William Brown, AKA Charles Williams, AKA "Fast" v. United States

Fourth Circuit

William Brown, AKA Charles Williams, AKA "Fast" v. United States

547 F.2d 821, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 10405

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 21, 1977

Docket75-2291

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 547 F.2d 821 (William Brown, AKA Charles Williams, AKA "Fast" v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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William Brown, AKA Charles Williams, AKA "Fast" v. United States, 547 F.2d 821, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 10405 (4th Cir. 1977).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner alleges in this § 2255 action that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 20 years for bank robbery in that the court failed to consider the applicability of the Young Adult Offenders Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4209, and that he failed to make an express finding of no benefit under the Act. The district court denied relief on the grounds that no express finding is required when sentencing a young adult offender. We agree. However, in United States v. Noland, 510 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1975), we held with respect to a similar contention that sentencing under the provisions of the Young Adult Offenders Act is within the discretion of the district judge and that our review of such a sentencing decision is limited to ascertaining “whether there has indeed been an exercise of discretion.” We noted in Noland that the district judge had specifically considered the provisions of the Act and had thus exercised discretion in the sentencing process and accordingly affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence.

Here the record does not disclose whether the district court considered sentencing under the Young Adult Offenders Act. For that reason we remand, without vacating the sentence, with instructions to the district judge to put on the record whether or not he considered sentencing the appellant under the Young Adult Offenders Act. In requiring clarification of the record, we impose no duty upon the district court to give reasons or otherwise state whether the defendant would have benefit-ted from treatment under the Young Adult Offenders Act. It will suffice if the record, as amended on remand, simply shows that the sentencing judge was aware of and considered the alternate sentencing procedures of the Young Adult Offenders Act. If he did not consider the sentencing alternative, the district court should, of course, vacate the sentence and cause the defendant to be brought before the court for re-sentencing.

REMANDED.

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PER CURIAM.

Petitioner alleges in this § 2255 action that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 20 years for bank robbery in that the court failed to consider the applicability of the Young Adult Offenders Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4209, and that he failed to make an express finding of no benefit under the Act. The district court denied relief on the grounds that no express finding is required when sentencing a young adult offender. We agree. However, in United States v. Noland, 510 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1975), we held with respect to a similar contention that sentencing under the provisions of the Young Adult Offenders Act is within the discretion of the district judge and that our review of such a sentencing decision is limited to ascertaining “whether there has indeed been an exercise of discretion.” We noted in Noland that the district judge had specifically considered the provisions of the Act and had thus exercised discretion in the sentencing process and accordingly affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence.

Here the record does not disclose whether the district court considered sentencing under the Young Adult Offenders Act. For that reason we remand, without vacating the sentence, with instructions to the district judge to put on the record whether or not he considered sentencing the appellant under the Young Adult Offenders Act. In requiring clarification of the record, we impose no duty upon the district court to give reasons or otherwise state whether the defendant would have benefit-ted from treatment under the Young Adult Offenders Act. It will suffice if the record, as amended on remand, simply shows that the sentencing judge was aware of and considered the alternate sentencing procedures of the Young Adult Offenders Act. If he did not consider the sentencing alternative, the district court should, of course, vacate the sentence and cause the defendant to be brought before the court for re-sentencing.

REMANDED.

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547 F.2d 821, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 10405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-brown-aka-charles-williams-aka-fast-v-united-states-ca4-1977.

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