William Flaugher v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Opinion

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2026; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2025-CA-0731-MR

WILLIAM FLAUGHER APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JEFFREY L. SCHUMACHER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CR-00034

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: EASTON, A. JONES, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES. MOYNAHAN, JUDGE: William Flaugher appeals from the order of the Fleming Circuit Court upon a conditional guilty plea following denial of motion to suppress evidence. Following careful review of the facts and law, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The facts are undisputed and brief. On June 15, 2024, while traveling on Goddard Road, Fleming County Sheriff Department Deputy James Welch observed a white SUV driven by Flaugher and performed a search on the license plate number. However, the license plate was partially obscured by a hauling hitch and Deputy Welch mistakenly ran the wrong number. When the search indicated a different vehicle associated with the number, Deputy Welch initiated a traffic stop of the SUV.

Deputy Dustin Cooper was following behind Deputy Welch and joined the stop. They approached the SUV together. At that time, Deputy Welch realized that he had called in the incorrect license plate number. However, the officers saw that Flaugher was not wearing a seatbelt. Deputy Cooper returned to his vehicle with Flaugher’s driver’s license and proceeded to run a check of it along with a check of the correct license plate number. Deputy Cooper also began writing a citation for Flaugher’s failure to wear a seatbelt.

As Deputy Cooper investigated Flaugher’s documentation and wrote the citation, Deputy Welch retrieved K-9 Officer Rex from his vehicle. Officer Rex quickly detected drugs. A search of the vehicle revealed pre-rolled marijuana and approximately 17 grams of methamphetamine.

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Flaugher was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance, first offense, more than 2 grams (methamphetamine); trafficking in a controlled substance, first offense, marijuana less than 8 ounces; not wearing a seatbelt; failure to register transfer of a motor vehicle; and possession of drug paraphernalia.

On February 14, 2025, Flaugher filed a motion to suppress the evidence in his vehicle, arguing that Officer Rex’s search had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on March 28, 2025.

Flaugher then pleaded guilty to all original charges with the trafficking of marijuana amended to possession of marijuana. He received a total sentence of five years of confinement. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard of review is two-fold. “We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error, and deem conclusive the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Ky. 2011). The second prong is de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law. Id.

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ANALYSIS

Flaugher does not dispute that the traffic stop and search of his vehicle were lawful. Nonetheless, a brief recitation of the pertinent law is helpful for our analysis.

Foundationally, an officer’s objectively reasonable belief that a traffic violation has occurred provides proper basis for a traffic stop. Commonwealth v. Lane, 553 S.W.3d 203, 205 (Ky. 2018). On point for this case, when an officer has “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered . . . detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile” is reasonable. Traft v. Commonwealth, 539 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)).

Additionally, canine searches are permissible in the course of a lawful stop if they do not prolong or extend the stop beyond the time needed for duties related to the initial reason. Commonwealth v. Clayborne, 635 S.W.3d 818, 824- 25 (Ky. 2021). Pertinent to Flaugher’s case, if “one officer continue[s] issuing the citation while another officer simultaneously conduct[s] a dog sniff, that search [is] permissible. . . . [A] dog sniff executed concurrently with diligent traffic-related work did not unduly prolong the stop, even absent independent justification for the dog sniff.” Id. at 827 (citations omitted).

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Again, Flaugher does not dispute the legality of the traffic stop and Officer Rex’s search. Instead, he sets forth his objective as, “[my] argument is simply that calling in the wrong plate number, while conveniently being a canine patrol unit, is not a reasonable mistake. [I am] asking the Court to amend, modify, or otherwise change the existing law on this particular issue under these particular set of facts.” As grounds, Flaugher claims that canine officers have the ability to manufacture mistakes which would justify traffic stops and, therefore, should be prohibited from initiating stops.

We must decline Flaugher’s invitation. “The Court of Appeals is bound by and shall follow applicable precedents established in the opinions of the Supreme Court and its predecessor.” Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 1.030(8)(a). Our role is “to afford every litigant the right of an appeal and to correct any errors committed at the trial level. Conversely, it is not our function to establish new rules of law or enunciate changes in Kentucky jurisprudence.” Tucker v. Tri-State Lawn & Garden, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky. App. 1986).

If this Court believes that the current law is uncertain or unsound, we may urge the Supreme Court to examine it. Id. In this case, however, we have no reason to question the law as it pertains to canine searches in the context of traffic stops. Our Supreme Court has clearly established Kentucky law concerning the legality of traffic stops and canine searches.

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Furthermore, there is no place in the law for the presumption that law enforcement officers act nefariously to effect traffic stops and we will not ask the Supreme Court to recognize or create such a presumption. “[T]he subjective intentions of police officers are irrelevant to judicial determinations of reasonableness.” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 180 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Ky. 2005). A police officer’s veracity is a credibility determination to be made by a finder of fact, whether a judge or a jury. See Ross v. Commonwealth, 531 S.W.3d 471 (Ky. 2017).

Regardless, there is no logical basis for a rule that a canine officer should be hampered from performing their duties. In fact, Deputy Welch testified that if Deputy Cooper had not been present, he would not have engaged Officer Rex because that would have unlawfully extended the stop. He could not have performed the canine search without Deputy Cooper working simultaneously.1 As our Supreme Court said in Clayborne, “the rule we clarify today prioritizes the length of a burden on personal liberty over the depth of its intrusion. This choice is a conscious one . . . that serves to balance the competing interests in the Fourth Amendment and in safe, effective, and proactive policing.” Clayborne, supra. Flaugher’s proposed policy of prohibiting police officers from performing

1 While Flaugher asserts that the law currently allows a “loophole” for officers to expand their investigative scope, he arguably seeks to create a loophole benefitting those who violate drug laws.

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their duties simply because they are accompanied by a canine officer goes against the interest of guarding public safety.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment and sentence entered by the Fleming Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Paul J. Dickman Russell Coleman Covington, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Melissa A. Pile

Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky