William Fuller v. the City of Miami

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 7, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-1694
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 7, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________

No. 3D24-1694 Lower Tribunal No. 24-793-CA-01 ________________

William Fuller, et al., Appellants,

vs.

The City of Miami, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Daryl E. Trawick, Judge.

AXS Law Group, PLLC, and Jeffrey W. Gutchess and Samuel Jacob Etkin Kramer and Jack S. Flagg, for appellants.

Dentons US LLP, and Angel A. Cortiñas, for appellee City of Miami.

Rivero Mestre LLP, and Jorge Alejandro Mestre, Alan H. Rolnick, Patricija Gregznaite, Robert J. Kuntz, Jr., and Christina M. Ceballos-Levy, for appellee Joe Carollo.

Before LOGUE, BOKOR and GOODEN, JJ.

BOKOR, J. In 2018, William Fuller and Martin Pinilla sued City of Miami

Commissioner Joe Carollo, in his individual capacity, under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Fuller and Pinilla alleged that Carollo, under color of law, weaponized

city resources and engaged in a yearslong campaign of retaliation and

harassment against them and their businesses located in the City of Miami

because of Fuller and Pinilla’s support for Carollo’s unsuccessful political

opponent. After a weekslong federal jury trial, vigorously contested by

Carollo, in 2023 the jury found Carollo liable and awarded Fuller and Pinilla

over $63 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Relying on that

federal verdict and final judgment, Fuller, Pinilla, and others sued the City of

Miami and Carollo under the City of Miami Charter Citizens’ Bill of Rights,

seeking Carollo’s removal from office. The trial court dismissed the action

with prejudice. To be clear, we do not condone Carollo’s shocking and

egregious behavior underpinning the unanimous federal jury verdict and final

judgment. But for the reasons explained below, we agree with the trial court

that the appellants lack standing and the removal provision may only be

invoked upon the finding of a charter violation attributable to the City.

I.

2 The dispute traces back to 2018, when the original plaintiffs in the

action below, Fuller and Pinilla, brought a federal civil rights action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Carollo in his individual capacity. That action alleged

that Carollo unlawfully used his position as city commissioner to retaliate

against Fuller and Pinilla for advocating in support of Carollo’s political

opponent. In June 2023, after a jury trial in the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida, United States District Judge Rodney

Smith entered a judgment finding Carollo liable and awarding Fuller and

Pinilla a combined total of over $63 million in damages. The verdict form

included express findings that Carollo intentionally violated Fuller and

Pinilla’s constitutional rights to free speech and assembly and that these acts

were done under color of state law. But the verdict also found Carollo liable

only in his individual capacity and did not make any finding that he was acting

under City policy or established custom.

Pursuant to this judgment, Fuller and Pinilla sought a declaratory

judgment and writ of quo warranto finding that the City was obligated to

remove Carollo from office under the City of Miami Charter Citizens’ Bill of

Rights. The Citizens’ Bill of Rights prohibits the City from violating its citizens’

rights of free speech and assembly, allows residents to bring an action in the

3 circuit court to vindicate these rights, and provides that public officials found

by the court to have violated these rights shall forfeit their office.

Because Fuller and Pinilla concede that they are not residents of the

City, the trial court twice dismissed the complaint without prejudice due to

lack of standing. In the operative second amended complaint, Fuller and

Pinilla added more plaintiffs, including various Miami businesses they owned

and operated, as well as an individual resident and taxpayer, Denise Galvez-

Turros. As the plaintiffs asserted, Carollo’s actions caused them to suffer a

chilling of their own free speech rights, though they also asserted a public

right to enforce the Charter regardless of whether they suffered any direct

harm from the violation. Carollo and the City again moved to dismiss, and

the trial court granted dismissal with prejudice. The trial court found that the

plaintiffs (now appellants) lacked standing, failed to allege a special injury,

and that the judgment against Carollo in his individual capacity did not

support standing for a declaratory claim or confer a cause of action under

the Citizens’ Bill of Rights. This appeal followed.

II.

We generally review an order dismissing a claim for declaratory

judgment for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Bloch v. Del Rey, 208 So. 3d

189, 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). But “to the extent that the dismissal is based

4 upon a legal determination, our review is de novo.” Id. Also, “[d]etermining

whether a party has standing is a pure question of law to be reviewed de

novo.” Herbits v. City of Miami, 207 So. 3d 274, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)

(quotation omitted). To the extent we consider the denial of the petition for

quo warranto, our review is for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Israel v.

