Wilkins v. City of Waynesboro

42 S.E. 767, 116 Ga. 359, 1902 Ga. LEXIS 103
Supreme Court of Georgia·Decided August 9, 1902·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

Little, J.

A petition was filed in the superior court of Burke county, in which it was prayed that certain bonds sought to be issued by the City of Waynesboro should be validated, and the legality of the issue established. Certain citizens residing in that [360] municipality intervened, were made parties to the proceeding, and filed objections to the grant of the order which was sought. The hearing resulted in a judgment confirming and validating the bonds. The intervenors excepted, and as plaintiffs in error here contend that for many reasons the grant of the order was erroneous. It appears that in 1901 the General Assembly passed a special act which by its terms authorized the municipal authorities of Waynesboro to issue bonds, and an ordinance was adopted by the mayor and council, calling an election to ascertain whether the qualified voters of the city would assent to the issue. This ordinance prescribed the number and amount of the bonds sought to be issued, the time of maturity, and the manner in which funds necessary for the payment of the principal and interest should be raised. A notice calling an election, which set out in substance the terms*of the ordinance, was duly published. An election was held, which it is claimed resulted in favor of the issue. The published notice calling the election followed the ordinance, and set out the number of bonds to be sixty, each of the denomination of $500, specified the rate of interest as five per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually, and fixed the date of the maturity of the principal on January 1,1932. In relation to the disposition of the proceeds arising from the sale of such bonds, it was therein declared that not less than $7,000 nor more than $10,000 shall be applied to the construction of an electric-light plant, and not less than $20,000 nor more than $23,000 to a waterworks plant, with the following proviso: “ That should the maximum amount appropriated to either project be not issued, the overplus may, in the discretion of the mayor and council, be appropriated to the other object named and to other purposes incident thereto; but if not so used, the said over-plus shall become a part of the sinking fund provided for the redemption of said bonds.” The notice also specified the sum of $1,-500 as the annual interest to be paid on the bonds, for the years 1903 to 1931 inclusive, and recited: “ the amount of principal to be paid (that is collected as a part of the sinking fund provided for the redemption of said bonds) annually, for the years 1903 to 1932 inclusive, to be $517.25;” and as a plan devised for the redemption of the bonds at maturity the notice also declared that “the sinking fund provided by ordinance for the redemption of the bonds should, with its accumulation, be amply sufficient for that [361] purpose, but in the event of unfavorable casualty or failure to make the fund pay interest equal to the estimate, to wit, 5 per cent, compounded annually, the mayor and council will on proper authority, from time to time as the exigencies of the case may require, supplement said fund by an additional ad valorem tax, or with such fund as may be in the treasury at the time, not otherwise appropriated, so as to insure a sufficient amount to pay the bonds in full at maturity.”

The objections presented by tbe intervenors at the hearing, to a judgment of validation, and urged here as reasons for setting aside that judgment, are, substantially, that the ordinance and notice under which the election was held are invalid, because they are contrary to the constitution and laws of the State; that no provision is made for an annual payment of the principal of the bonds, nor for the annual tax required by law to be levied to meet the sum when due. It is claimed, on the contrary, that the ordinance, notice, and election were each regular, valid, authorized by the constitution and laws of the State, and by the terms of a special act approved November 15, 1901; and that no error was committed in rendering the judgment of validation. A determination of all the issues raised -can be reached by a consideration, first, of the nature and scope of the constitutional provisions relating to the issue of bonds by a municipal corporation; second, of the requirements of the statute as to notice of the election, and the method by which it shall be determined whether a sufficient number of voters have sanctioned the issue ; and third, of the legal effect to be given the special act which is relied on in part as authorizing the plan of payments set out in the ordinance and notice.

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Wilkins v. City of Waynesboro, 42 S.E. 767, 116 Ga. 359, 1902 Ga. LEXIS 103 (Ga. 1902).

42 S.E. 767 (Wilkins v. City of Waynesboro) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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