William Bates v. Melinda Bates

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-23-00488-CV ___________________________

WILLIAM BATES, Appellant

V.

MELINDA BATES, Appellees

On Appeal from the 481st District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 22-5647-481

Before Bassel, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant William Bates (Husband) appeals from a divorce decree dissolving

his marriage to appellee Melinda Bates (Wife). In three issues, Husband argues that

the trial court erred by (1) dividing the marital estate without addressing his union

retirement benefits, (2) dividing the marital estate despite having insufficient evidence

regarding the value of certain assets, and (3) valuing Husband’s nonretirement union

benefits at zero dollars even though there was purportedly no evidence to support this

valuation. Because the record reflects the trial court’s clear and unambiguous intent

to award Husband all of his retirement benefits and because Wife acknowledges that

the trial court awarded Husband all of his retirement benefits and suggests that we

reform the decree to accurately reflect this award, we sustain Husband’s first issue and

modify the decree to reflect the union retirement benefits as an asset awarded to

Husband. Overruling the remainder of Husband’s issues, we affirm the decree in all

other respects.

I. BACKGROUND

Husband and Wife married in 2006 and have two children. During the

marriage, Wife worked as a financial advisor, and Husband worked sporadically in

construction. The marriage suffered as Husband became addicted to methamphetamines

and spent hundreds of dollars on drugs.

In July 2022, Wife filed for divorce on the grounds that Husband had, among

other things, committed adultery and treated her cruelly. Shortly thereafter, Husband

2 filed a counterpetition.

The divorce case proceeded despite Husband’s roughly six-month incarceration

from August 2022 to February 2023, and a final trial was held in April 2023. Both

parties presented evidence regarding their assets and arguments regarding how the

community estate should be divided. In June 2023, the trial court issued its ruling

with respect to the property division.1 As relevant here, the court awarded Husband

his “Local 3 Operating Engineers” benefits,2 which the court listed as having an

“[u]nknown” value, and certain real property located in Sun Valley, Nevada.

After the trial court issued its ruling regarding the property division, Husband

notified the court that “there could be some issues.” Accordingly, in August 2023,

the trial court held a brief hearing to explain its rationale for the property division and

to give the parties a chance to raise any issues that needed to be addressed. At this

1 According to Wife, the trial court issued its property-division rendition via email, but this email does not appear in the clerk’s record. However, as Wife acknowledges, a copy of the court’s emailed property division is included in the clerk’s record as an attachment to Husband’s motion to reconsider and reopen evidence. We note that a trial court’s private email communicating its decision to the parties—even if it is subsequently attached as an exhibit to a party’s pleading—does not constitute a rendition of judgment. Baker v. Bizzle, 687 S.W.3d 285, 294 (Tex. 2024). But because both parties have referred to the June 2023 email as the trial court’s property-division ruling and because the email’s status as a true rendition has no bearing on our resolution of this appeal, see infra note 5, we will refer to the June 2023 email as the trial court’s property-division ruling for consistency and ease of communication.

At trial, Husband described these benefits as a “pension.” But the trial court’s 2

property division classified them as “[u]nion [b]enefits,” not retirement benefits.

3 hearing, the trial court explained its division of the parties’ retirement benefits as

follows:

I awarded [Wife] all of her retirement benefits. I awarded [Husband] all of his retirement benefits. He never gave a number in testimony of what those benefits added up to; however, he said, if he were to take it out now, which there would be a penalty for, but if he took it out now, he would be getting $2,000 a month. And that’s how I considered that. Thus, the trial court made it clear that it had intended to award both parties all of their

own retirement benefits.

Husband then filed a motion to reconsider the property-division ruling and

reopen evidence. Although Husband alleged that the property division was

“extremely disproportionate” and identified a number of purported inequities and

unaddressed issues, he did not specify what evidence, if any, he had that would justify

granting his requested relief.

In October 2023, Wife filed a motion to enter a final divorce decree. Wife

attached a proposed decree to the motion. The proposed decree awarded Husband

“[a]ll nonretirement benefits arising out of [his] membership in the Local 3 Operating

Engineers,” but it was silent regarding any retirement benefits arising out of this

membership. [Emphasis added.] Husband filed a competing motion to enter his own

proposed divorce decree. Notably, Husband’s proposed decree included the exact

4 same language as Wife’s regarding the award of his Local 3 Operating Engineers

benefits.3

On December 15, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Husband’s motion to

reconsider as well as the parties’ motions to enter their proposed divorce decrees.

After denying Husband’s motion to reconsider, the trial court heard arguments

regarding the parties’ proposed divorce decrees. At no point during the hearing did

Husband object to the language in Wife’s proposed decree concerning the award of

his Local 3 Operating Engineers benefits. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the

trial court rejected Husband’s proposed language and granted Wife’s motion to enter

her proposed decree. The trial court signed the final decree that same day. Husband

promptly requested findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Texas Rules

of Civil Procedure 296 and 297,4 and the trial court ultimately issued its findings and

conclusions in February 2024. Husband did not object to any of the trial court’s

findings or request additional ones. This appeal followed.

The most significant difference between Husband’s and Wife’s proposed 3

decrees was Husband’s inclusion of proposed language concerning his reimbursement claim against Wife’s separate estate. But this proposed language has nothing to do with the issues Husband raises on appeal.

Husband did not request findings under Family Code Section 6.711. See Tex. 4

Fam. Code Ann. § 6.711.

5 II. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Address Local 3 Operating Engineers Retirement Benefits

In his first issue, Husband contends that the trial court erred by failing to

address his Local 3 Operating Engineers retirement benefits in the divorce decree.

Husband posits that this was “likely [a] mistake” given the trial court’s statement that

it had “awarded [Husband] all of his retirement benefits.” Wife acknowledges that

“[t]he trial court awarded Husband all of his retirement benefits” and suggests that we

reform the decree to reflect these benefits as an asset awarded to Husband. Because

the record reflects that the omission of Husband’s retirement benefits was a clerical

error, we agree that modification of the decree is appropriate.

“A clerical error is one that results from an inaccurate recording of the court’s

decision” such that “the signed judgment inaccurately reflects the true decision of the

court.” Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584, 585–86 (Tex. 1986); In re S.D., No. 02-10-

00221-CV, 2011 WL 3847440, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2011, no pet.)

(mem. op.); see Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 167

(Tex. 2013). A judicial error, in contrast, “stems from a legal or factual mistake that

requires judicial reasoning to correct.” In re J.S., No. 02-19-00231-CV, 2019 WL

5655254, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see

Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. 1986) (clarifying that “a clerical error [is

one] made in entering final judgment” while “a judicial error [is one] made in rendering a

final judgment”). “A judgment nunc pro tunc can correct a clerical error in the

6 original judgment, but not a judicial one.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 397 S.W.3d at 167; see

Tex. R. Civ. P. 316, 329b(f) (providing that “the [trial] court may at any time correct a

clerical error in the record of a judgment and render judgment nunc pro tunc under

Rule 316”); Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231 (recognizing that after a trial court loses

jurisdiction over a judgment, “it can correct only clerical errors in the judgment by

judgment nunc pro tunc”). Likewise, an appellate court has the power to modify a

judgment to correct a clerical error “where the evidence necessary to correct the

judgment appears in the record.” Jordan-Nolan v. Nolan, No. 07-12-00431-CV, 2014

WL 3764509, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 28, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing

Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d)); see In re

R.H., No. 02-20-00396-CV, 2021 WL 2006038, at *8 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

May 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (modifying judgment to correct clerical errors).

Here, the record reflects that the trial court made a clerical error when it

awarded Husband “[a]ll nonretirement benefits arising out of [his] membership in the

Local 3 Operating Engineers” but failed to address his retirement benefits arising out

of this same membership. The trial court stated clearly and unambiguously that it

“awarded [Husband] all of his retirement benefits.”5 Thus, it is evident that the

5 This oral statement at the August 2023 hearing—which took place more than four months before the final decree was signed—made clear the trial court’s intent to award Husband all of his retirement benefits. See Brim Laundry Mach. Co. v. Washex Mach. Corp., 854 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, writ denied) (op. on reh’g) (“[T]he trial court’s intent is relevant when determining whether there was a clerical error.”). Thus, regardless of whether the trial court’s June 2023 email to the

7 decree inaccurately reflects the trial court’s true decision.6 See Andrews, 702 S.W.2d at

585–86. Accordingly, we sustain Husband’s first issue and modify the decree to

reflect that Husband was awarded all retirement and nonretirement benefits arising

out of his membership in the Local 3 Operating Engineers. See Jordan-Nolan, 2014

WL 3764509, at *3.

