NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-759
WILLIAM C. CONNELL
vs.
ROBERT J. MORRISSEY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, William C. Connell,1 filed a complaint
against his father-in-law, Robert J. Morrissey, claiming
Morrissey improperly advised him not to obtain a prenuptial
agreement before marrying Morrissey's daughter. Connell appeals
from a judgment dismissing his artfully drafted complaint on
statute of limitations grounds. We reverse the order allowing
the motion to dismiss and vacate the judgment.
Background. We set forth the facts alleged in the
complaint, accepting them as we must at this procedural stage as
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Connell's favor.
1Unless specified otherwise, all references to "Connell" are references to the plaintiff. See Bassichis v. Flores, 490 Mass. 143, 148 (2022). A resident
of Greenwich, Connecticut, Connell is the founder of a private
equity firm, one of six beneficiaries of the Connell family
trusts, and the sole beneficiary of the William C. Connell 1989
trust (1989 trust).2 Morrissey was a trustee of the Connell
family trusts and the 1989 trust until his resignation in August
2020.
Morrissey, a named partner at his own trusts and estates
law firm, was a close personal friend of Connell's father,3 who
personally selected Morrissey to serve as trustee of the Connell
family trusts and to protect the Connell family assets. A major
donor of his time and money, Morrissey has held "positions of
responsibility at significant institutions in Massachusetts and
beyond." For decades, Morrissey served as a member of the
Connell Limited Partnership advisory board with Connell, and, in
that capacity, Morrissey gained direct knowledge of the Connell
family assets. Morrissey held himself out to Connell as a
Connell also holds a minority interest in Connell Family 2
Partnership III with his siblings. Connell's father founded Connell Limited Partnership, which Connell alleges was, at its peak, one of the largest privately held companies in the United States. In the 1980s and 1990s, Connell's father placed ownership of that entity and other family assets into a series of trusts.
3 The elder Connell, William F. Connell, passed away in 2001.
2 trusted counselor and advisor to wealthy families and
institutions, and as a man of "substantial personal wealth."4
The Connell family trusts have paid Morrissey millions of
dollars for his services.
In 2006, Connell became engaged to Morrissey's daughter,
Pamela.5 Connell had not been married before; Pamela was
divorced and had three children from her prior marriage. When
Connell broached the subject of a prenuptial agreement, Pamela
informed Connell that "she would follow her father's direction."
Both Connell and his personal attorney then spoke separately
with Morrissey about the topic. During his conversation with
Morrissey, Connell explained that he wanted a prenuptial
agreement, and that "he was primarily worried about protecting
the trusts and [his] premarital assets." Morrissey informed
Connell that "he had nothing to worry about, [and] that a
prenuptial agreement was unnecessary." Morrissey held himself
out as having "superior knowledge" of the couple's respective
financial positions, and he represented to Connell that "only he
4 Morrissey owned multiple homes, high-end cars, and a boat, and flew on private jets.
5 Because Connell's complaint refers to the plaintiff as "Connell" and to Connell's wife as "Pamela M. Connell," we refer to the wife by her first name to avoid confusion.
3 had sufficient knowledge of both Pamela's and Connell's finances
to weigh in on the need for a prenuptial agreement."6
Connell's attorney subsequently met with Morrissey in
September 2006 and informed him that Connell wanted a prenuptial
agreement, and that he had recommended that Connell obtain one.
In response, Morrissey "purported to explain Pamela's financial
situation," stating, "Pamela was giving up a lot by marrying
Connell." Morrissey also repeated his representation that he
was the only one with knowledge of both sides' financial
situations, which qualified him "to weigh in on the need for a
prenuptial agreement." Connell's attorney later repeated this
conversation to Connell.
Connell understood from these two conversations that the
Connell family trust assets and premarital assets were protected
in the event of a future divorce -- even without a prenuptial
agreement in place -- and that, given Morrissey's substantial
personal wealth, Pamela "would have no reason to ever seek
Connell family assets and would never do so." Connell alleged
that he believed Morrissey was acting in his and the Connell
family's best interests when he advised against the prenuptial
6 Connell understood Morrisey's claim to "knowing the finances on both sides" to refer to Morrissey's substantial personal wealth, Pamela's financial situation, and the financial support Morrissey had provided to and would continue to provide to Pamela.
