Willett v. Dahlberg

• Court: District Court, Virgin Islands
• Decided: June 3, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00024
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

DIVISION OF ST. CROIX ║ KATHERINE WILLETT, ║ ║ Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, ║ ║ v. ║ ║ 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH CHRISTOPHER DAHLBERG, ║ ║ Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff. ║ ________________________________________________ ║ TO: Lee J. Rohn, Esq. David J. Cattie, Esq.

ORDER THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Motion to Strike Defendant’s Opposition to Renewed Motion for Protective Order, filed on May 27, 2025 by Plaintiff Katherine Willett, Dkt. No. 49; the Opposition to Motion to Strike, filed on May 27, 2025 by Defendant Christopher Dahlberg, Dkt. No. 50; and the Reply to Opposition to Motion to Strike, filed on May 30, 2025 by Plaintiff, Dkt. No. 53. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike. The Court will permit the Defendant an opportunity to file an appropriate motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) if he wishes the Court to consider his Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for a Protective Order. BACKGROUND On March 14, 2025, Plaintiff Willett moved for a protective order to be entered in this case. Dkt. No. 29. On March 30, 2025, Defendant Dahlberg opposed the motion, Dkt. No. 32, Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 2

motion without prejudice, concluding that it could not, on the record before it, determine precisely which issues, and which provisions of the proposed protective order, were in dispute Dkt. No. 41. The Court provided Plaintiff with a May 7, 2025 deadline to refile her motion to address the points in the Order, a May 14, 2025 deadliInde. for Dahlberg to file an opposition, and a May 16, 2025 deadline for Willett to file a reply. On May 7, 2025, Willett filed an unopposed motion in which she requested an extension of time, until May 9, 2025, to file her renewed motion for a protective order. Dkt. No. 44. Although the Court concluded that Willett had not shown good cause for the extension, it exercised its discretion to grant her motion because it was unopposed and the extension sought was relatively short. Dkt. No. 45. The Order provided a May 9, 2025 deadline for Willett to file her renewed motion, a May 16, 2025 deadline for DahlbeIdrg. to file an opposition, and a May 19, 2025 deadline for Willett to file a reply if she wished. Willett timely filed her renewed motion on May 9, 2025. Dkt. No. 46. Dahlberg filed an untimely opposition on May 21, 2025. Dkt. No. 48. He did not file a motion for extension of time seeking leave for his late filing. On May 27, 2025, Willett filed a “Motion to Strike Defendant’s Opposition to Renewed Motion for Protective Order.” Dkt. No. 49. In the motion, Willett points out that the Court provided a May 16, 2025 deadline for Dahlberg to file his opposition to her renewed motion, but he untimely filed it on May 21, 2025 without acknowledging itIsd u.ntimeliness or filing a

formal motion for an extension of time showing excusable neglect. Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 3

Willett asks the Court to strike the opposition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ . P. 6(b), the rule gIdoverning extensions, and the Court’s May 8, 2025 Order setting the May 16, 2025 deadline. . at 2. She acIkdn,owledgesD trhipapt ec ovu. rTtosb aerlien gskeinerally granted deference with regard to case management. quoting , 604 F.3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 2010). However, Rule 6(b)(1)(B) dictates that, if an act must be done within a specified time, the court may extend the time for good causeI do.n motion after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect. at 4. Plaintiff cites case law providing that, while a court generally has discretion to grant such an extension, “there is no discretiIodn to grant Da rpipopste- deadline extension absent a motion and a showing of excusable neglect.” ., quoting , 604 F.3d at 784. Because Dahlberg failed to file a motion for an extension of time, and failed to show excusable neglect, she contends that the Court has no discretion to consider Defendant’s opposition. And without aIndy. opposition, the Court should grant Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for a Protective Order. Plaintiff also argues that the Court should stIrdike the opposition as an impVriovpoet rE fqiluinipg. uConrdpe.r v i. tUs nindherewreantet ra Mutehcohraitnyi xt oS ecrovns.t,r LoLl Cits docket. . at 4-5 (quoting, inter alia, , 23-cv-0009, 2024 WL 231450, at *3 (D.V.I. Jan. 22, 2024)). Later on May 27, 2025, Dahlberg filed an opposition to the Motion to Strike. Dkt. No. 50. The first paragraph of the opposition is unusual because it does not address the

