MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 14 2015, 9:52 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Matthew D. Barrett Gregory F. Zoeller Fulton County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Logansport, Indiana Justin F. Roebel Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William B. Scroggs, October 14, 2015 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 25A03-1504-CR-126 v. Appeal from the Fulton Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Wayne E. Steele, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 25D01-1111-MR-753
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 1 of 7 [1] William Scroggs appeals his convictions for Murder, 1 a felony, and Burglary,2 a
class B felony. Scroggs contends that his burglary conviction should be vacated
on double jeopardy grounds. Additionally, Scroggs argues that the sentence
imposed by the trial court is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses
and his character. Finding that Scroggs waived the double jeopardy argument
by pleading guilty to these offenses and that the sentence is not inappropriate,
we affirm.
Facts [2] On November 22, 2011, Scroggs met up with Roy Bell and Jason Miller to
commit a burglary because it was “the easiest way to get [more] drugs.”
Appellant’s App. p. 33. Scroggs drove Bell and Miller to the residence of
Wilma Upsall, an eighty-two-year-old woman in the early stages of dementia.
Scroggs waited in the vehicle outside the residence while Bell and Miller broke
and entered. They forced Upsall to sit in a chair and tied her up with a phone
cord. Bell shot and killed Upsall because she had seen his face and would be
able to identify him. Leaving Upsall’s tied-up body for her family to discover,
Scroggs drove away with Bell and Miller in the vehicle. They had stolen
multiple firearms and 1,000 rounds of ammunition from Upsall’s residence.
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. 2 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 2 of 7 [3] After Upsall’s murder was reported to the police, someone with secondhand
knowledge came forward and told law enforcement officials that Scroggs, Bell,
and Miller may have been involved. Police eventually attempted to stop the
vehicle containing the three men. Scroggs, who was still driving, led police in a
high speed chase that ended when Scroggs crashed the vehicle into a drainage
ditch. The three men then led the police in a foot chase but were apprehended
shortly thereafter. Three handguns were found in Scroggs’s vehicle. After
being arrested, Scroggs denied involvement in the burglary and murder until
confronted with evidence of his guilt.
[4] On November 28, 2011, the State charged Scroggs with murder, class A felony
burglary, and class A felony robbery, later adding a charge of class D felony
criminal confinement. On March 11, 2015, Scroggs entered into a plea
agreement pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to murder and class B
felony burglary in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. In the plea
agreement, Scroggs agreed that “he committed the crimes of Burglary as a Class
B felony and felony Murder” and that “a judgment of conviction will be entered
for each of the offenses admitted.” Appellant’s App. p. 19. On March 31,
2015, the trial court sentenced Scroggs to concurrent terms of sixty years
imprisonment for murder and twenty years imprisonment for burglary. Scroggs
now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 3 of 7 Discussion and Decision I. Double Jeopardy [5] Scroggs first argues that his convictions for murder and burglary violate double
jeopardy principles. Although he attempts to frame this argument as a
sentencing issue, it is well established that a double jeopardy claim challenges
the validity of the convictions—not the sentences. See Kovats v. State, 982
N.E.2d 409, 414-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that “if the trial court does
enter judgment of conviction [on two offenses barred by double jeopardy
principles] . . . then simply merging the offenses [for the purposes of sentencing]
is insufficient and vacation of the offense is required”).
[6] As a general rule, a defendant waives any right to a double jeopardy claim by
pleading guilty. Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. 2002) (holding that
the defendant waived the right to challenge a plea agreement on double
jeopardy grounds and there is no exception even for facially duplicative
charges). In this case, specifically, Scroggs explicitly waived his right to raise
this claim on direct appeal, given that he agreed that he had committed the two
offenses and that “a judgment of conviction will be entered for each of the
offenses committed.” Appellant’s App. p. 19. Scroggs also explicitly waived
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 4 of 7 his right to appeal his convictions. Id. Therefore, he has waived this argument
and we decline to address it.3
II. Sentence [7] Scroggs also argues that the sixty-year sentence imposed by the trial court for
the murder conviction is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and
his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that this Court may revise
a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender. We must “conduct [this] review with substantial
deference and give ‘due consideration’ to the trial court’s decision—since the
‘principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and not to
achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence . . . .” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274,
1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013))
(internal citations omitted).