4 agreement, and that he believed Morrissey's representations.
Connell never "imagined that Morrissey would betray [his
deceased, close personal friend] by doing anything other than
what was best for Connell and his family, even in a matter
involving Morrissey's own daughter."7
On December 30, 2006, Connell married Pamela without a
prenuptial agreement. After thirteen years of marriage and the
birth of two children with Pamela, Connell commenced divorce
proceedings against her in the Connecticut Superior Court. One
of Pamela's first actions was to file a document request seeking
production of all documents relating to the Connell family
trusts, of which Connell is a beneficiary. In August 2020,
Pamela also sought to add the trustees of the 1989 trust,
including her father, as parties to the divorce action, and
sought an order directing the trustees to make distributions
from the 1989 trust for her benefit. The lack of a prenuptial
agreement has thus "substantially" increased Connell's
litigation costs in the Connecticut divorce action.
Discussion.8 The issue presented is whether Connell's
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and gross negligence claims,
7 As we have noted, we are constrained to accept this allegation as true. See Bassichis, 490 Mass. at 148.
8 In the trial court, Connell objected to Morrissey's improper attempt to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-759
WILLIAM C. CONNELL
vs.
ROBERT J. MORRISSEY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, William C. Connell,1 filed a complaint
against his father-in-law, Robert J. Morrissey, claiming
Morrissey improperly advised him not to obtain a prenuptial
agreement before marrying Morrissey's daughter. Connell appeals
from a judgment dismissing his artfully drafted complaint on
statute of limitations grounds. We reverse the order allowing
the motion to dismiss and vacate the judgment.
Background. We set forth the facts alleged in the
complaint, accepting them as we must at this procedural stage as
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Connell's favor.
1Unless specified otherwise, all references to "Connell" are references to the plaintiff. See Bassichis v. Flores, 490 Mass. 143, 148 (2022). A resident
of Greenwich, Connecticut, Connell is the founder of a private
equity firm, one of six beneficiaries of the Connell family
trusts, and the sole beneficiary of the William C. Connell 1989
trust (1989 trust).2 Morrissey was a trustee of the Connell
family trusts and the 1989 trust until his resignation in August
2020.
Morrissey, a named partner at his own trusts and estates
law firm, was a close personal friend of Connell's father,3 who
personally selected Morrissey to serve as trustee of the Connell
family trusts and to protect the Connell family assets. A major
donor of his time and money, Morrissey has held "positions of
responsibility at significant institutions in Massachusetts and
beyond." For decades, Morrissey served as a member of the
Connell Limited Partnership advisory board with Connell, and, in
that capacity, Morrissey gained direct knowledge of the Connell
family assets. Morrissey held himself out to Connell as a
Connell also holds a minority interest in Connell Family 2
Partnership III with his siblings. Connell's father founded Connell Limited Partnership, which Connell alleges was, at its peak, one of the largest privately held companies in the United States. In the 1980s and 1990s, Connell's father placed ownership of that entity and other family assets into a series of trusts.
3 The elder Connell, William F. Connell, passed away in 2001.
2 trusted counselor and advisor to wealthy families and
institutions, and as a man of "substantial personal wealth."4
The Connell family trusts have paid Morrissey millions of
dollars for his services.
In 2006, Connell became engaged to Morrissey's daughter,
Pamela.5 Connell had not been married before; Pamela was
divorced and had three children from her prior marriage. When
Connell broached the subject of a prenuptial agreement, Pamela
informed Connell that "she would follow her father's direction."
Both Connell and his personal attorney then spoke separately
with Morrissey about the topic. During his conversation with
Morrissey, Connell explained that he wanted a prenuptial
agreement, and that "he was primarily worried about protecting
the trusts and [his] premarital assets." Morrissey informed
Connell that "he had nothing to worry about, [and] that a
prenuptial agreement was unnecessary." Morrissey held himself
out as having "superior knowledge" of the couple's respective
financial positions, and he represented to Connell that "only he
4 Morrissey owned multiple homes, high-end cars, and a boat, and flew on private jets.
5 Because Connell's complaint refers to the plaintiff as "Connell" and to Connell's wife as "Pamela M. Connell," we refer to the wife by her first name to avoid confusion.
