NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2766-22
WILLIAM COBURN,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent. ___________________
Submitted April 30, 2024 – Decided May 14, 2024
Before Judges Paganelli and Augostini.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
William Coburn, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM William Coburn, currently an inmate Northern State Prison, challenges an
April 26, 2023 final agency decision by the New Jersey State Parole Board
(Board) denying him parole and imposing an eighteen-month future eligibility
term (FET). We affirm.
In March 1985, Coburn was convicted by a jury of the following: first-
degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; second-degree possession of a weapon for
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); third-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); possession of a controlled dangerous substance
(CDS) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 24:21-19(a)(1) (repealed by L. 1987, c.
106, § 25); and possession of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 24:21-20(a)(4) (repealed by
L. 1987, c. 106, § 25). In July 1985, Coburn was sentenced to an aggregate term
of life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of thirty years for the murder
conviction, nine months for the unlawful possession of a weapon charge, and
six years for the possession of CDS with intent to distribute to run concurrently
with the life sentence. 1
Coburn became eligible for parole on the first-degree murder offense in
November 2014. Defendant received an initial parole hearing in December
1 The judge merged the second-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose conviction into the murder conviction and the possession of marijuana conviction into the possession of CDS with intent to distribute conviction. A-2766-22 2 2022, after becoming parole eligible for the fifth time. After a hearing in
January 2023, a two-member Board panel denied parole and established an
eighteen-month FET. In finding there was a substantial likelihood Coburn
would violate conditions of his parole if released, the panel cited: the facts and
circumstances of the offense; prior opportunity on probation failed to deter
criminal behavior; commission of institutional disciplinary infractions which
were serious in nature and which resulted in loss of commutation time, with the
most recent infraction occurring in December 2015; insufficient problem
resolution, specifically, lack of insight into criminal behavior and minimization
of conduct, as demonstrated by panel interview and documentation in the case
file; and the results of an objective risk assessment indicating a "moderate" risk
of recidivism.
The panel also acknowledged the following mitigating factors: minimal
prior record; all opportunities on community supervision committed without
violation; infraction free since last panel hearing; participation in institutional
programs; participation in program(s) specific to behavior; institutional reports
reflect favorable institutional adjustment; minimum custody status achieved/
maintained; and correspondence in support of parole.
A-2766-22 3 Coburn appealed to the full Board from the two-member Board panel's
decision. On April 26, 2022, the full Board affirmed the two-member panel's
decision to deny parole and impose an eighteen-month FET. In its
comprehensive written opinion, the Board addressed each of Coburn's
contentions and concluded it "concur[red] with the determination of the Board
panel that a preponderance of the evidence indicate[d] that there is substantial
likelihood that [Coburn] would commit a crime if released on parole at this
time."
On appeal, Coburn argues "three essential points" to support his assertion
the Board erred in denying parole: first, the Board "incorrectly equate[d] a 'status
offense' . . . with criminality"; second, the Board failed in not relying on "new
information"; and third, the Board utilized an incorrect standard to deny him
parole.
Our review of final decisions of the Board is limited. Malacow v. N.J.
Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Circus Liquors,
Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9 (2009)). The Board's
parole determinations are entitled to deferential review given its expertise in
rendering "'highly individualized' appraisal[s]" of an inmate's future behavior.
Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 250 N.J. 431, 454 (2022) (quoting Trantino v.
A-2766-22 4 N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino VI), 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Board's decision, as with other final agency
decisions, will not be overturned unless it is "arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record
as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) (citing
Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)). The Board's decision
is entitled to a presumption of validity and reasonableness. In re Vey, 272 N.J.
Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993). The burden of overcoming this presumption
falls on the inmate to demonstrate the Board's actions were unreasonable.
Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304-05 (App. Div. 1993).
At the time of Coburn's offenses, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) provided the
Board should generally grant parole to an inmate on their parole date unless it
can be shown by "a preponderance of the evidence . . . there is a substantial
likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of this State if
released on parole at such time." Perry v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 459 N.J. Super.
