1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT 2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON May 06, 2026 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 WILLARD DYNAMITE BERNARD PALMER, No. 4:25-CV-05176-MKD 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 9 DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO v. DISMISS 10 STATE OF WASHINGTON, 11 WASHINGTON STATE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 12 THE COURTS, and WALLA WALLA ECF Nos. 18, 19, 27, 28, 30, 33 COUNTY, 13 Defendants. 14 Before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 18, 19. 15 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The State of Washington and the Washington State 16 Administrative Office of the Courts (the “State Defendants”) are represented by 17 Brandon Slaven. Walla Walla County is represented by Jakub Kocztorz. The 18 Court has reviewed the record and is fully informed. For the reasons set forth 19 below, the Court grants the motions. 20 1 BACKGROUND 2 The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint and the attachment
3 thereto. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. 4 Plaintiff alleges that he is “a permanently disabled, indigent Black man” 5 who suffers from significant medical conditions, including cardiac and spinal
6 issues, as well as a documented reading disability. ECF No. 1-1 at 3, 8. He asserts 7 that these conditions result in “limited mobility,” “extreme chronic pain,” and 8 impairments affecting his ability to read, write, and participate in legal 9 proceedings. ECF No. 1 at 4.
10 Plaintiff’s claims arise from divorce-related proceedings in Walla Walla 11 County Superior Court. ECF No. 1-1 at 9. He alleges that over a period of years, 12 Defendants, “acting through their courts, judges, policies, and administrators,”
13 denied him “meaningful access to the courts” and failed to provide requested ADA 14 accommodations. Id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, he submitted requests for 15 accommodations related to his medical conditions, including “periodic breaks,” 16 permission “to sit or stand as needed,” additional time to read from notes, and a
17 continuance of trial due to a scheduled surgery. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges that 18 Defendants “did not initiate the required ‘interactive process’” and that his requests 19 were “ignored, continued without explanation, and ultimately struck.” Id.
20 1 Plaintiff further alleges that his trial was scheduled on the same date as a 2 medically necessary surgical procedure and that his treating physician advised he
3 should not participate in legal proceedings at that time. Id. at 11-12. Despite this, 4 Plaintiff alleges he was required to proceed to trial while in “extreme pain,” under 5 the effects of medication, and unable to meaningfully participate. Id. at 12-13.
6 Plaintiff also alleges that the presiding judge engaged in hostile and unequal 7 treatment, including minimizing his statements, interrupting him, and treating him 8 less favorably than his opposing party. Id. at 14. He contends this conduct 9 reflected discrimination based on disability and race and affected the outcome of
10 his case. Id. 11 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that after he filed complaints regarding judicial 12 conduct and initiated related proceedings, Defendants engaged in retaliatory
13 conduct, including striking filings, denying motions, and obstructing his access to 14 the courts. Id. at 15, 17. 15 Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $40,000,000 in 16 damages. Id. at 4, 25.
17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 “To survive a [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must 19 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
20 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 1 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the 2 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
3 suffice.” Id. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 4 Court must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations and any reasonable 5 inference to be drawn from them, but legal conclusions are not entitled to the same
6 assumption of truth. Id. A complaint must contain either direct or inferential 7 allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under 8 some viable legal theory. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562. “Factual allegations must be 9 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. Because
10 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his pleadings. Capp v. 11 Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2019). 12 DISCUSSION
13 A. State Defendants 14 1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 15 The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state and its 16 agencies unless the state consents to suit or Congress validly abrogates the state’s
17 immunity. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1996); Raygor v. 18 Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 540-41 (2002). Defendant 19 Washington State Administrative Office of the Courts is a state agency that
20 functions as an arm of the State of Washington and is therefore entitled to Eleventh 1 Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 2 89, 100 (1984). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for alleged past conduct and
3 does not name a state official as a defendant or seek prospective injunctive relief 4 against such an official. “The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to 5 immunize states from lawsuits for private damages or other retrospective relief
6 brought in federal court by its own citizens or citizens of other states.” R.W. v. 7 Columbia Basin Coll., 572 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1017 (E.D. Wash. 2021), aff’d in 8 part, appeal dismissed in part, 77 F.4th 1214 (9th Cir. 2023). Because the State 9 Defendants have not consented to suit in this case, and no exceptions applies, the
10 Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claims against them. See Rains v. State, 674 11 P.2d 165, 170 (Wash. 1983) (“[T]he State cannot be sued in federal court because 12 of the Eleventh Amendment.”).
