Will of Ehle

41 N.W. 627, 73 Wis. 445, 1889 Wisc. LEXIS 179
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 19, 1889
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 41 N.W. 627 (Will of Ehle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Will of Ehle, 41 N.W. 627, 73 Wis. 445, 1889 Wisc. LEXIS 179 (Wis. 1889).

Opinion

Cassoday, J.

The testator, Abram Ehle, died seized of 260 acres of land, consisting of six forties, and a narrow strip of twenty acres on the west side thereof, all in compact form, and being 240 rods in length, north and south, and 173-J rods in width, east and west.

1. It is claimed that the will only covers 160 acres of [450]*450such lands; and that as to the other 100 acres the testator died intestate; and hence that the same, upon the death of Abram, descended to James; and then, upon his survival of his wife and children, and his death, descended to his heirs at law, who in that event would have been the same as the heirs at law of Abram. The determination of the question may have some bearing upon the burden of proof in connection with the more important question of survivor-ship which will be considered hereafter. Undoubtedly the learned counsel for the appellants is correct in claiming “ that the plain intent of the testator, as evinced by the language of his will, must prevail.” It is moreover true that such intention must be collected from the whole will; that in construing it the different parts are to be examined and compared, with the view of ascertaining such intention as evinced by the whole will and not as may appear from some particular part when taken alone. Baddeley v. Leppingwell, 3 Burrows, 1542; Will of Rowse, Lofft, 99; Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 472; Hopkins v. Glunt, 111 Pa. St. 290. By the first clause of the will the testator disposed- of “ all ” of his real estate to his three grandchildren absolutely,” subject, however, to the two intervening life estates, — one of which had been extinguished by the death of Susan Ehle prior to the death of the testator. Standing alone, the language of that clause of the will would be too plain for construction. But it is claimed that such clause is immediately followed by another, which is either repugnant to the first, or necessarily restricts its meaning to a particular ICO acres. If such is the plain meaning of that clause, then it must prevail over the first clause, in accordance with a rule well understood and supported by authorities cited by counsel. The clause referred to is to the effect that the land so devised consists of 160 acres,” to “ be divided into three portions, by lines running from north to south, each embracing fifty-three and one-third acres or thereabouts,” [451]*451with “ the residence and buildings ” on the western third. "Assuming, for the present, that the description of such 160 acres is sufficiently definite and certain to be located, still we would not be justified in holding that the second clause is repugnant to the first. On the contrary, the second clause, upon such assumption, merely devised such 160 acres in three equal specific parts to the respective grandchildren, leaving the other 100 acres to go to them as tenants in common. This is in harmony with the rule that where the whole will indicates nothing to the contrary a devise by words of general description is not to be cut down or limited by a subsequent attempt at a particular description. Freeman v. Coit, 96 N. Y. 68; Schouler on Wills, § 475. So it is in harmony with the rule that no pr'esumption of an intent to die intestate as to any part of the estate is to be indulged, when the words of the will, fairly construed, are such as to carry the whole. Raudenbach’s Appeal, 87 Pa. St. 51; Ferry's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 207; Given v. Hilton, 95 U. S. 591; Schouler on Wills, § 490.

2. But we are not prepared to hold that the description of the 100 acres, attempted in the second clause of the will, is sufficiently definite and certain to be supported. True, it is to be divided by north and south lines into three equal parts, and the western third is to embrace the residence and farm buildings. Neither the length nor the breadth of such parts, however, are given. They may be the whole length of the farm, — 240 rods,— or less than 148 rods, or at any point’ between those distances. Of course, the width would increase as the length diminished. If we understood counsel correctly as to the location of the buildings, and we assume that the lengths of such’ strips were calculated to extend the whole length of the farm, then it is very plain that the west line of such 160 acres might be the west line of the whole farm, or the 160 acres might be moved gradually eastward, until such west [452]*452line struck such residence or farm buildings; and yet the western third would all the time answer the calls of such description. The same would be true, in a more limited sense, in case such strips only extended to the quarter line, or any point between that line and the south line of the farm. Thus it appears that the farm embraced an infinite number of 160-acre tracts, each of which would answer all the calls of the description given. We must hold that such attempted description of 160 acres is void for uncertainty.

3. This brings us to the important question of fact, whether the testator, Abram Ehle, and his son, James A. Ehle, or either of them, survived all three of the infant children. The determination of the question depends upon inferences and conclusions to be drawn from facts and circumstances in evidence and which are substantially undisputed, and the rules of law applicable as to the burden of proof. To enable us the better to educe such inferences and conclusions in the light of the legal principles applicable, it seems to be necessary to briefly state the situation on the night of this horrible disaster.

The house consumed was a wooden structure, and had been built about thirty-three years. The main part was two stories high, thirty-four feet long and twenty-four feet wide, with a cellar under the whole, and the front end facing the north. In the west third of this main part there was a front and back hall leading from the front door south to the kitchen in an addition or extension. Rear the front door, and opposite the foot of the stairway leading above, was a door leading eastward into the front room, which was about eighteen feet long and sixteen feet wide. Immediately south of this front room was the family room, of about sixteen feet square, witfi two beds in it, in which James and his wife and three children slept. One of'the beds in that room stood in the southwest corner, and was [453]*453usually occupied by Helen and her two little girls. The other bed stood near it, and was usually occupied by James and his little boy. The heads of both beds were against the south wall of that room. On the north side of that room, and near the middle, was a chimney, running from the bottom of the cellar through the top of the roof. On the east side of this chimney was a door between this room and the front room. Near the chimney was a stove, with a zinc or iron sheet under it, and the pipe going into the east side of the chimney, in which fire was kept when the weather was very cold. There was also a stove in the cellar, with a pipe running into the chimney below, in which fire was sometimes kept in very cold weather. In the.hall, and on the projected line of the partition between the front room and the family room, was a door between the front and back halls above mentioned. On the east side of the south end of this back hall was a door leading south into the kitchen.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
41 N.W. 627, 73 Wis. 445, 1889 Wisc. LEXIS 179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/will-of-ehle-wis-1889.