Desantis, 269 So. 3d 491, 494 (Fla. 2019).

III.

The Citizens’ Bill of Rights “guarantees the following additional rights

to its Citizens,” including as the third enumerated right: “Speech, Assembly

and Press. The City shall not interfere with the rights: (i) of freedom of

speech; (ii) of freedom of the press; (iii) to petition the government, or (iv) to

peaceable assembly.” City of Miami Code of Ordinances, Citizens’ Bill of

Rights § (A)(3). With respect to enforcement, the Citizens’ Bill of Rights

provides:

Residents of the City shall have standing to bring legal actions to enforce the City Charter, the Citizens’ Bill of Rights, and the Miami-Dade County Citizens’ Bill of Rights as applied to the City. Such actions shall be filed in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court pursuant to its general equity jurisdiction and, if successful, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover costs, but not attorney’s fees, as fixed by the court. Any public official, or employee who is found by the court to have willfully violated this section shall forthwith forfeit his or her office or employment.

Id. § (C).

5 We first examine the standing of the appellants to bring suit under the

Charter. The parties agree that Galvez-Turros is a “[r]esident[] of the City”

for purposes of the Charter, and that Fuller and Pinilla are not. Because

Fuller and Pinilla aren’t residents, they have no standing to sue. Galvez-

Turros meets the initial threshold of being a “resident,” but she nonetheless

lacks standing. This is because “[c]itizens and taxpayers lack standing to

challenge a governmental action unless they demonstrate either a special

injury, different from the injuries to other citizens and taxpayers, or unless

the claim is based on the violation of a provision of the Constitution that

governs the taxing and spending powers.” Solares v. City of Miami, 166 So.

3d 887, 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (noting also that “a city charter does not rise

to the level of the Florida Constitution for purposes of creating an exception

to standing”); see also N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So. 2d 154,

155 (Fla. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of a constitutional challenge, a taxpayer

may bring suit only upon a showing of special injury which is distinct from

that suffered by other taxpayers in the taxing district.” (quotation omitted));

Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832, 837 (Fla. 1972) (“The interest may

be one shared in common with a number of other members of the community

as where an entire neighborhood is affected, but not every resident and

property owner of a municipality can, as a general rule, claim such an

6 interest. An individual having standing must have a definite interest

exceeding the general interest in community good share in common with all

citizens.”).

Here, the only appellants found by the federal judgment to have been

harmed were Fuller and Pinilla, who acknowledge that they are not

“residents” of the City under the Citizens’ Bill of Rights. All other appellants

assert standing as “citizens and taxpayers.” Galvez-Turros alleges no

special injury. The business entities attempt to plead special injury, but only

indirectly through their association with Fuller and Pinilla. They rely on one

line from the federal case finding that Carollo’s acts of retaliation included

“attempting to shut down [Fuller and Pinilla’s], or their tenants’, businesses.”

Fuller v. Carollo, No. 18-24190, 2024 WL 3838519, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21,

2024). But the business entities’ conclusive and, at most, derivative

allegation of an injury fails to establish standing. See Alterra Healthcare

Corp. v. Est. of Shelley, 827 So. 2d 936, 941 (Fla. 2002) (“In the ordinary

course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and

cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”

(quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991))); see also Herbits, 207

So. 3d at 283 (affirming dismissal with prejudice for lack of special injury

“nexus” between alleged city charter violations and harm to plaintiffs).

7 IV.

In examining whether Fuller and Pinilla have shown a violation of the

Citizens’ Bill of Rights, we emphasize the fact that the federal judgment

contains no finding of liability attributable to the City. Fuller and Pinilla sued

Carollo in his individual capacity. And that is the judgment they obtained.

There is a separate, unresolved federal lawsuit pending against the City. Yet

the appellants seek to short circuit that lawsuit and impute to the City the

federal findings against Carollo in his individual capacity. But the federal

judgment is not so far-reaching.

In a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a local

government may only be sued for an injury inflicted by an employee or agent

“when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York,

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty.,

285 F.3d 962, 966 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A plaintiff can establish § 1983 liability

by identifying that she has been deprived of constitutional rights by either an

express policy or a widespread practice that, although not authorized by

written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as

to constitute a custom and usage with the force of law.” (quotation omitted)).