13 2. Section 1983 Claims 14 Plaintiff’s constitutional claims independently fail because states and state 15 agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. 16 Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“We hold that neither a
17 State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 18 1983.”). 19
20 1 3. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims 2 Plaintiff also asserts claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. ECF
3 No. 1. Plaintiff’s response emphasizes that Title II of the ADA may apply in the 4 context of access to courts and relies on Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 5 Even assuming such a theory could be viable in an appropriate case, Plaintiff’s
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1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT 2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON May 06, 2026 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 WILLARD DYNAMITE BERNARD PALMER, No. 4:25-CV-05176-MKD 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 9 DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO v. DISMISS 10 STATE OF WASHINGTON, 11 WASHINGTON STATE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 12 THE COURTS, and WALLA WALLA ECF Nos. 18, 19, 27, 28, 30, 33 COUNTY, 13 Defendants. 14 Before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 18, 19. 15 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The State of Washington and the Washington State 16 Administrative Office of the Courts (the “State Defendants”) are represented by 17 Brandon Slaven. Walla Walla County is represented by Jakub Kocztorz. The 18 Court has reviewed the record and is fully informed. For the reasons set forth 19 below, the Court grants the motions. 20 1 BACKGROUND 2 The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint and the attachment
3 thereto. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. 4 Plaintiff alleges that he is “a permanently disabled, indigent Black man” 5 who suffers from significant medical conditions, including cardiac and spinal
6 issues, as well as a documented reading disability. ECF No. 1-1 at 3, 8. He asserts 7 that these conditions result in “limited mobility,” “extreme chronic pain,” and 8 impairments affecting his ability to read, write, and participate in legal 9 proceedings. ECF No. 1 at 4.
10 Plaintiff’s claims arise from divorce-related proceedings in Walla Walla 11 County Superior Court. ECF No. 1-1 at 9. He alleges that over a period of years, 12 Defendants, “acting through their courts, judges, policies, and administrators,”
13 denied him “meaningful access to the courts” and failed to provide requested ADA 14 accommodations. Id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, he submitted requests for 15 accommodations related to his medical conditions, including “periodic breaks,” 16 permission “to sit or stand as needed,” additional time to read from notes, and a
17 continuance of trial due to a scheduled surgery. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges that 18 Defendants “did not initiate the required ‘interactive process’” and that his requests 19 were “ignored, continued without explanation, and ultimately struck.” Id.
20 1 Plaintiff further alleges that his trial was scheduled on the same date as a 2 medically necessary surgical procedure and that his treating physician advised he
3 should not participate in legal proceedings at that time. Id. at 11-12. Despite this, 4 Plaintiff alleges he was required to proceed to trial while in “extreme pain,” under 5 the effects of medication, and unable to meaningfully participate. Id. at 12-13.
6 Plaintiff also alleges that the presiding judge engaged in hostile and unequal 7 treatment, including minimizing his statements, interrupting him, and treating him 8 less favorably than his opposing party. Id. at 14. He contends this conduct 9 reflected discrimination based on disability and race and affected the outcome of
10 his case. Id. 11 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that after he filed complaints regarding judicial 12 conduct and initiated related proceedings, Defendants engaged in retaliatory
13 conduct, including striking filings, denying motions, and obstructing his access to 14 the courts. Id. at 15, 17. 15 Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $40,000,000 in 16 damages. Id. at 4, 25.
17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 “To survive a [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must 19 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
20 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 1 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the 2 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
3 suffice.” Id. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 4 Court must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations and any reasonable 5 inference to be drawn from them, but legal conclusions are not entitled to the same
6 assumption of truth. Id. A complaint must contain either direct or inferential 7 allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under 8 some viable legal theory. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562. “Factual allegations must be 9 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. Because
10 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his pleadings. Capp v. 11 Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2019). 12 DISCUSSION
13 A. State Defendants 14 1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 15 The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state and its 16 agencies unless the state consents to suit or Congress validly abrogates the state’s
17 immunity. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1996); Raygor v. 18 Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 540-41 (2002). Defendant 19 Washington State Administrative Office of the Courts is a state agency that
20 functions as an arm of the State of Washington and is therefore entitled to Eleventh 1 Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 2 89, 100 (1984). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for alleged past conduct and
3 does not name a state official as a defendant or seek prospective injunctive relief 4 against such an official. “The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to 5 immunize states from lawsuits for private damages or other retrospective relief
6 brought in federal court by its own citizens or citizens of other states.” R.W. v. 7 Columbia Basin Coll., 572 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1017 (E.D. Wash. 2021), aff’d in 8 part, appeal dismissed in part, 77 F.4th 1214 (9th Cir. 2023). Because the State 9 Defendants have not consented to suit in this case, and no exceptions applies, the
10 Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claims against them. See Rains v. State, 674 11 P.2d 165, 170 (Wash. 1983) (“[T]he State cannot be sued in federal court because 12 of the Eleventh Amendment.”).