untimeliness of his opposition, but expresses counsel’s annoyance at the motion, given that Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 4

counsel had acquiesced to Plaintiff’s multiple requests for additional time for filings. Dahlberg opines that Willett’s counsel might have used the time spent drafting the motion to strike to instead address the fact that “her client stole and sought to use privileged communications between DahlbIderg and his lawyer” (a reference to a separate motion for sanctions that Defendant filed). . at 1. Following that introduction, counseIdl .states that he “mistakenly calendared the response for May 21st instead of the 16th.” He contends that Willett did not identify any harm or prejudice she suffered stemminIdg. from the delay, as the motion to strike relies exclusively on the fact that it was late. Although Willett argued that a filing must be stricken if untimely, that is notI dth. e law, since a Ldoeociksiino nG otoo da lPlorowp ss.u, cLhL Ca vfi.l iAnsgc owt aCso urlpt.i mNaamteelys wLtidthin the Court’s discretion. at 2 (quoting Clarke v. Mar.,r Nioot.t 1In2t-ecrvn-1a3ti8o,n 2a0l,1 I4n cWL 1002114, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2014)). Moreover, in ., No. 08-0086,D 2a0u1b2e WrtL 2285188 (D.V.I. June 18, 2012), Plaintiff’s attorney in this case filed oppositions to motions five days out of time, but the Court agreed to accept them as an exercise of its discretion. Particularly where no prejudice caInd. be shown when a filing is Iunn rtiem Aeslbye fsotro sa bPrrioedfs p. eLriaiobd. ,L ciotiugrts prefer to consider the filings. at 2 (quoting, inter alia, ., 384 F. Supp. 3d 532, 545 (E.D. Pa. 2019)). Counsel “apologizes for the late filing” but goes on to assert that “the motion to strike was a petty and unnecessary filing that only adds to the Court’s already consIidd.erable docket,”

and the Court should exercise its discretion and deny the motion to strike. Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 5

On May 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion to Strike. Dkt. No. 53. She asserts that the Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Protective OrdIder remains unaccompanied by a motion for an extension of time as required by Rule 6(b). . at 1. While Plaintiff appreciated that Defendant did not oppose her request for an extension to file her Renewed Motion, she complied with Rule 6(b) by filing a motion for an extension of tIidm. e and requesting Defendant’s position on the same, which Defendant has not done here. Willett also notes that she provided binding, Third Circuit authority that there was “no discretion to grant a post-deadline extension absent a motion and showing of excusable neglect.” Defendant, however, provided non-binding authority, lodged personal attacks, and asserted that his failure to file a motion for an extension of time should be excused bIdec.ause Plaintiff’s coCulanrskeel vr.e Mceaivrreido tatn extension of time in another case over a decade ago. But in that case, Id , counsel filed a motion for an extension of time with regard to those late responses. . at 2. Plaintiff adds that most of the other cases ciItne dr eb yA sDbeefsetnods aPnrto wdse. rLei afrbo. mLi toiguats.ide this Circuit and did not provide binding authority. In , 384 F. Supp. 3d 532, 545 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 2019), the district court denied a motion to dismiss an amended complaint filed ten days late and did not .strike the pleading because the party established good cause for the delay. Dkt. No. 53 at 3 The discussion occurred in a footnote unsupported by legal authority, and the case was silent as to whether a motion for extension

of time was filed, although it likely had been because that would be the vehicle to find good Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 6 Id

cause. . All of Defendant’s cases failed to distinguish betwDeriepnp ae court’s lack of discretion to consider an untimely post-deadline extension, as held in , and a court’s discretion to strike an untimely pleading. Plaintiff’s case law demonstrated that the Court has no discretion to consider Defendant’s opposition and must disregard it, altho. uIdgh there was discretion for the Court to strike the pleading and may do so in its discretion . Id. Finally, theD Toeh ivr.d 9 C1i9rc-5u9it0 h4a sQ hueeblde cth, aInt ct.h,e mis-calendaring a deadline is not excusable. at 3-4, citing 727 F. App’x 737 (3d Cir. 2018). Moreover, Plaintiff was prejudiced: she filed a motion to strike because by thIed .time Defendant had filed the opposition, the time for Plaintiff to rDeIpSlyC UhSadSI aOlrNe ady passed. at 4. I. Legal Standards A. Motion to Extend Time

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), entitled “Extending Time,” provides in relevant part: (1)In General. When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time:

(A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; or

(B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Rule 6(b)(2) provides some exceptions to this Rule, not relevant here. Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 7

District Dcroipuprtes are accorded “great deference with regard to matters of case management.” , 604 F.3d at 783. However, a court’s exercise Louf jtahna tv d. Nisactrieotnioanl Wmialdyl bifee lFiemdietreadt iionn some instances when faced wDirthip upne timely filings. Citing , 497 U.S. 871 (1990), the Court described the proper procedure that attorneys should followL iunj asnuch circumstances: The late filing [in ] was governed by Rule 6(b), which “not onlyI dsp. ecifically confers the ‘discrpeotisotn’ relevant to the present issue, but also provides the mechanism by which that discretion is to be invoked and exercised.” Pursuant to the Rule, “any Id .deadline extension must bqeu o‘utipnogn motion made,’ and is permissible only where the failure to meet the deadline ‘was the result of excusable neglect.’” at 896, 110 S. Ct. 3177 ( Rule 6(b)). A contrary interpretation would directly contravene the Rule's specific delineation between “requests” and “motions.” In a pivotal footnote, the Supreme Court explained that

Rule 6(b) establishes a clear distinction between “requests” and “motions,” and the one cannot be converted into the other without violating its provisions. . . . Rule 6(b)(1) allows a court (“for cause shown” apnrodv i“dined its discretion”) to grant a “request” for an extension Aoftf etrime, whether the request is made “with or without motion or notice,” the request is made before the time for filing expires. the time for filing has expired, however, the court (again “for cause shown” and “in its discretion”) may extend the time only “upon motion.” To treat all postdeadline “requests” as “motions” (if indeed any of them can be treated that way) would eliminate the distinction between predeadline Id. and postdeadline filings that the Rule painstakingly draws. . . .

at 896 n. 5, 110 S. Ct. 3L1u7ja7n.

Courts have construed 's construction of Rule 6(bS)e et oSm iimthp ov.s De isat rsictrt ioctf rCeoqluumirbemia,ent that litigants file formal motions for RuleL 6u(jba)n time-extensions when attempting to file in contravention of a scheduling order. 430 F.3d 450, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“In [ ], the Supreme Court noted the distinction between this provision and Rule 6(b)(1), which allows a court to grant an extension if a ‘request’ is made before the time for filing expires. Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 8

only ‘for cause shown’ and ‘upon motion.’ Any post-deadline motionq u‘omtuinsgt cLounjatnai,n a high degree of formality and precJiosnioens ,v p. Cuettnint. gB tahnek ,opposing party on notice that a motion is at issue and that he therefore ought to respond.’” ( 497 U.S. at 896 n. 5, 110 S. Ct. 3177)); 161 F.3d 311, 314 n. 2 (5th Cir.1998) (“[R]ule 6(b)(2) requires that, once a deadline has exLpuirjaend (as occurred in the instant case), leave to file late can be granted only ‘upon motion made.’ The Supreme Court said so explicitly icni tcinogn sLturujainng, rule 6(b) in [ ]. . . In other woArdDsA, PthTe orfe P ihs inlao. dv.i sPchrielati.o Hno tuos .g Arauntht .a, post-deadline extension absent a motion and showing of excusable neglect.” ( 497 U.S. at 896, 110 S. Ct. 3177)); 511 F. Supp. 2d 510, 515 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“If the moving party does not seek an extension until after the time limit has expired, the court may execritciinsge Litusj dains,cretion only if a motion is made and the moving party proves its failure to comply with the applicable deadline was the Dripperesult of excusable neglect.” ( 497 DUr.Sip. paet 896 n. 5, 110 S. Ct. 3177)).