8 Because the federal case proceeded against Carollo in his individual

capacity, there’s no finding that Carollo acted according to an official policy

or custom of the City.1 So the trial court here (and the federal district judge

when specifically asked) correctly declined to read a finding into the federal

judgment that the jury did not make.

And the lack of such a finding against the City is fatal to the claim here.

Based on a careful reading of the Citizens’ Bill of Rights, a finding of liability

against the City forms a prerequisite to a resident’s ability “enforce the City

Charter” or “the Citizens’ Bill of Rights.” City of Miami Code of Ordinances,

Citizens’ Bill of Rights § (C). We come to this conclusion by analyzing the

meaning of the text at issue. See Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594,

598 (Fla. 2022) (explaining that we should interpret statutory provisions “by

reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language

is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole” (quotation

omitted)).

1 Fuller and Pinilla base the underlying removal action on the federal judgment against Carollo in his individual capacity under 23 U.S.C. § 1983. We have not been asked to determine, nor do we take a position on, whether there are other vehicles through which a court of competent jurisdiction could determine that the City violated its citizens’ rights under the Citizens’ Bill of Rights.

9 We first look at the text itself and then the broader context. The

appellants seek Carollo’s removal under a provision entitled “Remedies for

violations.” City of Miami Code of Ordinances, Citizens’ Bill of Rights § (C).

It is that provision, the appellants argue, that gives them the right to enforce

the Citizens’ Bill of Rights and seek Carollo’s removal. We agree with the

general proposition encapsulated by the plain language that “[r]esidents of

the City shall have standing to bring legal actions to enforce . . . the Citizens’

Bill of Rights.” Id. And that same paragraph admonishes that “[a]ny public

official . . . found by the court to have willfully violated this section shall

forthwith forfeit his or her office or employment.” Id. But focusing exclusively

on that provision misses much context, not to mention divorces the remedy

sought from the violation of the right claimed. And the Citizens’ Bill of Rights

addresses both the rights and the remedies.

So we must also examine the section of the Citizens’ Bill of Rights the

appellants claim Carollo willfully violated. The text of that section declares

that: “The City shall not interfere with the rights: (i) of freedom of speech; (ii)

of freedom of the press; (iii) to petition the government, or (iv) to peaceable

assembly.” Id. § (A)(3). We must give every word meaning and harmonize

the provisions, wherever possible. See Giamberini v. Dep’t of Fin. Servs.,

162 So. 3d 1133, 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (reiterating that “[a] statute

10 should be interpreted to give effect to every clause in it, and to accord

meaning and harmony to all of its parts” and “[a] single word or provision of

a statute cannot be read in isolation” (quotation omitted)). Except for sections

(A)(6)–(7), which promote certain environmental policies, the Citizens’ Bill of

Rights structures the rights as a limitation on the City’s power or authority.

While state constitutions (or municipal charters, consistent with state law)

“may provide broader protections than those conferred by the United States

Constitution,” we find nothing in the text of section (A)(3) that provides

greater rights than those conferred by the federal or state constitutions. Scott

v. State, 368 So. 3d 8, 10 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Both the federal and state

constitutional rights to free speech and expressive political activities apply

not against private actors but “against government infringement.” Id. Nothing

in the text of the Citizens’ Bill of Rights would suggest any other result here.

In fact, the text specifically exclaims that “[t]he City shall not interfere” with

those same rights. City of Miami Code of Ordinances, Citizens’ Bill of Rights

§ (A)(3).

That analysis, that the right protected under the Citizens’ Bill of Rights

is freedom from government infringement, leads us to our conclusion. A

finding against Carollo in his individual capacity is not a finding of

government infringement of the right of freedom of speech guaranteed under

11 the Citizens’ Bill of Rights. So Carollo can’t be removed for willfully violating

a section that the City hasn’t yet been found to have violated.2

V.

A federal jury awarded significant damages, including punitive

damages, based on Carollo’s acts in his individual capacity. We do not

minimize that finding or its consequences. But, for the reasons explained,

principles of standing and a plain reading of the Citizens’ Bill of Rights

compel affirmance.

Affirmed.

2 We decline to address the contours and limitations of the writ of quo warranto relief as it does not impact our analysis or conclusion based on standing and textual analysis of the provision at issue.