William A Burchett v. United States Postal Service

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 22, 2024
DocketPH-0752-19-0157-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of William A Burchett v. United States Postal Service (William A Burchett v. United States Postal Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
William A Burchett v. United States Postal Service, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

WILLIAM ANTHONY BURCHETT, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0752-19-0157-I-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: July 22, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

William Anthony Burchett , Newton, West Virginia, pro se.

Lori L. Markle , Esquire, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed the agency’s indefinite suspension action. For the reasons set forth below, the appellant’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

BACKGROUND On February 26, 2019, the appellant filed a Board appeal challenging the agency’s proposal to indefinitely suspend him from his position as an Automotive Technician. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 3, Tab 4 at 25-28. Shortly thereafter, effective March 2, 2019, the agency indefinitely suspended the appellant because it found reasonable cause to believe that he had committed a crime for which a term of imprisonment could be imposed. IAF, Tab 4 at 15-19. The appellant requested a hearing on the matter. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. Following the appellant’s failure to file a prehearing submission and participate in two prehearing conferences, IAF, Tab 7 at 1, Tab 13 at 1, the administrative judge issued a September 30, 2019 initial decision on the record affirming the agency’s action, IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 7-8. The administrative judge notified the appellant that the initial decision would become final on November 4, 2019, unless a petition for review was filed by that date. ID at 8. On February 18, 2020, the appellant filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 32. In his petition, the appellant avers that he did not receive “notifications from MSPB.” Id. at 4, 18. He also makes arguments ostensibly regarding the merits of his appeal, id. at 5-6, 8-11, 13, 15, and provides additional documentary evidence, id. at 19-31. The Office of the Clerk of the Board notified the appellant that his petition for review was untimely and explained that he must file a motion asking the Board to accept the petition for review as timely and/or to waive the time limit for good cause. PFR File, Tab 2 at 1-2. The appellant did not respond. The agency has responded to the appellant’s petition for review, arguing that it is untimely filed and that he has not shown good cause for his untimeliness. PFR File, Tab 3 at 4-9. 3

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW A petition for review must be filed within 35 days after the issuance of the initial decision, or, if the petitioner shows that he received the initial decision more than 5 days after the date of the issuance, within 30 days after the date he received the initial decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). Here, the initial decision was issued on September 30, 2019, and sent to the appellant electronically the same day. IAF, Tab 15 at 1. The appellant is a registered e-filer, IAF, Tab 1 at 2, and Board documents served electronically on registered e-filers are deemed to have been received on the date of electronic submission, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(m) (2) (2019). Thus, the appellant’s petition for review is untimely by more than 3 months. PFR File, Tab 1; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The Board will waive the time limit for filing a petition for review only upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). To establish good cause for an untimely filing, the appellant must show that he exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). In determining whether there is good cause, the Board considers the length of the delay, the reasonableness of the excuse and showing of due diligence, whether the appellant is proceeding pro se, and whether he has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune that similarly shows a causal relationship to his inability to file a timely petition. See Wyeroski v. Department of Transportation, 106 M.S.P.R. 7, ¶ 7, aff’d, 253 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We find that the appellant has not demonstrated good cause for the untimely filing of his petition for review. Although the appellant is pro se, his 3-month delay in filing is not minimal and he failed to respond to the notice affording him the opportunity to file a motion to accept the filing as timely and/or to waive the time limit for good cause. See Cabarloc v. Department of Veterans 4

Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶¶ 9-10 (2009) (finding no good cause for the pro se appellant’s 10-day delay in filing a petition for review when he failed to respond to the Clerk’s notice regarding timeliness); see also Floyd v. Office of Personnel Management, 95 M.S.P.R. 260, ¶ 6 (2003) (finding a 1-month delay not minimal). In his petition for review, the appellant asserts that he received a call from “a lady representing MSPB” who informed him that his case has been continued for 30 days, 2 and, thereafter, he did not receive any additional filings from the Board or “see any notifications from MSPB.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 18. Insofar as the record reflects that all Board filings, including the initial decision, were electronically served on the appellant, this assertion does not constitute good cause. See Rivera v. Social Security Administration, 111 M.S.P.R. 581, ¶ 7 (2009) (finding that the appellant failed to show that he exercised due diligence in monitoring his case as a registered e-filer); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(j)(3) (2019) (stating that e-filers are responsible for monitoring case activity at the Repository at e-Appeal Online to ensure that they have received all case-related documents). The appellant also alleges the following: (1) the agency misrepresented his employment status to the State of West Virginia; (2) the agency is falsifying vehicle maintenance records; (3) the agency violated his due process rights; (4) his suspension did not promote the efficiency of the service; and (5) the initial decision “was one sided.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6, 8-11, 13, 15. However, these ostensibly merit-based arguments do not show good cause for his untimeliness. See Guevara v. Department of the Navy, 112 M.S.P.R.

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Related

Wyeroski v. Merit Systems Protection Board
253 F. App'x 950 (Federal Circuit, 2007)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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William A Burchett v. United States Postal Service, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-a-burchett-v-united-states-postal-service-mspb-2024.