[8] A person convicted of murder faces a sentence of forty-five to sixty-five years
imprisonment, with an advisory term of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3.
Here, the trial court sentenced Scroggs to a term of sixty years imprisonment.
[9] As to the nature of Scroggs’s offenses, he, Bell, and Miller made a premeditated
plan to commit burglary with the sole aim of funding their drug habit. On the
3 The State acknowledges that double jeopardy principles prohibit judgments of conviction on both a felony murder conviction and a conviction for the underlying felony. It correctly points out, however, that any argument regarding the convictions may now only be raised through an appropriate post-conviction claim.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 14 2015, 9:52 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Matthew D. Barrett Gregory F. Zoeller Fulton County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Logansport, Indiana Justin F. Roebel Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William B. Scroggs, October 14, 2015 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 25A03-1504-CR-126 v. Appeal from the Fulton Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Wayne E. Steele, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 25D01-1111-MR-753
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 1 of 7 [1] William Scroggs appeals his convictions for Murder, 1 a felony, and Burglary,2 a
class B felony. Scroggs contends that his burglary conviction should be vacated
on double jeopardy grounds. Additionally, Scroggs argues that the sentence
imposed by the trial court is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses
and his character. Finding that Scroggs waived the double jeopardy argument
by pleading guilty to these offenses and that the sentence is not inappropriate,
we affirm.
Facts [2] On November 22, 2011, Scroggs met up with Roy Bell and Jason Miller to
commit a burglary because it was “the easiest way to get [more] drugs.”
Appellant’s App. p. 33. Scroggs drove Bell and Miller to the residence of
Wilma Upsall, an eighty-two-year-old woman in the early stages of dementia.
Scroggs waited in the vehicle outside the residence while Bell and Miller broke
and entered. They forced Upsall to sit in a chair and tied her up with a phone
cord. Bell shot and killed Upsall because she had seen his face and would be
able to identify him. Leaving Upsall’s tied-up body for her family to discover,
Scroggs drove away with Bell and Miller in the vehicle. They had stolen
multiple firearms and 1,000 rounds of ammunition from Upsall’s residence.
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. 2 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 2 of 7 [3] After Upsall’s murder was reported to the police, someone with secondhand
knowledge came forward and told law enforcement officials that Scroggs, Bell,
and Miller may have been involved. Police eventually attempted to stop the
vehicle containing the three men. Scroggs, who was still driving, led police in a
high speed chase that ended when Scroggs crashed the vehicle into a drainage
ditch. The three men then led the police in a foot chase but were apprehended
shortly thereafter. Three handguns were found in Scroggs’s vehicle. After
being arrested, Scroggs denied involvement in the burglary and murder until
confronted with evidence of his guilt.
[4] On November 28, 2011, the State charged Scroggs with murder, class A felony
burglary, and class A felony robbery, later adding a charge of class D felony
criminal confinement. On March 11, 2015, Scroggs entered into a plea
agreement pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to murder and class B
felony burglary in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. In the plea
agreement, Scroggs agreed that “he committed the crimes of Burglary as a Class
B felony and felony Murder” and that “a judgment of conviction will be entered
for each of the offenses admitted.” Appellant’s App. p. 19. On March 31,
2015, the trial court sentenced Scroggs to concurrent terms of sixty years
imprisonment for murder and twenty years imprisonment for burglary. Scroggs
now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 3 of 7 Discussion and Decision I. Double Jeopardy [5] Scroggs first argues that his convictions for murder and burglary violate double
jeopardy principles. Although he attempts to frame this argument as a
sentencing issue, it is well established that a double jeopardy claim challenges
the validity of the convictions—not the sentences. See Kovats v. State, 982
N.E.2d 409, 414-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that “if the trial court does
enter judgment of conviction [on two offenses barred by double jeopardy
principles] . . . then simply merging the offenses [for the purposes of sentencing]
is insufficient and vacation of the offense is required”).
[6] As a general rule, a defendant waives any right to a double jeopardy claim by
pleading guilty. Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. 2002) (holding that
the defendant waived the right to challenge a plea agreement on double
jeopardy grounds and there is no exception even for facially duplicative
charges). In this case, specifically, Scroggs explicitly waived his right to raise
this claim on direct appeal, given that he agreed that he had committed the two
offenses and that “a judgment of conviction will be entered for each of the
offenses committed.” Appellant’s App. p. 19. Scroggs also explicitly waived
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 4 of 7 his right to appeal his convictions. Id. Therefore, he has waived this argument
and we decline to address it.3
II. Sentence [7] Scroggs also argues that the sixty-year sentence imposed by the trial court for
the murder conviction is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and
his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that this Court may revise
a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender. We must “conduct [this] review with substantial
deference and give ‘due consideration’ to the trial court’s decision—since the
‘principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and not to
achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence . . . .” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274,
1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013))
(internal citations omitted).
[8] A person convicted of murder faces a sentence of forty-five to sixty-five years
imprisonment, with an advisory term of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3.
Here, the trial court sentenced Scroggs to a term of sixty years imprisonment.
[9] As to the nature of Scroggs’s offenses, he, Bell, and Miller made a premeditated
plan to commit burglary with the sole aim of funding their drug habit. On the
3 The State acknowledges that double jeopardy principles prohibit judgments of conviction on both a felony murder conviction and a conviction for the underlying felony. It correctly points out, however, that any argument regarding the convictions may now only be raised through an appropriate post-conviction claim.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 5 of 7 day of the burglary and murder, Scroggs used methamphetamine, heroin, and
prescription pain medication for which he did not have a prescription.
Scroggs’s co-actors broke and entered the house and tied its elderly occupant to
a chair with a phone cord. Upsall was not only elderly, she was suffering from
the early stages of dementia. They stole multiple firearms and 1,000 rounds of
ammunition from the residence, and eventually shot Upsall multiple times
because she had seen their faces and would be able to identify them. They left
Upsall’s body tied in the chair for her family to discover. Later, Scroggs led
police on a “massive” manhunt, a high speed vehicle chase, and a foot chase
after the vehicle crashed. Appellant’s App. p. 23. After being arrested, Scroggs
was uncooperative and dishonest with law enforcement until being confronted
with evidence of his guilt. We do not find that the nature of the offenses aids
Scroggs’s sentencing argument.
[10] As to Scroggs’s character, he has been using illegal drugs since the age of
fifteen. Rather than seeking treatment for his addictions, he has chosen to steal
from other people to support his substance abuse habits. Scroggs dropped out
of high school and was unemployed at the time he committed these crimes.
While he pleaded guilty, the decision to do so was largely pragmatic given that
one of his co-actors had already been convicted by overwhelming evidence and
that Scroggs received a significant benefit for his guilty plea with the State’s
agreement to refrain from pursuing a sentence of life without parole. While
Scroggs does not have a prior criminal history, his character is far from that of a
model citizen.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 6 of 7 [11] Although Scroggs is perhaps not the worst of the worst offenders, the nature of
these offenses is particularly heinous. These three men preyed upon an
extremely vulnerable member of our society solely to feed their drug habit.
They executed her senselessly and callously. They evaded and later fled from
law enforcement. Scroggs did not receive the maximum possible term of sixty-
five years; instead, the trial court imposed a sentence slightly higher than the
advisory term and slightly lower than the maximum. We see no error in this
sentence. We do not find that the sentence imposed by the trial court is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and Scroggs’s character.
[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A03-1504-CR-126 | October 14, 2015 Page 7 of 7