B. Property Division

In his second issue, Husband contends that the trial court erred by dividing the

marital estate without placing specific values on (1) Husband’s retirement and

nonretirement benefits arising out of his membership in the Local 3 Operating

Engineers or (2) the Sun Valley property. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Considering both parties’ rights, a trial court is charged with dividing the

community estate in a “just and right” manner. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001; Watson

v. Watson, 286 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). But a

parties constituted a true rendition, see supra note 1, the record shows that the decree inaccurately reflects the trial court’s intended property division. See id.; see also Andrews, 702 S.W.2d at 585–86. 6 We note that the mere fact that Wife’s attorney drafted the decree does not preclude the error from being clerical in nature. See Ramirez v. Ramirez, No. 03-18- 00200-CV, 2019 WL 1561812, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Newsom v. Petrilli, 919 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ) (rejecting interpretation of opinion in Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1973), that would support proposition that “error made in a judgment prepared by an attorney becomes ‘judicial’ error when that judgment is entered by the court” because that interpretation “would eliminate any possibility of clerical error, since almost all judgments today are drafted by the successful attorney for the judge’s signature”).

8 property division need not be equal to satisfy the just-and-right standard. See In re

Marriage of Mozley, No. 06-16-00004-CV, 2016 WL 4256926, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana Aug. 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

“Because the standards for dividing a community estate involve the exercise of

sound judgment, a trial court must be accorded much discretion in its decision.”

Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018). “The division ‘should be

corrected on appeal only where an abuse of discretion is shown in that the disposition

made of some property is manifestly unjust and unfair.’” Id. (quoting Hedtke v. Hedtke,

248 S.W. 21, 23 (Tex. 1923)). “The appellate court cannot merely reweigh the

evidence.” Id. “Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment only where it

‘clearly abused its discretion and if the error materially affects the court’s just and right

division of the property.’” In re Marriage of Williams, No. 06-18-00041-CV, 2018 WL

6424245, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 7, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting

Bigelow v. Stephens, 286 S.W.3d 619, 620 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.)).

“Under an abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual sufficiency are relevant

factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion, but they are not

independent grounds of error.” Id. at *4 n.7 (citations omitted). “If there is any

reasonable basis for doing so, we must presume that the trial court properly exercised

its discretion.” Id. at *4.

“The party complaining of the trial court’s property division must demonstrate

from evidence in the record that the division was so unjust that the trial court abused

9 its discretion.” Id. “In determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, we

view the evidence in a light most favorable to the court’s decision and indulge every

legal presumption in favor of its judgment.” In re Marriage of Ford, 435 S.W.3d 347,

350 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.).

2. Analysis

In his second issue, Husband essentially argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by dividing the community estate because it lacked sufficient evidence to

determine the values of Husband’s Local 3 Operating Engineers benefits and the Sun

Valley property. But Husband is precluded from complaining on appeal about the

trial court’s failure to determine the values of either of these assets.

Regarding the Sun Valley property, Husband never complained to the trial

court about its failure to value this asset—much less how this failure impacted the

justness and rightness of the trial court’s property division. He did not address the

Sun Valley property’s valuation in his motion to reconsider the trial court’s property

division or in his motion to enter his proposed final divorce decree, nor did he

request any additional findings of fact to address the Sun Valley property’s value. 7

Having failed to raise this issue in the trial court, he has failed to preserve it for our

review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Ward v. Ward, No. 04-12-00703-CV, 2014 WL

470153, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 5, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

7 Further, as noted above, Husband did not request characterization or valuation findings under Family Code Section 6.711. See supra note 4.

10 (concluding that appellant had failed to preserve appellate complaints for review

because he “did not raise the same objections before the trial court”); see also In re

Marriage of Mann, No. 13-21-00442-CV, 2023 WL 403004, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Jan. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that wife had waived

appellate complaint regarding the lack of evidence of a community asset’s value where

the trial court had not assigned a value to the asset in the final decree or made a

specific finding regarding the asset’s value because wife had failed “to request that the

trial court supplement its findings to include such a valuation”).

Although Husband addressed the trial court’s failure to value his Local 3

Operating Engineers benefits in his motion to reconsider, he is nevertheless precluded

from complaining on appeal about the trial court’s failure to value this asset. Because

each spouse bears the responsibility to provide the trial court with sufficient evidence

of the value of the community estate to enable the court to make a just-and-right

division, see Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. 1981); Finch v. Finch, 825

S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ), a spouse who does

not present evidence regarding the value of property to be divided may not complain

on appeal that the trial court lacked sufficient information to properly divide the

estate, see In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 385 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2013, no pet.); Deltuva v. Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no

pet.) (op. on reh’g). Here, Husband presented only minimal evidence regarding the

value of his Local 3 Operating Engineers benefits, testifying that he was currently

11 entitled to receive a pension of approximately $2,000 per month at retirement but that

“[i]t doesn’t mature until you get . . . closer to retirement,” so “[r]ight now,” the

benefits are worth “almost nothing” because he would be heavily penalized for

withdrawing funds before he reached retirement age. Having failed to present more

comprehensive evidence at trial regarding the value of these benefits, Husband cannot

use this lack of evidence as the basis for an appellate attack on the justness and

rightness of the trial court’s property division.8 See Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405

S.W.3d at 385; Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d at 887; see also In re Marriage of Lewis, No. 06-19-

00046-CV, 2020 WL 34919, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (holding that appellant who “introduced no evidence of how much money was in

her retirement account or her income earnings versus [her husband’s] income earnings

during the marriage” could not “use her failure to present evidence at trial to argue

that the trial court’s award to each party of its own retirement account was unjust”).

Accordingly, we overrule Husband’s second issue.

8 Husband argues that because the record contains no evidence regarding the value of his nonretirement benefits in the Local 3 Operating Engineers, this case fits within an exception to the default rule precluding him from complaining on appeal that the trial court lacked sufficient information to properly divide the estate. See Tran v. Vinh Van Hoang, No. 08-22-00100-CV, 2023 WL 4441138, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 10, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). But as noted, Husband testified that his benefits were worth “almost nothing” until he reached retirement age. This testimony constitutes some evidence to support the trial court’s zero-dollar valuation of Husband’s nonretirement benefits in the Local 3 Operating Engineers.

12 C. Valuation of Nonretirement Benefits in the Local 3 Operating Engineers

In his third issue, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

valuing his nonretirement benefits in the Local 3 Operating Engineers at zero dollars

even though there was purportedly no evidence to support this valuation. This

argument lacks merit.

First, as noted, Husband testified that his benefits were worth “almost

nothing” until he reached retirement age. Thus, the record contains at least some

evidence to support the trial court’s zero-dollar valuation. See Knight v. Knight, 301

S.W.3d 723, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). (“A trial court does

not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative nature

to support the decision.” (citing LaFrensen v. LaFrensen, 106 S.W.3d 876, 877 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.))).

Second, even if the trial court’s zero-dollar valuation were based on insufficient

evidence, Husband cannot show that he was harmed by it. See Wheeling v. Wheeling,

546 S.W.3d 216, 224 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (clarifying that “[i]f . . . an

appellant is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s

valuation of a particular asset,” he must show not only that the valuation was

erroneous but also “that the error was harmful”). Since the trial court awarded

Husband his nonretirement benefits in the Local 3 Operating Engineers, he could

only have been harmed if these benefits were overvalued, not undervalued. If the

nonretirement benefits’ actual value exceeds the trial court’s valuation, then that

13 would mean that Husband was served too large a slice of the community pie, not too

small a slice. See id. (explaining that to show harm from a valuation error, an appellant

should argue “that because of the . . . error, the size of the community pie was

underestimated; as a result, the division of the community estate was manifestly unjust

and [appellant] was served too small a slice”). Because the trial court valued

Husband’s nonretirement benefits at zero dollars, they could only have been

undervalued, not overvalued. 9 Thus, even if we were to assume that the valuation was

erroneous, Husband cannot show harm.

Accordingly, we overrule Husband’s third issue.

III. CONCLUSION

Having sustained Husband’s first issue, we modify the divorce decree to reflect

Husband’s retirement benefits arising out of his membership in the Local 3 Operating

Engineers as an asset awarded to Husband. Having overruled Husband’s remaining

issues, we affirm the divorce decree in all other respects.

/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel Justice

Delivered: November 27, 2024

9 Nothing in the record suggests that Husband’s nonretirement union benefits might have a negative value.