13 2. Section 1983 Claims 14 Plaintiff’s constitutional claims independently fail because states and state 15 agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. 16 Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“We hold that neither a
17 State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 18 1983.”). 19
20 1 3. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims 2 Plaintiff also asserts claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. ECF
3 No. 1. Plaintiff’s response emphasizes that Title II of the ADA may apply in the 4 context of access to courts and relies on Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 5 Even assuming such a theory could be viable in an appropriate case, Plaintiff’s
6 Complaint does not plausibly allege facts showing that Plaintiff was excluded from 7 participation in court proceedings or denied meaningful access to the courts by 8 reason of disability. To the extent Plaintiff’s response includes additional factual 9 assertions regarding accommodation requests or ongoing conduct, “it is ‘axiomatic
10 that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to 11 dismiss.’” Apple Inc. v. Allan & Assoc. Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 3d 42, 59 (N.D. Cal. 12 2020) (quoting Frenzel v. AliphCom, 76 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014));
13 see, e.g., Lee v. City of Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 B. Walla Walla County 15 1. Municipal Liability 16 A municipal entity may be liable under § 1983 only where the alleged
17 constitutional violation results from an official policy, custom, or practice of the 18 municipality. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 19 694 (1978). However, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no factual allegations
20 suggesting that Defendant Walla Walla County adopted or implemented any policy 1 that caused the alleged violations. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations concern the 2 conduct of a state judge presiding over Plaintiff’s divorce proceedings.
3 In Washington, superior courts are part of the state judicial branch created 4 by the Washington Constitution. Wash. Const. art. IV, § 6. When performing 5 judicial functions, judges do not act as municipal policymakers for purposes of §
6 1983 liability. Cf. Eggar v. City of Livingston, 40 F.3d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1994). 7 Because Plaintiff does not allege that a county policy or custom caused the alleged 8 violations, he fails to state a claim against Walla Walla County. 9 2. Judicial Immunity
10 The conduct underlying Plaintiff’s claims consists of actions taken by a 11 judge during judicial proceedings. Judges are absolutely immune from liability for 12 damages for acts performed in their judicial capacity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435
13 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). The conduct 14 alleged, including rulings regarding scheduling, courtroom management, and trial 15 proceedings, constitutes judicial acts. Neither of the two recognized exceptions to 16 judicial immunity applies to Plaintiff’s claims: (1) for actions not taken in a judge’s
17 judicial capacity; and (2) for actions, though judicial, taken absent any jurisdiction. 18 Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. To the extent Plaintiff’s claims depend on such 19 conduct, they are barred by judicial immunity.
20 1 Further, because Plaintiff has not stated a viable underlying federal claim, 2 his remaining conspiracy claims, necessarily fail.
3 CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons explained above, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to 5 dismiss. The Court further denies leave to amend because no amendment can
6 overcome Eleventh Amendment immunity, judicial immunity, and the absence of a 7 viable basis for municipal liability. See Lucas v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 8 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that when a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff’s 9 complaint, it must give the plaintiff leave to amend “[u]nless it is absolutely clear
10 that no amendment can cure the defect” in the complaint). 11 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 12 1. The State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 18, is GRANTED.
13 2. Walla Walla County’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 19, is GRANTED. 14 3. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 15 4. All pending motions, including ECF Nos. 27, 28, 30, 33, are DENIED as 16 moot.
17 5. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal of 18 this Order would not be taken in good faith. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order,
20 provide a copy to the parties, enter judgment, and CLOSE the file. 1 DATED May 6, 2026.
2 s/Mary K. Dimke MARY K. DIMKE 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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