186, 194 (App. Div. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams
v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 336 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2000)).2 In making its
2 The 1997 amendment to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) regarding parole eligibility states that an inmate shall be released on parole "unless information supplied in
A-2766-22 5 parole decision, the Board must consider the factors set forth in N.J.A.C.
10A:71-3.11(b)(1) to (24). In considering this non-exhaustive list of factors, the
Board's "prediction as to future conduct and its opinion as to compatibility with
the public welfare [must] be grounded on due consideration of the aggregate of
all of the factors which may have any pertinence." Beckworth v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 360 (1973).
In evaluating whether Coburn should be released on parole, the Board
considered several aggravating and mitigating factors. The Board reviewed
Coburn's entire record in rendering its decision, which contained a juvenile
truancy adjudication for which he received probation. The Board rejected
Coburn's contention that it was not permitted to consider this adjudication given
the passage of time.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2766-22
WILLIAM COBURN,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent. ___________________
Submitted April 30, 2024 – Decided May 14, 2024
Before Judges Paganelli and Augostini.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
William Coburn, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM William Coburn, currently an inmate Northern State Prison, challenges an
April 26, 2023 final agency decision by the New Jersey State Parole Board
(Board) denying him parole and imposing an eighteen-month future eligibility
term (FET). We affirm.
In March 1985, Coburn was convicted by a jury of the following: first-
degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; second-degree possession of a weapon for
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); third-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); possession of a controlled dangerous substance
(CDS) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 24:21-19(a)(1) (repealed by L. 1987, c.
106, § 25); and possession of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 24:21-20(a)(4) (repealed by
L. 1987, c. 106, § 25). In July 1985, Coburn was sentenced to an aggregate term
of life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of thirty years for the murder
conviction, nine months for the unlawful possession of a weapon charge, and
six years for the possession of CDS with intent to distribute to run concurrently
with the life sentence. 1
Coburn became eligible for parole on the first-degree murder offense in
November 2014. Defendant received an initial parole hearing in December
1 The judge merged the second-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose conviction into the murder conviction and the possession of marijuana conviction into the possession of CDS with intent to distribute conviction. A-2766-22 2 2022, after becoming parole eligible for the fifth time. After a hearing in
January 2023, a two-member Board panel denied parole and established an
eighteen-month FET. In finding there was a substantial likelihood Coburn
would violate conditions of his parole if released, the panel cited: the facts and
circumstances of the offense; prior opportunity on probation failed to deter
criminal behavior; commission of institutional disciplinary infractions which
were serious in nature and which resulted in loss of commutation time, with the
most recent infraction occurring in December 2015; insufficient problem
resolution, specifically, lack of insight into criminal behavior and minimization
of conduct, as demonstrated by panel interview and documentation in the case
file; and the results of an objective risk assessment indicating a "moderate" risk
of recidivism.
The panel also acknowledged the following mitigating factors: minimal
prior record; all opportunities on community supervision committed without
violation; infraction free since last panel hearing; participation in institutional
programs; participation in program(s) specific to behavior; institutional reports
reflect favorable institutional adjustment; minimum custody status achieved/
maintained; and correspondence in support of parole.
A-2766-22 3 Coburn appealed to the full Board from the two-member Board panel's
decision. On April 26, 2022, the full Board affirmed the two-member panel's
decision to deny parole and impose an eighteen-month FET. In its
comprehensive written opinion, the Board addressed each of Coburn's
contentions and concluded it "concur[red] with the determination of the Board
panel that a preponderance of the evidence indicate[d] that there is substantial
likelihood that [Coburn] would commit a crime if released on parole at this
time."
On appeal, Coburn argues "three essential points" to support his assertion
the Board erred in denying parole: first, the Board "incorrectly equate[d] a 'status
offense' . . . with criminality"; second, the Board failed in not relying on "new
information"; and third, the Board utilized an incorrect standard to deny him
parole.
Our review of final decisions of the Board is limited. Malacow v. N.J.
Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Circus Liquors,
Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9 (2009)). The Board's
parole determinations are entitled to deferential review given its expertise in
rendering "'highly individualized' appraisal[s]" of an inmate's future behavior.
Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 250 N.J. 431, 454 (2022) (quoting Trantino v.
A-2766-22 4 N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino VI), 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Board's decision, as with other final agency
decisions, will not be overturned unless it is "arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record
as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) (citing
Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)). The Board's decision
is entitled to a presumption of validity and reasonableness. In re Vey, 272 N.J.
Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993). The burden of overcoming this presumption
falls on the inmate to demonstrate the Board's actions were unreasonable.
Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304-05 (App. Div. 1993).
At the time of Coburn's offenses, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) provided the
Board should generally grant parole to an inmate on their parole date unless it
can be shown by "a preponderance of the evidence . . . there is a substantial
likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of this State if
released on parole at such time." Perry v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 459 N.J. Super.
186, 194 (App. Div. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams
v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 336 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2000)).2 In making its
2 The 1997 amendment to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) regarding parole eligibility states that an inmate shall be released on parole "unless information supplied in
A-2766-22 5 parole decision, the Board must consider the factors set forth in N.J.A.C.
10A:71-3.11(b)(1) to (24). In considering this non-exhaustive list of factors, the
Board's "prediction as to future conduct and its opinion as to compatibility with
the public welfare [must] be grounded on due consideration of the aggregate of
all of the factors which may have any pertinence." Beckworth v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 360 (1973).
In evaluating whether Coburn should be released on parole, the Board
considered several aggravating and mitigating factors. The Board reviewed
Coburn's entire record in rendering its decision, which contained a juvenile
truancy adjudication for which he received probation. The Board rejected
Coburn's contention that it was not permitted to consider this adjudication given
the passage of time. However, there is no evidence that the Board gave undue
weight to this prior adjudication or that it was a significant factor in the Board's
decision to deny parole.
the report filed . . . or developed or produced at a hearing . . . indicates by a preponderance of the evidence that the inmate has failed to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation or that there is a reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole imposed . . . if released on parole at the time ." However, because Coburn committed his crimes prior to the amendment, the pre-1997 version of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) applies to his case. A-2766-22 6 The Board properly rejected Coburn's contention that it was limited to
considering only "new information" since the last parole determination.
Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino V), 331 N.J. Super. 577, 610-11
(App. Div. 2000) (Board's consideration of all relevant information does not
violate ex post facto clause). Coburn argues that the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2021) overturned the
holding in Trantino V, which provided "that application of the 1997 amendments
to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.56c . . . [does] not violate the ex post facto clause since
this change in the law is a procedural modification that does not constitute a
substantive change in the parole release criteria." Trantino V, 331 N.J. Super.
at 610 (citing State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 56-57 (1996)); Cal. Dep't of
Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, (1995). However, Holmes did not overrule
Trantino V. Rather, the Third Circuit reinstated Holmes' ex post facto claim,
permitting his claim to proceed and "remand[ing] for discovery to determine
whether the retroactive application of the 1997 [a]mendments [specific] to
Holmes 'create[d] a significant risk of prolonging [his] incarceration.'" Holmes,
14 F.4th at 268 (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Garner v. Jones,
529 N.J. 244, 251 (2000)).
A-2766-22 7 Based upon Coburn's responses to questions posed by the Board at the
hearing and the documentation in the file, the Board determined Coburn
exhibited insufficient problem resolution, specifically, that he "lack[ed] insight
into [his] criminal behavior, and that [he] minimize[d] [his] conduct." The
Board further noted that "while [Coburn] acknowledge[d] the serious
consequences of [his] criminal activity . . . it represent[ed] only an initial effort
at rehabilitation."
In response to his failure to comply with the prior Board panel's
suggestion that Coburn participate in "Focus on the Victim" and "Thinking for
a Change" programs, Coburn advised the Board that the Focus on the Victim
program was unavailable at the prison. Contrary to Coburn's assertion, the
Board confirmed during the parole hearing that this program was in fact
available to inmates at Northern State Prison.
Thus, the Board considered the appropriate factors in rendering its parole
decision and applied the correct legal standards. Moreover, there is sufficient
evidence in the record supporting the Board's denial of parole. We are persuaded
that the Board's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and we affirm
substantially for reasons given by the Board in its thorough written decision.
A-2766-22 8 Any remaining arguments advanced by Coburn lack sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2766-22 9