221-21-0147-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: August 14, 2023 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

David Torchia, Esquire, Cincinnati, Ohio, for the appellant.

Matthew O. Kortjohn, Esquire, Dayton, Ohio, for the agency.

Nicholas Kennedy, Esquire, Akron, Ohio, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which granted in part and denied in part the appellant’s request for corrective action under 5 U.S.C. § 1221. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

¶2 Under the evidentiary framework of 5 U.S.C. § 1221, the Board first determines whether the appellant has established by preponderant evidence 2 that he made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C) or (D). See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230,

¶ 5 (2016); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.7(a). Next, the Board determines whether the protected disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action that was threatened, proposed, taken, or not taken. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5; 5 C.F.R. § 1209.7(a). If the respondent makes both of these showings by preponderant evidence, the burden of persuasion shifts to the agency to demonstrate by clear and convincing

2 Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).

evidence 3 that it would have threatened, proposed, taken, or not taken the same personnel action in the absence of the disclosure or other protected activity. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5; 5 C.F.R. § 1209.7(b); see also Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

¶3 In determining whether an agency has met its burden by clear and convincing evidence, the Board will consider the following factors, which were coincidentally first set forth in Carr: (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of the personnel action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated. Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323. The Board does not view these factors as discrete elements, each of which the agency must prove by clear and convincing evidence, but instead weighs the factors together to determine if the evidence is clear and convincing as a whole. Elder v. Department of the Air Force, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 42 (2016). Our reviewing court has further clarified that “[e]vidence only clearly and convincingly supports a conclusion when it does so in the aggregate considering all the pertinent evidence in the record, and despite the evidence that fairly detracts from that conclusion.” 4 Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

3 Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof that produces in the mind of a trier of fact a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be estab lished. 5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(e). 4 The court made that statement in the course of explaining that Congress imposed a heightened burden of proof on the agency to compensate for the “evidentiary disadvantages” faced by whistleblowers. Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see 135 Cong. Rec. H747-48 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (explanatory statement on Senate Amendment S. 20) (explaining that the hi gher burden of proof required of the agency “recognizes that when it comes to proving the basis of an agency’s decision, the agency controls most of the cards —the drafting of the documents supporting the decision, the testimony of witnesses who participate d in the

¶4 In its petition for review, the agency contends that the administrative judge did not consider all the record evidence, as required under Whitmore. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. However, as the administrative judge observed, the agency made no attempt below to show by clear and convincing evidence that, in the absence of the appellant’s whistleblowing, it still would not have selected him for the Operations Manager in 2017. 5 Rather than acknowledge its burden of proof, the agency instead contended that the burden of proof was on the appellant to show that his qualifications were “plainly superior” to that of the selectee. Hearing Transcript, Day 3 at 623-24. In effect, the agency waived its opportunity to rebut the appellant’s prima facie case of retaliation.

¶5 The agency’s attempt to shift the burden of proof to the appellant is unavailing. On review, the agency argues that evaluating the select ee’s qualifications is “especially vital” in individual right of action (IRA) appeals of nonselections, because in nonselection cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 6 a complainant can only prove an illegal hiring practice if his qualifications are “plainly superior” to those of the selectee. This is so, the agency argues, because “Title VII is not a vehicle for substituting the judgment of a court for that of the employer.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 9 (quoting Jiminez v. Mary Wash. Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 1995)). While the agency concedes—as it must—that this case is not governed by Title VII, it

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William Godby v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2023).

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