NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1992-23
WILLIAM COLEMAN,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. __________________________
Submitted May 27, 2025 – Decided June 4, 2025
Before Judges Smith and Vanek.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
William Coleman, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Joseph D. Sams, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM William Coleman, an inmate at Mid-State Correctional Facility, appeals
pro se from a Department of Corrections (DOC) final agency decision imposing
discipline for committing the prohibited acts of *.553, smoking where
prohibited, and *.256, refusing to obey an order. On appeal, Coleman contends
that the agency was arbitrary and capricious in finding DOC witness statements
more credible, and that this finding denied Coleman due process. We affirm.
I.
We glean the facts from the administrative record. Lieutenant Joseph
Mellace and Assistant Superintendent Lisa Schofield were visiting units at Mid-
State Correctional Facility when they observed smoke coming from the rear of
petitioner's unit where petitioner was walking. Schofield and Mellace entered
the unit and smelled a burning odor as they approached petitioner. Mellace
ordered petitioner to stop, but he kept walking towards the back of the room.
Later, petitioner contended in his inmate statement that he was hard of hearing,
and did not hear Mellace's order to stop walking. When petitioner reached the
wall at the rear of the room, he calmly leaned forward and placed his hands
against the wall, while Mellace handcuffed and detained him.
Mellace then reviewed the unit's security camera footage, which showed
petitioner's back to the camera with puffs of white smoke emerging from the
A-1992-23 2 front of petitioner's body as he walked towards the back of the unit. After
petitioner was detained, he was strip-searched, then ordered to take a urine
screen. Finally, the DOC subjected petitioner to a bed and locker search. No
contraband was found, and the urine screen was negative.
After being charged, petitioner pled not guilty and secured a counsel
substitute. At the administrative hearing, petitioner presented his statement and
a statement from another witness, Curtis Jones, who lived in the unit. Neither
petitioner nor Jones testified. Petitioner's counsel substitute argued that: 1) the
security video showed petitioner was dispensing air freshener, not smoking; and
2) petitioner did not hear Mellace because of his hearing defect and was not
ignoring him.
The DOC presented witness statements from Mellace, Schofield, and
Sergeant Brian Lowden, who ordered petitioner to submit to the urine screen. It
also presented other documents and the unit security video.
The departmental hearing officer (DHO) heard the evidence and issued an
initial decision. It found petitioner's arguments unsupported by any
corroborating evidence and rejected them. The DHO, relying upon the reports
and statements, found petitioner guilty of both charges. The DHO imposed a
sanction of thirty-days loss of privileges for the *.533 smoking charge, and
A-1992-23 3 sixty-days loss of commutation time and placement in restorative housing unit
for the *.256 violation.
The DOC Associate Administrator, Fathom Borg, issued a final
administrative decision (FAD) finding that there was sufficient evidence in the
record to support the guilty findings, noting the unit security video corroborated
the written reports of the corrections staff, and that no evidence was found to
support the spray bottle theory. 1 The FAD upheld the sanction for the *.533
charge, but rescinded the sixty-day sanctions for the *.256 charge, exercising
leniency.
Petitioner appealed, contending that the DOC was arbitrary, capricious,
and unreasonable in determining witness credibility and in failing to provide an
adequate statement of reasons to support the FAD. Petitioner also argued his
due process rights were violated by the DOC's adoption of the DHO's initial
decision.
II.
Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited.
Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. 2010). "We
1 Petitioner changed his explanation for the smoke at some point after the hearing. Originally, he argued that he was spraying air fresher, not smoking. He eventually contended that he was dispensing a cloud of nasal spray. A-1992-23 4 will disturb an agency's adjudicatory decision only upon a finding that the
decision is 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,' or is unsupported 'by
substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't
of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231, 237-38 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Henry v.
Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).
We have also noted that the Legislature has provided the DOC with broad
discretion in all matters regarding the administration of a prison facility,
including disciplinary infractions by prisoners. Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324
N.J. Super. 576, 583 (App. Div. 1999). Therefore, we may not vacate an
agency's determination because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record
may support more than one result. De Vitis v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 202 N.J.
Super. 484, 489-90 (App. Div. 1985).
However, "although the determination of an administrative agency is
entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory
review." Figueroa, 414 N.J. Super. at 191 (quoting Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr.,
348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002)). We are not "relegated to a mere
rubber-stamp of agency action," but rather we must "engage in a careful and
principled consideration of the agency record and findings." Williams v. Dep't
A-1992-23 5 of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Mayflower Sec. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
A prison disciplinary proceeding "is not part of a criminal prosecution and
thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not
apply." Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). In Avant,
our Supreme Court prescribed limited due process protections due prisoners
prior to their subjection to discipline. Id. at 519 n.21. These protections include
written notice of the charges and timely adjudication; a hearing before an
impartial tribunal; representation, if requested, by counsel-substitute; a limited
ability to call witnesses and confront adverse witnesses; and a limited ability to
present documentary evidence. Id. at 525-30.
III.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1992-23
WILLIAM COLEMAN,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. __________________________
Submitted May 27, 2025 – Decided June 4, 2025
Before Judges Smith and Vanek.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
William Coleman, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Joseph D. Sams, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM William Coleman, an inmate at Mid-State Correctional Facility, appeals
pro se from a Department of Corrections (DOC) final agency decision imposing
discipline for committing the prohibited acts of *.553, smoking where
prohibited, and *.256, refusing to obey an order. On appeal, Coleman contends
that the agency was arbitrary and capricious in finding DOC witness statements
more credible, and that this finding denied Coleman due process. We affirm.
I.
