Opinion of the Court
asserting it never requested or agreed to the services and that statutory law, not
equitable principles, governs cleanup costs. The trial court granted summary
judgment for defendant, finding no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff appeals,
arguing that sufficient evidence supports its claim. Jurisdiction is proper under
N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1) as a final judgment of the trial court. Upon review, we affirm.
I.
On 22 August 2017, a tractor-trailer owned by defendant Finishline Trucking,
L.L.C., overturned in Davie County, North Carolina, resulting in a fire and the
release of diesel fuel and other automotive fluids. Emergency responders, including
the Davie County Fire Marshal’s Office and Emergency Management Services
(“EMS”), arrived at the scene. Fire Marshal Jerry Myers determined a cleanup was
necessary and contacted plaintiff William Fulp Wrecker Service, Inc. to assist in
containing and remediating the spill. Plaintiff’s work spanned nine days, involving
personnel, equipment, and oversight from the North Carolina Department of
Environmental Quality (“NCDEQ”) and a geologist who conducted soil and water
testing.
Plaintiff contends defendant was aware of and accepted the benefit of the
cleanup, citing communications between Kent Fulp, plaintiff’s vice president, and an
individual he believed to be Edward Garcia, Finishline’s owner. Plaintiff further
states defendant’s representative provided insurance details, indicating an
expectation that coverage would apply. Plaintiff sent defendant an invoice for
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$289,707.00 on 14 September 2017 but received no payment.
Defendant, however, denies authorizing, agreeing to pay for, or assuming
responsibility for plaintiff’s services. Defendant argues the cleanup was arranged
solely by Fire Marshal Myers, and it was not involved in the decision-making process
regarding the scope or cost of the remediation. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendant, concluding that no genuine issue of material fact
existed regarding defendant’s liability. Plaintiff appeals that ruling.
II.
“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such
judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that ‘there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573 (2008) (citation omitted). “A ‘genuine issue’ is
one that can be maintained by substantial evidence. The showing required for
summary judgment may be accomplished by proving an essential element of the
opposing party’s claim does not exist, cannot be proven at trial, or would be barred by
an affirmative defense.” Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83 (2000) (internal citations
omitted).
Unjust enrichment is “a claim in quasi contract or a contract implied in law.”
Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570 (1988). A prima facie claim for unjust enrichment
requires proof of five elements: (1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the
defendant; (2) the benefit was not conferred officiously, meaning it was not imposed
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through unjustified interference; (3) the benefit was not gratuitous; (4) the benefit is
measurable; and (5) the defendant consciously accepted the benefit. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Browning, 230 N.C. App. 537, 541–42 (2013). To establish
liability, a plaintiff must show that property or benefits were conferred on the
defendant under circumstances that create a legal or equitable obligation to
compensate for those benefits, but that the defendant has failed to make restitution.
Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 140 N.C. App. 390, 417 (2000).
In this case, the State, not defendant, directly benefited from the cleanup.
North Carolina law authorizes agencies like NCDEQ and local emergency
management to oversee and direct hazardous material spill remediation to protect
public health and the environment. See § 143-215.84(b). Here, these agencies took
control of the cleanup process, coordinating and directing the response.
The forecast of evidence does not indicate defendant requested, approved, or
exercised any control over the remediation, nor did it determine its scope or cost. The
benefit conferred was to the State and the public. Under the statutory framework,
cost recovery is pursued through State enforcement mechanisms, further indicating
the State—not defendant—was the intended beneficiary of the remediation efforts.
Because unjust enrichment requires a party to have “consciously accepted the
benefit[,]” Booe, 322 N.C. at 570, defendant cannot be held directly liable to plaintiff
for cleanup costs merely due to its involvement in the underlying spill. Without
evidence that defendant requested, controlled, or otherwise knowingly accepted the
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benefit, the unjust enrichment claim against defendant fails as a matter of law.
Plaintiff argues the North Carolina Fire Code, specifically §§ 2701 and 2703,
imposes financial responsibility on defendant by requiring parties who store, handle,
or transport hazardous materials to cover cleanup costs. However, § 101.2 states the
Fire Code regulates “structures, processes, premises, and safeguards,” but does not
govern the discharge of diesel oil onto land or into waters. Because the Fire Code
does not establish liability or cost recovery procedures for such discharges, it does not
apply to this claim.
In contrast, defendant argues the Oil Pollution and Hazardous Substances
Control Act of 1978, codified in N.C.G.S. § 143-215.75 et seq., governs liability and
cost recovery for hazardous material spills in North Carolina. This statutory
framework establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme for state agencies to
recover cleanup costs. Because the Act provides a specific enforcement mechanism,
defendant contends it preempts plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, making the
State—not a private entity—the proper party to seek reimbursement. We agree.
Under N.C.G.S. § 143-215.84(a), any person responsible for an unlawful
discharge of oil or hazardous substances must immediately clean up the spill and
restore the affected area. This provision establishes a clear duty for responsible
parties to mitigate environmental damage. However, § 143-215.84(b) grants the
Department of Environmental Quality authority to intervene when necessary,
allowing it to deploy state resources, collaborate with local agencies, or hire
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contractors to investigate and remediate contamination.
Additionally, N.C.G.S. § 143-215.88 provides a structured reimbursement
process for state-incurred cleanup costs. Once remediation is complete, participating
state or local agencies submit expenses to the Department, which then disburses
funds from the Oil or Other Hazardous Substances Pollution Protection Fund. The
Secretary must seek reimbursement from the responsible party, and if payment is
not made, the Attorney General is authorized to initiate legal action to recover costs
on behalf of the State. § 143-215.88. This process makes clear that liability for
cleanup costs lies with the responsible party, but only the State—not private
entities—can enforce payment through statutory means.
In this case, Fire Marshal and Emergency Management Director Jerry Myers
authorized plaintiff to conduct diesel oil containment, mitigation, cleanup, and
remediation. NCDEQ conducted an on-site assessment with Davie County
Emergency Management, a geologist from GeoScience & Technology, and plaintiff’s
site managers to discuss cleanup procedures and establish daily stream monitoring.
Defendant was not involved in this process. The agreement for remediation was
between Fire Marshal Myers and plaintiff, yet plaintiff now attempts to bind
defendant—a third party—to that agreement despite no evidence that defendant
requested or authorized that work.
Plaintiff argues Davie County Ordinance § 51.63 imposes strict liability on
defendant for cleanup costs, asserting it applies to transporters of hazardous
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materials in Davie County and requires reimbursement for emergency response and
remediation. Plaintiff relies on § 51.63(d) to claim that defendant, as the transporter
of the spilled materials, is financially responsible for the cleanup and contends that
this ordinance, along with state environmental laws, supports an unjust enrichment
claim by establishing a legal obligation for defendant to cover the costs incurred.
However, N.C.G.S. § 153A-136(a) only authorizes counties to regulate
“nonhazardous solid waste,” explicitly excluding hazardous waste under § 153A-
136(d). Because § 51.63 attempts to impose liability for hazardous material spills
from transportation accidents, it exceeds the county’s regulatory authority. Since
diesel fuel and automotive fluids do not qualify as nonhazardous solid waste, the
ordinance does not apply, making plaintiff’s reliance on it misplaced.
III.
Plaintiff performed the remediation at the direction of government agencies,
and the evidence does not indicate defendant requested, authorized, or knowingly
accepted the benefit. Since unjust enrichment requires conscious acceptance of a
benefit, Booe, 322 N.C. at 570, plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element of
its claim. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment
in favor of defendant.
AFFIRMED.
Judges HAMPSON and MURRY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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