William Estuardo Valdez v. Andrew M. Saul

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: October 2, 2023
• Docket: 2:20-cv-11256
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM E. V., Case No. 2:20-cv-11256-HDV (AGR)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND 13 v. RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 16 Defendant. 17

18 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the pleadings, the 19 records on file, and the Report and Recommendation (“Report”) of the United 20 States Magistrate Judge. Further, the Court has engaged in a de novo review of 21 those portions of the Report to which objections have been made. 22 The Report recommends that the Commissioner’s decision denying disability 23 benefits be affirmed. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report (ECF No. 24 18) do not warrant a change to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendation, 25 for the following reasons. 26 Plaintiff objects that the Administrative Law Jude (“ALJ”), in discounting 27 the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, “erred by substituting her 28 interpretation” of the objective medical findings “that were used as the basis of the 1 [physician’s] opinions.” (ECF No. 18 at 2.) But although an ALJ generally does 2 not have the qualifications of a medical professional, he or she is recognized as 3 competent to interpret objective medical findings in assessing disability. See Burch 4 v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an ALJ properly 5 considered “objective medical findings” from an MRI and x-rays in assessing a 6 claimant’s testimony); see also Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 488 (9th Cir. 7 2022) (recognizing “a presumption that ALJs are, at some level, capable of 8 independently reviewing and forming conclusions about medical evidence to 9 discharge their statutory duty to determine whether a claimant is disabled and 10 cannot work”). 11 Plaintiff objects that the ALJ, in discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s 12 treating physician, “erred by picking and choosing the normal findings felt to be 13 persuasive while ignoring abnormalities[.]” (ECF No. 18 at 5.) To the contrary, 14 the Report cited findings that constituted substantial evidence. Specifically, the 15 record included evidence that, on several occasions, Plaintiff reported only 16 “everyday” kinds of pain and had physical and mental examinations revealing 17 normal findings. (ECF No. 16 at 6-7.) 18 Plaintiff objects that the ALJ, in discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s 19 treating physician, erred in characterizing Plaintiff’s treatment as conservative. 20 (ECF No. 18 at 5-6.) As the Report found, however, the treating physician 21 prescribed only medications and did not advise epidural injections or even physical 22 therapy, even when told by Plaintiff that medications provided only approximately 23 10% relief. (ECF No. 16 at 6.) The ALJ could properly characterize such 24 treatment as conservative. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 500 (9th Cir. 2022) 25 (holding that an ALJ cited evidence of conservative treatment that included 26 physical therapy and ongoing pain medication); see also Rollins v. Massanari, 261 27 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an ALJ may decline to credit a medical 28 opinion that is inconsistent with the claimant’s conservative treatment). 1 Plaintiff objects that the ALJ, in discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s 2 treating physician, erred in finding the opinion conflicted with a recommendation 3 from another doctor that Plaintiff return to work. (ECF No. 18 at 6.) As an initial 4 matter, Plaintiff objects that the ALJ did not actually make this finding. (Id.) To 5 the contrary, the ALJ explicitly found that the treating physician’s opinion was 6 inconsistent with “treatment notes from U.S. Health Works Medical Group,” in 7 which the recommendation to return work could be found. (ECF No. 11-3 at 39; 8 ECF No. 11-12 at 22.) Plaintiff further objects that any such recommendation was 9 vague about what type of work Plaintiff could perform. (ECF No. 18 at 6.) To the 10 contrary, the recommendation specified that Plaintiff could “return to his regular 11 job duties immediately.” (ECF No. 11-12 at 22.) 12 Plaintiff objects that the ALJ, in discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s 13 treating physician, failed to assess the opinion under the agency’s regulatory 14 factors. (ECF No. 18 at 7-8.) These factors include “the length of the treatment 15 relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the 16 treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with the record, and 17 specialization of the physician.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 18 2017). But an ALJ “is not required to make an express statement that she 19 considered all the factors outlined” in that regulation; rather, his or her decision 20 need only contain some indication that the factors were properly considered. Kelly 21 v. Berryhill, 732 F. App’x 558, 562 n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, the ALJ’s opinion 22 contained adequate indications that the regulatory factors were considered in 23 assessing the treating physician’s opinion. The ALJ acknowledged the treatment 24 relationship and then explained the supportability and consistency of the medical 25 opinion compared to the rest of the medical record. (ECF No. 11-3 at 40.) 26 Plaintiff objects that the ALJ, in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony, was 27 “vague” in finding the testimony inconsistent with “the evidence as a whole.” 28 (ECF No. 18 at 8.) To the contrary, the ALJ clearly explained that Plaintiff’s 1 || testimony was discounted because it was unsupported by objective medical 2 || evidence, because he had a wide range of daily activities, because his treatment was 3 |} routine and conservative, because he had not been entirely compliant with 4 || recommended treatment, and because he had experienced documented 5 || improvement with treatment. (ECF No. 11-3 at 37-38.) 6 Finally, Plaintiff objects that the ALJ, in discounting Plaintiff's testimony, 7 || impermissibly relied solely on lack of substantiation by objective medical evidence. 8 || (ECF No. 18 at 8.) To the contrary, as the Report found, the ALJ permissibly relied 9 || on other reasons. Specifically, a physician opined that Plaintiff could return to 10 || work, Plaintiff was not seeing his pain specialist, and he reported independence in 11 || walking, sitting, standing, crouching, stooping, and kneeling. (ECF No. 16 at 10.) 12 || These were permissible reasons to discount Plaintiff's testimony. See Matthews v. 13 || Shalala, 10 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that an ALJ properly assessed a 14 || claimant’s back impairment partly because a physician opined he would be able to 15 || return to his regular work); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) 16 || (holding that an ALJ may assess a claimant’s testimony with evidence of an 17 || unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment), superseded on 18 || other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a); Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 (holding that an 19 || ALJ could find a claimant’s testimony inconsistent with her testimony about her 20 || abilities). 21 IT IS ORDERED that (1) the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate 22 || Judge is accepted and adopted; and (2) the decision of the Commissioner is 23 || affirmed. 24 25 | DATED: __ 10/2/23 Gp Ye fe he 27 28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE