William Anthony Russo II v. the State of Texas

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00141-CR

William Anthony RUSSO II, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 218th Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas Trial Court No. CRW1912241 Honorable Jennifer Dillingham, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 15, 2026

AFFIRMED

In a single issue, appellant William Anthony Russo II contends the district court that

revoked his community supervision, adjudicated his guilt for the charged offense, and sentenced

him to prison lacked jurisdiction to do so because a different district court, in the same county,

initially accepted his guilty plea, deferred the adjudication of his guilt, and placed him on

community supervision. We affirm. 04-25-00141-CR

BACKGROUND

After being indicted for committing the aggravated sexual assault of a child, Russo pled

guilty to committing the offense. The Honorable Russell Wilson, duly elected to the 218th Judicial

District Court of Wilson County, Texas (the “218th District Court”), presided over Russo’s plea

proceeding, wherein the trial court deferred adjudicating Russo’s guilt and placed him on

community supervision for ten years.

Subsequently, the State filed a motion to revoke Russo’s community supervision. The

Honorable Jennifer M. Dillingham, duly elected to the 81st Judicial District Court of Wilson

County, Texas (the “81st District Court”), presided over Russo’s revocation proceeding. Russo

pled true to violating a term or condition of his community supervision, and the trial court accepted

Russo’s plea of “true.” Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court revoked Russo’s community

supervision, adjudicated Russo guilty of committing the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a

child, and sentenced Russo to serve fifty-six years in prison.

Russo appeals.

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

Russo argues that absent a transfer order, as prescribed by articles 42A.151 and 42A.754

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, because he pled guilty to committing the offense, his

guilt was deferred, and he was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision in the 218th

District Court; he could not later have his community supervision revoked, his guilt adjudicated,

and sentence imposed in the 81st District Court, as that court lacked jurisdiction. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 42A.151 (explaining “the jurisdiction of the case [of a defendant placed

on community supervision,] may be transferred to a court of the same rank in this state” based on

geographical specifications), 42A.754 (“Only the court in which the defendant was tried may

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revoke the defendant’s community supervision unless the judge has transferred jurisdiction of the

case to another court under [a]rticle 42A.151”). Russo’s case, however, was not transferred to

another district court, and thus these articles do not apply to this case.

The 81st District Court and the 218th District Court’s judicial district consists of Atascosa,

Frio, Karnes, LaSalle, and Wilson counties. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 24.183(a), 24.396(a).

Both courts have concurrent jurisdiction of felonies pending in their respective courts. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 4.05 (explaining that district courts have original jurisdiction of felony

criminal cases); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.396(b) (“Indictments within each county[,

in this case Wilson County,] may be returned to any district court[—the 81st District Court and

the 218th District Court—]within that county.”).

District judges in Texas are generally given broad authority to conduct proceedings of other

district courts in the same county. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11 (“District Judges may exchange

districts, or hold courts for each other when they may deem it expedient, and shall do so when

required by law.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.003; see also In re Schmitz, 285 S.W.3d 451, 454

(Tex. 2009) (explaining that “Texas law allows judges to sit for one another whenever they

choose”). Specifically, section 24.003 of the Texas Government Code provides:

(a) This section applies only to counties with two or more district courts.

(b) Unless provided otherwise by the local rules of administration, a district judge in the county may: ....

(2) hear and determine any case or proceeding pending in another district court in the county without having the case transferred;

(3) sit for another district court in the county and hear and determine any case or proceeding pending in that court;

(4) temporarily exchange benches with the judge of another district court in the county; [and]

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....

(6) occupy the judge’s own courtroom or the courtroom of another district court in the county.

(d) A district judge in the county may hear and determine any part or question of any case or proceeding pending in any of the district courts, and any other district judge may complete the hearing and render judgment in the case or proceeding.

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.003(a), (b), (d).

Under these circumstances, nothing in the Texas Government Code or the Texas

Constitution requires a written order or explanation for an exchange of benches by district judges

in the same county. See TEX. CONST. art V, § 11; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.003; see also Mata

v. State, 669 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (stating it is not necessary for the court file

to reflect the reason for the exchange of benches by district judges, and “a formal order need not

be entered”). We conclude the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over Russo’s case.

Accordingly, we overrule Russo’s appellate issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Russo’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s final judgment

adjudicating guilt.

Irene Rios, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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