3 had sufficient knowledge of both Pamela's and Connell's finances
to weigh in on the need for a prenuptial agreement."6
Connell's attorney subsequently met with Morrissey in
September 2006 and informed him that Connell wanted a prenuptial
agreement, and that he had recommended that Connell obtain one.
In response, Morrissey "purported to explain Pamela's financial
situation," stating, "Pamela was giving up a lot by marrying
Connell." Morrissey also repeated his representation that he
was the only one with knowledge of both sides' financial
situations, which qualified him "to weigh in on the need for a
prenuptial agreement." Connell's attorney later repeated this
conversation to Connell.
Connell understood from these two conversations that the
Connell family trust assets and premarital assets were protected
in the event of a future divorce -- even without a prenuptial
agreement in place -- and that, given Morrissey's substantial
personal wealth, Pamela "would have no reason to ever seek
Connell family assets and would never do so." Connell alleged
that he believed Morrissey was acting in his and the Connell
family's best interests when he advised against the prenuptial
6 Connell understood Morrisey's claim to "knowing the finances on both sides" to refer to Morrissey's substantial personal wealth, Pamela's financial situation, and the financial support Morrissey had provided to and would continue to provide to Pamela.
4 agreement, and that he believed Morrissey's representations.
Connell never "imagined that Morrissey would betray [his
deceased, close personal friend] by doing anything other than
what was best for Connell and his family, even in a matter
involving Morrissey's own daughter."7
On December 30, 2006, Connell married Pamela without a
prenuptial agreement. After thirteen years of marriage and the
birth of two children with Pamela, Connell commenced divorce
proceedings against her in the Connecticut Superior Court. One
of Pamela's first actions was to file a document request seeking
production of all documents relating to the Connell family
trusts, of which Connell is a beneficiary. In August 2020,
Pamela also sought to add the trustees of the 1989 trust,
including her father, as parties to the divorce action, and
sought an order directing the trustees to make distributions
from the 1989 trust for her benefit. The lack of a prenuptial
agreement has thus "substantially" increased Connell's
litigation costs in the Connecticut divorce action.
Discussion.8 The issue presented is whether Connell's
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and gross negligence claims,
7 As we have noted, we are constrained to accept this allegation as true. See Bassichis, 490 Mass. at 148.
8 In the trial court, Connell objected to Morrissey's improper attempt to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), after he had filed
5 and his request for declaratory relief, accrued at the time of
his marriage in 2006, as Morrissey contends, or, as Connell
argues, when Pamela sought to access information about his
trusts in 2020. At this procedural stage, where we are
constrained to accept the truth of the facts as alleged in the
complaint, Bassichis, 490 Mass. at 148, Connell has the better
argument.
The parties agree that all claims are subject to a three-
year limitations period, see G. L. c. 260, § 2A, and that the
actual knowledge standard applies. See Tocci v. Tocci, 490
Mass. 1, 12 (2022) ("Where claims arise out of a fiduciary
relationship, the statute of limitations is tolled until a
plaintiff has actual knowledge that [he or] she has been injured
by the fiduciary's conduct" [quotations and citation omitted]).
See Doe v. Harbor Schs., Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 254-255 (2006).
As explained by the Supreme Judicial Court, in the context of a
trustee relationship, "a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty does not arise until the beneficiary is aware that
an answer. See Holmquist v. Starr, 402 Mass. 92, 93 n.4 (1988). The judge analyzed the motion under rule 12 (b) (6). Nothing in our decision turns on this procedural irregularity, as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c) is "akin" to a rule 12 (b) (6) motion, Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 530 (2002), and the same de novo standard of review applies. See Luu v. Fallon Serv., Inc., 105 Mass. App. Ct. 236, 239 (2025); Ridgeley Mgmt. Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Gosnold, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 797 (2012).
6 repudiation has occurred." Lattuca v. Robsham, 442 Mass. 205,
213 (2004). "Constructive knowledge is insufficient." Id. The
critical moment for accrual purposes is not when the "plaintiff
gains knowledge of any wrongdoing by the fiduciary but, rather,
. . . [when] the plaintiff gains knowledge of the particular
harm forming the basis for his or her claim." Tocci, supra at
12-13.
Here, Morrissey's alleged repudiation of trust, fraudulent
misrepresentations, and breach of duty occurred in 2006. See
Kneer v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Norfolk, 93 Mass. App. Ct.
548, 556 (2018) (trustees cannot allow own interests to
interfere with those of beneficiaries). Connell, however, did
not learn of the harm flowing from Morrissey's wrongdoing until
his divorce proceedings began. On March 16, 2020, Pamela's
attorney filed the first of several motions seeking discovery
about the Connell family trusts and other premarital assets, and
in August 2020, the attorney sought distributions from the
trusts to Pamela. At some point between March 16, 2020, and
August 2020, when Pamela sought to add the trustees of the
Connell family trusts as parties to the divorce action and
Morrissey resigned as a trustee, Connell (1) knew unequivocally
that his trust assets were being targeted "aggressively" in the
divorce proceedings and that, absent a prenuptial agreement, the
Connell family trusts and his premarital assets could be at
7 risk;9 and (2) began incurring significant attorney's fees to
defend his trust and premarital assets that, until that time, he
had thought were safe. Connell's actual knowledge of the harm
forming the basis of his claims then triggered the running of
the limitations period. See Tocci, 490 Mass. at 12-13. This
action, filed on March 7, 2023, was therefore timely.
Accordingly, we disagree with the ruling that Connell's
claims accrued on the day he married Pamela in 2006 without a
prenuptial agreement. Connell certainly knew about the
importance and benefits of a prenuptial agreement and some of
Morrissey's wrongdoing at that point, such as Morrissey's
obvious conflict of interest. As he alleges the facts, however,
he was then unaware that he had been harmed by Morrissey's
advice to forgo that protection.
For two reasons, at the time of his marriage, Connell was
operating under the belief that the Connell family assets would
never be at risk in the event of divorce. First, Morrissey, a
prominent trusts and estates attorney, had been selected by
9 According to the allegations of the complaint, the Connell family trusts and the 1989 trust, which are not in the record, are "sole discretion" trusts. Pamela has alleged that certain transfers to the 1989 trust were fraudulent conveyances. We take judicial notice that the question whether the trust assets can be reached by Pamela has not yet been decided by the Connecticut court. The divorce case is scheduled for trial in October 2025.
8 Connell's father to protect the family assets, and Connell
understood that "as a trustee from the outset," Morrissey knew
the terms of the trusts established to fulfill that goal.
Morrissey specifically assured Connell that, in his expert
opinion, a prenuptial agreement was unnecessary in the event of
divorce, causing Connell to reasonably believe that the
attorneys who drafted the trusts had made sure the assets were
unreachable by a spouse. Second, Connell believed that, in
marrying Pamela, he was joining another very wealthy family and
that, given Morrissey's own financial success, "Pamela would
have no reason to ever seek Connell family assets and would
never do so." As Connell alleges the facts, therefore, he was
not yet aware of the harm that he had suffered in 2006, see Doe,
446 Mass. at 255 ("Mere suspicion or mere knowledge that [a]
fiduciary has acted improperly does not amount to actual
knowledge that [a] plaintiff has suffered harm"), and the
9 complaint in this case was thus not time-barred.10
The order allowing the motion to dismiss is reversed, the
judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.
So ordered.
By the Court (Ditkoff, Hand & Walsh, JJ.11),
Clerk
Entered: June 11, 2025.
10We are not blind to the improbability of Connell's prevailing on his claims where he had independent counsel and Morrissey was representing the interests of his daughter and own family in his discussions with Connell's counsel. Nor have we overlooked the fact that this lawsuit is being used to gain tactical advantage in the Connecticut divorce case. Nonetheless, untimeliness is not among the complaint's flaws.
11 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.