April 20, 2023 Supreme Court
No. 2021-267-Appeal. (PC 07-6702)
William Felkner :
v. :
Rhode Island College et al. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme
Court on December 6, 2022, on appeal by the plaintiff, William Felkner (Felkner or
plaintiff), from entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Rhode Island
College (RIC), John Nazarian (Nazarian), Carol Bennett-Speight (Dean Bennett-
Speight), James Ryczek (Professor Ryczek), Roberta Pearlmutter (Professor
Pearlmutter), and S. Scott Mueller (Professor Mueller), (collectively, defendants).1
Before this Court, the plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred in granting
1 More specifically, defendants are: John Nazarian, President of RIC at the time Felkner was enrolled at the School of Social Work (SSW); Carol Bennett-Speight, Dean of the SSW at relevant times; James Ryczek, an adjunct professor at the SSW at relevant times; Roberta Pearlmutter, a professor of social work at the SSW at relevant times; and S. Scott Mueller, an assistant professor of social work at the SSW at relevant times. Felkner v. Rhode Island College, 203 A.3d 433, 440 n.2 (R.I. 2019) (Felkner I). -1- summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The plaintiff also
contends that the hearing justice disregarded this Court’s mandate when the case was
remanded to the Superior Court. Finally, the plaintiff argues that the hearing justice
improperly resolved questions of material fact in granting summary judgment. For
the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
This is not the first time Felkner has appeared before this Court. A full
rendition of the original facts and travel can be found at Felkner v. Rhode Island
College, 203 A.3d 433 (R.I. 2019) (Felkner I). We will, however, recite the facts
and travel pertinent to the instant appeal. Felkner, who describes himself as a
“conservative libertarian,” began pursuit of a Master of Social Work degree at RIC
in 2004. Shortly thereafter, he learned that the School of Social Work (the SSW)
would be sponsoring a showing of the movie Fahrenheit 9/11.2 Felkner objected to
the showing of the film to Professor Ryczek, his instructor for a foundational course,
and requested that the SSW show a rebuttal film that represented the conservative
view-point. Professor Ryczek responded that the SSW has a mission dedicated to
social and economic justice and suggested that:
2 Fahrenheit 9/11 is a documentary film written and directed by filmmaker, author, and political commentator Michael Moore that takes a liberal, critical look at the presidency of George W. Bush, the war in Iraq, and its coverage in the media. Fahrenheit 9/11 (Michael Moore 2004). -2- “[I]f a student finds that they are consistently and regularly experiencing opposite views from what is being taught and espoused in the curriculum, or the professional ‘norms’ that keep coming up in class and in field, then their fit with the profession will not get any more comfortable, and in fact will most likely become increasingly uncomfortable.”
The sponsor of the film presentation, Professor Daniel Weisman (Professor
Weisman), responded to Felkner that the SSW was “not committed to balanced
presentations” and that, “[f]or the most part, Republican ideology is oppositional”
to the fundamental values of the social work profession. Nevertheless, Professor
Weisman did show the rebuttal film suggested by Felkner to the same classes that
saw the first film because he felt it was “the reasonable thing to do.”
In Professor Ryczek’s course, students were assigned a group project in which
they were to advocate for a social welfare issue in class and compose a policy paper
promoting the group’s position. According to Felkner, Professor Ryczek provided
a list of issues the students could choose from, all of which involved, in Felkner’s
words, “a leftist position on social welfare issues.” Professor Ryczek indicated that
the students would advocate on behalf of their selected issue and lobby the General
Assembly in the next semester’s course. Felkner joined a class group advocating for
passage of Senate Bill 525 (SB 525), a proposed amendment to a “temporary cash
assistance program for Rhode Islanders having a difficult time making ends meet.”
Felkner later requested permission from Professor Ryczek to advocate in opposition
to SB 525 in the class debate because, according to Felkner, “SB 525 did not actually -3- help people get off welfare with higher-paying jobs * * *.” Professor Ryczek
refused to allow Felkner to change his debate position and required Felkner to argue
in favor of SB 525. According to Felkner, Professor Ryczek told him that RIC was
a “perspective school” and that if Felkner was to lobby on SB 525, it would need to
be “in [RIC’s] perspective.”3 Additionally, Felkner wrote his policy paper from a
perspective opposing the passage of SB 525.
After complaints from group members that Felkner was not participating in
accordance with class expectations, Professor Ryzcek disaggregated Felkner’s grade
from the group. He went on to give Felkner a failing grade for the debate and on his
paper, and ultimately gave Felkner a C-plus grade for the course. Felkner appealed
his failing grades for the paper and the debate to the Academic Standing Committee
(ASC).
On January 20, 2005, a hearing was held before the ASC on Felkner’s appeal
of his grades. According to Felkner, he did not have the opportunity to question
Professor Ryczek at the hearing because Professor Ryczek left the room immediately
after his testimony. Felkner believed that Professor Ryczek had given inaccurate
testimony to the ASC regarding conversations between them and announced that he
3 This issue was ultimately resolved as stated in Felkner I: “There is no dispute that, although Professor Ryczek initially told Felkner he would be required to lobby from a perspective contrary to his own views, Felkner never was compelled to lobby or testify at a public hearing.” Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 452. -4- would hereafter record all of his conversations with RIC professors in order to
document them accurately. The ASC denied Felkner’s appeal, and he further
pursued the case to the chair of the Master of Social Work (MSW) program, Dr.
Lenore Olsen, and then to the dean of the SSW, Dean Bennett-Speight.
The decision of the ASC was upheld in both instances. Felkner approached
the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE)4 about his alleged
mistreatment. RIC’s then-President, Nazarian, received a letter from FIRE, dated
January 28, 2005, stating that RIC should reconsider the appeal and withdraw its
policies because they are unconstitutional. In a letter, Nazarian replied to FIRE that
no RIC student had been punished for failing to embrace a certain political position.
At the end of the course, Professor Ryczek informed Dr. Olsen that he would
not teach the second half of the class the next semester because, as an adjunct faculty
member, managing Felkner required too much of his time. Felkner was moved to a
section of the course taught by a full-time instructor. In an assignment that required
approval by Professor Pearlmutter, Felkner proposed that he would form a group
with students from other colleges to lobby RIC for an Academic Bill of Rights.
4 FIRE describes itself as a tax-exempt nonprofit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code with a mission to defend and promote the value of free speech for all Americans in courtrooms, on campuses, and in American culture. FIRE’s Mission, https://www.thefire.org/about-us/mission (last visited December 15, 2022). FIRE has since modified its name to the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression. -5- Professor Pearlmutter rejected this proposal. Felkner then submitted a project
request to lobby in favor of the then-governor’s proposed welfare-reform program.
This suggestion was also rejected.
Subsequently, Professor Pearlmutter permitted Felkner to work on a project
lobbying for the defeat of SB 525. Professor Pearlmutter told Felkner that she would
penalize his grade on the project if he did not work on it with students from her class.
Felkner, however, chose to work in a group with two individuals from outside of
RIC. 5 Additionally, Felkner audio-recorded an exchange with Professor Pearlmutter
without her knowledge and went on to post a rough transcript of the conversation to
the website he had created to expose what he characterized as the “liberal bias” at
RIC. Several students approached Professor Pearlmutter about the confidentiality
of the class being compromised by Felkner’s website postings. She allowed students
to discuss their concerns about the website one day in class. Felkner asserted that
his political ideology was “assail[ed]” in the classroom and that Professor
Pearlmutter would not give him the opportunity to respond. Felkner further asserted
that Professor Pearlmutter unmistakably communicated that only liberal ideas could
help the poor and advance the cause of social justice.
5 Felkner partnered with a student from Brown University and a local talk radio personality. -6- Professor Pearlmutter filed a complaint with the ASC, asserting that Felkner
violated the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics. On
April 27, 2005, the ASC held a hearing on Professor Pearlmutter’s complaint, that
Felkner committed unethical and unprofessional conduct. Thereafter, the ASC
issued a written decision determining that Felkner’s deceptive conduct in recording
his conversation with Professor Pearlmutter violated one of the three sections of the
Code of Ethics alleged by Professor Pearlmutter in her complaint. The ASC
recommended that Felkner declare immediately, in writing, that he would refrain
from any deceptive audio or video copying of conversations with social work
colleagues and refrain from any audio or video copying without express permission.
The ASC further advised that Felkner be dismissed from the MSW program if he
failed to carry out such a declaration. Felkner wrote a letter to Dean Bennett-
Speight, dated May 11, 2005, indicating that he would refrain from making audio or
video recordings of his conversations with his SSW colleagues unless he first
obtained their consent to record.
At the end of the spring semester, Felkner selected the Social Work
Organizing and Policy (SWOP) concentration for completion of his degree. As a
MSW student, Felkner was required to complete a field placement and integrative
project in order to fulfill the program requirements. For Felkner’s field placement
and integrative project, he obtained an internship in then-Governor Donald L.
-7- Carcieri’s office, assigned to welfare-reform legislation. Felkner alleged that
Professor Ryczek, who coordinated field placements, denied Felkner’s placement
because it would not promote progressive social change. Felkner claimed that
Professor Ryczek informed him that the SWOP-concentration objectives required
him to defend liberal policies and that Felkner’s views might be best served in
another academic discipline, such as political science. Felkner met with Dean
Bennett-Speight about his challenges in the SWOP-concentration field placement
process, claiming he was singled out because of his conservative views. Thereafter,
Dean Bennett-Speight assigned Professor Mueller to be Felkner’s field placement
supervisor. Professor Mueller initially rejected Felkner’s proposed field placement
and project, but eventually RIC approved the field placement in the Governor’s
office.
According to Felkner, Professor Mueller refused to authorize Felkner’s
submission of an integrative project on welfare reform because it was a “toxic”
subject. Felkner reluctantly conceded to initiate work on health care. Felkner alleged
that working on health-care reform put him at a disadvantage relative to other SSW
students because he was unable to use his field placement research for his integrative
project. Felkner worked on his integrative project throughout 2006 and 2007. On
November 26, 2007, Felkner requested more time to complete his integrative project.
In January 2008, Dean Bennett-Speight granted Felkner an extension until May 11,
-8- 2009, to complete his degree requirements. The extension was subject to Felkner
submitting a section of the project by April 15, 2008, a requirement with which he
did not comply. On March 17, 2008, Felkner sought an additional six-week
extension, but both Professor Pearlmutter and Dean Bennett-Speight denied this
request.
In December 2007, Felkner filed the instant action in Providence County
Superior Court, alleging multiple violations of the Rhode Island and United States
constitutions. Felkner sought equitable relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and § 1988, alleging that defendants’ conduct toward him during his enrollment in
the MSW program violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.6 Summary
judgment was entered on November 4, 2015, which was then appealed to this Court.
In Felkner I, the Court affirmed summary judgment on claims of retaliation based
on recording activities; equal protection; procedural due process; and civil
conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 452, 456, 458,
460. The Court further affirmed the order granting a motion to strike plaintiff’s
6 This Court stated in Felkner I, “Felkner has not drawn this Court’s attention to any distinction between the application of Rhode Island and federal law regarding his free speech and expression, equal protection, and due process claims. Therefore, we address only the application of federal law to these claims.” Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 446 n.9. -9- claim for punitive damages.7 Id. at 461. This Court vacated the judgment as to
claims for violation of Felkner’s First Amendment free-speech and expression rights
based on political viewpoint; retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights,
other than those related to recording; compelled speech contrary to his political
beliefs; and the imposition of unconstitutional conditions for obtaining his Master’s
degree. Id. at 450, 452-53, 462. Additionally, the Court noted that the hearing justice
had not addressed defendants’ qualified immunity arguments. Id. at 460.
Specifically, the Court stated, “[p]art of the Superior Court’s task on remand will be,
therefore, to consider whether any of the defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity, should defendants continue to press this argument.” Id. Subsequently, in
October 2019, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity.
After written memoranda from the parties, supplemental briefing, and a
hearing on the issue of qualified immunity, the hearing justice issued a written
decision on defendants’ motion for summary judgment. She applied a two-step
analysis and determined that it was uncontested that Felkner met the first step of a
qualified immunity claim, having alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional
right; thus, the hearing justice proceeded to the first aspect of the second step of the
7 In Felkner I, this Court also determined that all claims pursuant to the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42 (“RICRA”), and claims for equitable relief were waived. Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 446 n.10. - 10 - analysis. The hearing justice concluded that defendants’ actions had not been clearly
established as constitutional violations during the relevant time frame and that the
relevant caselaw favored the concept that courts should not intrude into purely
academic matters and should defer to educators. Therefore, she found, the second
step was not satisfied.
With regard to the second aspect of the second step, the hearing justice
proceeded to opine on whether a reasonable defendant would have understood that
his or her conduct violated Felkner’s constitutional rights. She determined that, at
the time of the alleged violations, the law was not clear on the subject matter of
Felkner’s allegations and that, therefore, a reasonable defendant would not have had
fair warning that Felkner’s constitutional rights might be violated by their decisions.
Upon a finding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, the
hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Felkner thereafter
filed a notice of appeal.8
Standard of Review
“This Court reviews a decision granting a party’s motion for summary
judgment de novo.” Citizens Bank, N.A. v. Palermo, 247 A.3d 131, 133 (R.I. 2021)
8 Felkner filed a premature notice of appeal on September 20, 2021; final judgment was entered on October 12, 2021. Therefore, we will treat the appeal as timely. See Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC, 134 A.3d 173, 175 (R.I. 2016) (treating a premature notice of appeal as timely filed). - 11 - (quoting Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 598
(R.I. 2019)). We assess the matter “from the vantage point of the trial justice[,] * *
* view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and if
we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm * * *” Id. (quoting
Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 598). “Although summary judgment is recognized as an
extreme remedy, * * * to avoid summary judgment the burden is on the nonmoving
party to produce competent evidence that proves the existence of a disputed issue of
material fact.” Id. (quoting Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 598).
Discussion
On appeal, Felkner argues that the hearing justice violated the law of the case
by exceeding this Court’s mandate on remand. Felkner asserts that the hearing
justice found that defendants had not violated Felkner’s constitutional rights, in
direct contravention of this Court’s decision. Felkner also maintains that defendants
are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Further, Felkner argues
that qualified immunity does not apply to his request for equitable relief and that
defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because Felkner’s constitutional
rights were established by caselaw. Felkner also maintains that defendants’
insurance coverage precludes the application of qualified immunity. Finally,
- 12 - Felkner suggests that the hearing justice impermissibly resolved questions of
material fact.
In response, defendants argue, inter alia, that the hearing justice correctly
decided that the law was not clearly established as to the alleged constitutional
violation. According to defendants, the facts presented by Felkner did not support
his assertion that defendants violated a clearly established right, and, therefore,
defendants were not given fair warning that they were acting in an unconstitutional
manner.
Qualified immunity is an immunity typically afforded to government officials
on the federal level. Ensey v. Culhane, 727 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1999). The United
States Supreme Court has stated that “government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are ‘shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity ‘gives government officials breathing room
to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,’ and ‘protects all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender,
565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).
This Court has acknowledged that the defense of qualified immunity may be
- 13 - available in some circumstances. Specifically, former Chief Justice Weisberger
wrote, “[w]e are of the opinion that, in an appropriate case, the doctrine of qualified
immunity might well be applied by this Court.” Ensey, 727 A.2d at 690. We deem
it applicable to the claims remaining in this case.
In a qualified-immunity analysis, “the first step in evaluating a claim * * * is
to ‘determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual
constitutional right at all.’” Monahan v. Girouard, 911 A.2d 666, 674 (R.I. 2006)
(deletion omitted) (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609). “Second, if the plaintiff has
satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). A
clearly established constitutional right “means that, at the time of the [official’s]
conduct, the law was ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing’ is unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138
S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741)). If the answer to the
second question is also yes, then the Court must determine the second aspect of the
second step, whether a reasonable official, situated similarly to the defendants,
would have understood that the conduct at issue, if proven, contravened the clearly
established law. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The determination of whether
defendants may avail themselves of qualified immunity considers the conduct in
- 14 - question from the perspective of “objective reasonableness.” See Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986).
It is undisputed by the parties, and it was recognized by the hearing justice,
that the first step in the qualified-immunity analysis was satisfied by Felkner when
he alleged that his First Amendment right to free speech was violated. Therefore,
we must determine whether the rights at issue were clearly established at the time of
defendants’ alleged misconduct.
The United States Supreme Court has created certain benchmarks concerning
First Amendment rights in academia as they relate to students and to educational
institutions. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393
U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (ruling that the school could not preclude students from
wearing black armbands in class to demonstrate against the Vietnam War); see also
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that
schools may restrict students’ First Amendment rights by exercising editorial power
“so long as [the schools’] actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns”); Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986)
(noting that students have First Amendment free-speech rights, but that schools may
limit speech that is “lewd, indecent, or offensive”)
This Court noted in Felkner I that, while freedom of speech is vital in
American classrooms, “[r]ights guaranteed by the First Amendment, however, are
- 15 - not unlimited in the context of academia.” Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 448 (citing
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273). This Court went on to note that, under Hazelwood,
“educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id.
(quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).
Generally, academic decisions concerning grades, coursework, and progress
within an academic program are accorded great deference and are not subject to
judicial review. See Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78, 89-90 (1978). “University faculties must have the widest range of
discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students and their
entitlement to promotion or graduation.” Id. at 96 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
Furthermore, courts “should show great respect for the faculty’s professional
judgment. Plainly, [courts] may not override [professional judgment] unless it is
such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that
the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment.” Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 449 (quoting Regents of University of Michigan
v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)).
The Supreme Court has stated that “[q]ualified immunity balances two
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they
- 16 - exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555
U.S. at 231. Thus, the precedent encompassing academic decisions by public
institutions, including Horowitz, Hazelwood, Ewing, and Fraser, convinces us that
the law was not sufficiently clear, such that a reasonable educator would have
understood what they were doing amounted to violations of a student’s constitutional
rights. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. The core of Felkner’s argument is that he was
not allowed to complete Master’s-level assignments on topics he chose, as opposed
to the topics that were assigned to him. Further, that when he pursued his chosen
topic against the wishes of the faculty, he was retaliated against with poor grades.
To expect faculty to decipher “a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing
precedent” would be improper. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. Felkner failed to show that
the law is clearly established; furthermore, a reasonable person in defendants’
position would not have had fair warning that their conduct potentially violated his
constitutional rights. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. We decline to disturb the findings
of the hearing justice.
Felkner argues that there are active claims against RIC, for which the defense
of qualified immunity cannot be raised. This Court determined that all claims
pursuant to the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42
(“RICRA”) and for equitable relief were waived. Felkner I, 203 A.3d at 446 n.10.
- 17 - The only claims against RIC in the amended complaint were for equitable relief.
Accordingly, no claims against RIC remain as an institution because RIC is not a
person, pursuant to § 1983. “This Court has recognized that ‘neither a State nor its
officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.’” Zab v. Rhode
Island Department of Corrections, 269 A.3d 741, 746 (R.I. 2022) (quoting
Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 868 (R.I. 1997)). Therefore, only the § 1983
claims against the individual defendants remained.
Lastly, Felkner’s contention that the existence of insurance coverage for
defendants precludes the application of qualified immunity is without merit. This
argument is not supported by caselaw and is inconsistent with the underpinnings of
qualified immunity. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814, 818 (noting that qualified immunity
strikes a balance between the need to vindicate constitutional harms and social costs
associated with bringing suit against government officials.). 9
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the final judgment of the Superior
Court. The papers in this case shall be returned to the Superior Court.
9 Felkner submitted citations of supplemental authorities and defendants submitted a response after oral argument pursuant to Article I, Rule 16(e) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. We acknowledge receipt of those authorities; however, it has not impacted our analysis. - 18 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case William Felkner v. Rhode Island College et al.
No. 2021-267-Appeal. Case Number (PC 07-6702)
Date Opinion Filed April 20, 2023
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Susan E. McGuirl
For Plaintiff:
Thomas W. Lyons, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendants:
Jeffrey S. Michaelson, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)