We glean the facts from the administrative record. Lieutenant Joseph
Mellace and Assistant Superintendent Lisa Schofield were visiting units at Mid-
State Correctional Facility when they observed smoke coming from the rear of
petitioner's unit where petitioner was walking. Schofield and Mellace entered
the unit and smelled a burning odor as they approached petitioner. Mellace
ordered petitioner to stop, but he kept walking towards the back of the room.
Later, petitioner contended in his inmate statement that he was hard of hearing,
and did not hear Mellace's order to stop walking. When petitioner reached the
wall at the rear of the room, he calmly leaned forward and placed his hands
against the wall, while Mellace handcuffed and detained him.
Mellace then reviewed the unit's security camera footage, which showed
petitioner's back to the camera with puffs of white smoke emerging from the
A-1992-23 2 front of petitioner's body as he walked towards the back of the unit. After
petitioner was detained, he was strip-searched, then ordered to take a urine
screen. Finally, the DOC subjected petitioner to a bed and locker search. No
contraband was found, and the urine screen was negative.
After being charged, petitioner pled not guilty and secured a counsel
substitute. At the administrative hearing, petitioner presented his statement and
a statement from another witness, Curtis Jones, who lived in the unit. Neither
petitioner nor Jones testified. Petitioner's counsel substitute argued that: 1) the
security video showed petitioner was dispensing air freshener, not smoking; and
2) petitioner did not hear Mellace because of his hearing defect and was not
ignoring him.
The DOC presented witness statements from Mellace, Schofield, and
Sergeant Brian Lowden, who ordered petitioner to submit to the urine screen. It
also presented other documents and the unit security video.
The departmental hearing officer (DHO) heard the evidence and issued an
initial decision. It found petitioner's arguments unsupported by any
corroborating evidence and rejected them. The DHO, relying upon the reports
and statements, found petitioner guilty of both charges. The DHO imposed a
sanction of thirty-days loss of privileges for the *.533 smoking charge, and
A-1992-23 3 sixty-days loss of commutation time and placement in restorative housing unit
for the *.256 violation.
The DOC Associate Administrator, Fathom Borg, issued a final
administrative decision (FAD) finding that there was sufficient evidence in the
record to support the guilty findings, noting the unit security video corroborated
the written reports of the corrections staff, and that no evidence was found to
support the spray bottle theory. 1 The FAD upheld the sanction for the *.533
charge, but rescinded the sixty-day sanctions for the *.256 charge, exercising
leniency.
Petitioner appealed, contending that the DOC was arbitrary, capricious,
and unreasonable in determining witness credibility and in failing to provide an
adequate statement of reasons to support the FAD. Petitioner also argued his
due process rights were violated by the DOC's adoption of the DHO's initial
decision.
II.
Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited.
Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. 2010). "We
1 Petitioner changed his explanation for the smoke at some point after the hearing. Originally, he argued that he was spraying air fresher, not smoking. He eventually contended that he was dispensing a cloud of nasal spray. A-1992-23 4 will disturb an agency's adjudicatory decision only upon a finding that the
decision is 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,' or is unsupported 'by
substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't
of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231, 237-38 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Henry v.
Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).
We have also noted that the Legislature has provided the DOC with broad
discretion in all matters regarding the administration of a prison facility,
including disciplinary infractions by prisoners. Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324
N.J. Super. 576, 583 (App. Div. 1999). Therefore, we may not vacate an
agency's determination because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record
may support more than one result. De Vitis v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 202 N.J.
Super. 484, 489-90 (App. Div. 1985).
However, "although the determination of an administrative agency is
entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory
review." Figueroa, 414 N.J. Super. at 191 (quoting Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr.,
348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002)). We are not "relegated to a mere
rubber-stamp of agency action," but rather we must "engage in a careful and
principled consideration of the agency record and findings." Williams v. Dep't
A-1992-23 5 of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Mayflower Sec. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
A prison disciplinary proceeding "is not part of a criminal prosecution and
thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not
apply." Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). In Avant,
our Supreme Court prescribed limited due process protections due prisoners
prior to their subjection to discipline. Id. at 519 n.21. These protections include
written notice of the charges and timely adjudication; a hearing before an
impartial tribunal; representation, if requested, by counsel-substitute; a limited
ability to call witnesses and confront adverse witnesses; and a limited ability to
present documentary evidence. Id. at 525-30.
III.
Petitioner essentially argues that the DOC got it wrong for several reasons.
First, he argues that there was no evidence to support the final decision. Second,
he contends that there was substantial evidence supporting his arguments. Next,
he contends the final decision was not supported by an adequate statement of
reasons. We find his arguments unpersuasive and without merit.
A-1992-23 6 Petitioner elected not to offer testimony and relied on his statement and
the statement of Jones. The DOC also relied on staff reports and statements. In
this FAD "on the papers," the agency also relied on the unit security video,
finding that it corroborated the submissions by corrections staff. The DOC
weighed the evidence in the record and made appropriate findings. Under our
limited standard of review, there is no need to retry the matter because petitioner
is dissatisfied with the outcome.
We have carefully reviewed the record and easily conclude there was no
constitutional due process violation. Petitioner was represented by counsel
substitute. Petitioner's hearing was postponed by the DOC for five days to
permit Jones' statement to be taken and become part of the record. Petitioner
chose not to testify or proffer other witnesses. Petitioner received all the
protections he was entitled to under Avant.
We find no reason to disturb the FAD. Its brevity is not a basis for
reversal. There was sufficient credible evidence in the ample record, including
petitioner's own statement and a clear and easy-to-see video of petitioner's
violative acts to support it. We conclude there is no error.
A-1992-23 7 To the extent we have not addressed any of petitioner's remaining
arguments, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1992-23 8