, 604 F.3d at 783-84 (footnote omitted). In , the Third Circuit ruled that the district court had abused its discretion in granting a late oral motion for summary judgment. The oral motion did not comply with the terms of Rule 6(b)(1)(B) because the moving party had not filed a “formal motion for extension of time,” Pwiohnicehe rthen required the district court to “make a finding Idof excusable neglect, under the Pionee rfacItnovr. sS, ebrevfso. rCeo .p ev.r mBritutninswg iacnk uAnsstoimcse.ly motion.” . at 785 (opining that, “[u]nder [ , 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1983)], the excusable neglect inquiry must consider “all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission. These include . . . the danger of prejudice ..., the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.”). Courts in this circuit have also described the excusable neglect inquiry in this circumstance as “requiring a demonstration of good faith on the part Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 9

tBhaen tki mv.e L sapkeec Eifsitesd. Cino nthdeo .r Auslesos.c .. ,. I. n[Ic].nadvertence of counsel do[es] not amount to good cause.” , No. 11-cv-5338, 2012 WL 1435637, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The determination of whether neglect is excusable ‘is at bottom an equitabRlea gognuee,t ttea kvi. nPgr eamccieoru Wnti noefs a&ll Srpeirleitvsa, nLtt dc.,ircumstances surrounding the party's omission.’P” ioneer, 424 F. App’x 155, 156 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 507 U.S. at 395)). In sum, a party must make a formal motion for an extension of time if seeking an extension to file a document after the deadline at issue has elapsed, and the court must make a fDinrdipinpge of excusable neglect under the PionBe. e r facMtoortsi obne ftoor eS tpreikrme itting that untimely filing. , 604 F.3d at 785. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) generally governs motions to strike. It provides that a court “may

strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not alloUwnietded, w Sittahtiens 2v1. V diaoylas after being served with the pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1), (2). See , No. 02-cv- 9014, 2003 WL 21545108, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 2003) (providing that a motion to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) may only be directed to a pleading). An opposition to a motion is not a pleading, and therefore Rule 12(fV) iivso itn Eaqpupilpicmabenlet iCno rthpis case. However, this Court held in . that “case law provides that a court

may strike improper filings from its docket pursuant to its inherent authority to control its Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 10 Vivot Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc.

docket.” , 2024 WL 231450, at *3 (citing , 757 F.2d 557, 567 (3d Cir. 1985) (“A court’s inherent power to manage its caseload, control its docket, and regulate the conduct of attorneys before it, provides authorKiatyr ltoo v f.a Pshititosnbu trogohls G tlhaasts aWido rtkhse, cLoLuCrt in getting on with the business of deciding cases.”); , No. 10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 3966434, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 8, 2015) (holding that, in a court’s exercise of its inherent authority to control its docket, it may strike from the record IaIn. imprAopppelrilcya ftiiloedn document) (citing cases)). The Defendant did not file a motion for an extension of time under Rule 6(b)(1)(B) when he filed his opposition to Plaintiff’s renewed motion for a protective order five days after the deadline proDvriidpepde in the Court’s May 8, 2025 Order. Pursuant to clear governing

authority set out in , 604 F.3d at 784-85, this Court does not have discretion to consider Defendant’s opposition because it was filed in contravention of Rule 6(b)(1)(B)— without a formal motion requesting leave to file out of time. And without such a motion to show that the late filing was due to excusable neglect, the Court never made such a finding. The cases provided by the Defendant from inside and outside this Circuit do not address, much less undercut, this governing law. Moreover, Defendant’s focus on the fact that Plaintiff was not prTeajulledyic ve.d W beyt ztehle delay is not sufficient to excuse it. As a panel of the Third Circuit opined in , No. 21-1855, 2022 WL 3712869, at *2 n.6 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 2022),

‘“[l]ack of prejudice to the non-movant is often used as a reason to excuse neglect, but even Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 11

if we assume that [appellant] suffered no prejudice, it will not suffice if no excuse at all is oBfofwermeda no vr. iKf otrhtee excuse is so threadbare as to make the neglect inexplicable.’” (quoting , 962 F.3d 995, 998 (7th Cir. 2020)). Given that the Court has no discretion to consider Defendant’s untimely opposition to the renewed motion for a protective order, as it was filed without a motion for extension of time, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion in part and deny it in part. It will grant the motion to the extent that Eita wshi,ll strike Defendant’Vs iovoptposition to the renewed proKteacrtliov, e order as improperly filed, 757 F.2d at, 567 , 2024 WL 231450, at *3; 2015 WL 3966434, at *3, which will also ensure a clean record in this matter. It will deny the motion to the extent that Plaintiff asks the Court to grant its Renewed Motion for Protective Order as unopposed. Drippe However, that is not the end of the story. —the case relied upon by Plaintiff— reversed and remanded the case to permit the attorney who had not complied with Rule D6(rbip)p(1e)(B) in making his untimely motion to file the required motion for an extension. , 604 F.3d at 785-86. The remand allowTeadll ethye district court to address the issue in the first instance, analyzing the relevant factors. , 2022 WL 3712869 at n.6. This Court will follow a similar procedure here. While it has stricken Defendant’s opposition to the renewed motion for a protective order, it will permit him to file a motion for an extension of time, and provide Attorney Cattie with an opportunity to file a motion for an extension of time,

pursuant to Rule 6(b)(1)(B). The Court will then assess whether he has demonstrated Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 12

excusable neglect and will determine whether it will permit the Defendant to refile his opposition to the renewed motion for a protective order. Finally, it is incumbent on the Court to comment on the tone of litigation in this case. Because the instant litigation has its origin in an extremely acrimonious divorce and custody battle, the emotional tenor of the parties is clearly quite high. However, the emotional tenor of the attorneys should not be. But both attorneys continue to personally attack each other in their filings and engage in constant finger-pointing, requiring the Court to wade through excess verbiage in order to arrive at the issue at hand. A case in point is Defendant’s opposition to the motion to strike. Instead of addressing his untimely filing head on, Defendant’s counsel launched into an attack on Plaintiff’s counsel for filing what he termed a “ridiculous” and “meritless motion to strike.” Dkt. No. 50 at 1. As this Order shows, that motion was not meritless, but it appears that Defendant’s counsel’s pique at Plaintiff’s counsel overrode his good judgment to solely address the issue at hand. And the Court can also point to numerous examples where Plaintiff’s counsel has done the same by leveling personal attacks on Defendant’s counsel rather than solely addressing the issue. The Court urges both attorneys to maintain their professional standards in this extremely fraught case so that it is not derailed by filings, or comments in filings, that detract from resolving the issues. Both attorneys can be zealous adCvOoNcCatLeUsS wIOitNho ut being demeaning to each other.

ORDERED Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, it is hereby : Willett v. Dahlberg 1:24-cv-00024-WAL-EAH Order Page 13

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike DeGfeRnAdNaTntE’sD IONp pPoAsRitTio AnN tDo DREeNnIeEwDe IdN MPAotRioTn for Protective OrdeGrR, DAkNtT. NEDo. 49, is . 2. The Motion is to the extent thatS TDRefIeCnKdEaNnt’s Opposition to Renewed Motion for ProteDcEtiNvIeE ODrder, Dkt. No. 48, is from the record. 3. The Motion is to the extent that Plaintiff requests that its Renewed Motion for Protective Order be granted on the ground that Defendant’s Opposition is stricken and therefore its Renewed Motion iJsu unneo 1p0p,o 2se0d2. 5 4. Defendant shall have up until and including to file a Motion for Extension of Time pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.J uPn. 6e( 1b7)(,1 2)0(B2)5. 5. Plaintiff shall have up until and including to file an opposiJtuionne a 2n0d,, s2h0o2u5ld Defendant wish to file a reply, he shall have up to and including to do so. ENTER: Dated: June 3, 2025 /s/ Emile A. Henderson III EMILE A. HENDERSON III U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE