Wilkins v. City of Waynesboro

42 S.E. 767, 116 Ga. 359, 1902 Ga. LEXIS 103
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedAugust 9, 1902
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 42 S.E. 767 (Wilkins v. City of Waynesboro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilkins v. City of Waynesboro, 42 S.E. 767, 116 Ga. 359, 1902 Ga. LEXIS 103 (Ga. 1902).

Opinion

Little, J.

A petition was filed in the superior court of Burke county, in which it was prayed that certain bonds sought to be issued by the City of Waynesboro should be validated, and the legality of the issue established. Certain citizens residing in that [360]*360municipality intervened, were made parties to the proceeding, and filed objections to the grant of the order which was sought. The hearing resulted in a judgment confirming and validating the bonds. The intervenors excepted, and as plaintiffs in error here contend that for many reasons the grant of the order was erroneous. It appears that in 1901 the General Assembly passed a special act which by its terms authorized the municipal authorities of Waynesboro to issue bonds, and an ordinance was adopted by the mayor and council, calling an election to ascertain whether the qualified voters of the city would assent to the issue. This ordinance prescribed the number and amount of the bonds sought to be issued, the time of maturity, and the manner in which funds necessary for the payment of the principal and interest should be raised. A notice calling an election, which set out in substance the terms*of the ordinance, was duly published. An election was held, which it is claimed resulted in favor of the issue. The published notice calling the election followed the ordinance, and set out the number of bonds to be sixty, each of the denomination of $500, specified the rate of interest as five per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually, and fixed the date of the maturity of the principal on January 1,1932. In relation to the disposition of the proceeds arising from the sale of such bonds, it was therein declared that not less than $7,000 nor more than $10,000 shall be applied to the construction of an electric-light plant, and not less than $20,000 nor more than $23,000 to a waterworks plant, with the following proviso: “ That should the maximum amount appropriated to either project be not issued, the overplus may, in the discretion of the mayor and council, be appropriated to the other object named and to other purposes incident thereto; but if not so used, the said over-plus shall become a part of the sinking fund provided for the redemption of said bonds.” The notice also specified the sum of $1,-500 as the annual interest to be paid on the bonds, for the years 1903 to 1931 inclusive, and recited: “ the amount of principal to be paid (that is collected as a part of the sinking fund provided for the redemption of said bonds) annually, for the years 1903 to 1932 inclusive, to be $517.25;” and as a plan devised for the redemption of the bonds at maturity the notice also declared that “the sinking fund provided by ordinance for the redemption of the bonds should, with its accumulation, be amply sufficient for that [361]*361purpose, but in the event of unfavorable casualty or failure to make the fund pay interest equal to the estimate, to wit, 5 per cent, compounded annually, the mayor and council will on proper authority, from time to time as the exigencies of the case may require, supplement said fund by an additional ad valorem tax, or with such fund as may be in the treasury at the time, not otherwise appropriated, so as to insure a sufficient amount to pay the bonds in full at maturity.”

The objections presented by tbe intervenors at the hearing, to a judgment of validation, and urged here as reasons for setting aside that judgment, are, substantially, that the ordinance and notice under which the election was held are invalid, because they are contrary to the constitution and laws of the State; that no provision is made for an annual payment of the principal of the bonds, nor for the annual tax required by law to be levied to meet the sum when due. It is claimed, on the contrary, that the ordinance, notice, and election were each regular, valid, authorized by the constitution and laws of the State, and by the terms of a special act approved November 15, 1901; and that no error was committed in rendering the judgment of validation. A determination of all the issues raised -can be reached by a consideration, first, of the nature and scope of the constitutional provisions relating to the issue of bonds by a municipal corporation; second, of the requirements of the statute as to notice of the election, and the method by which it shall be determined whether a sufficient number of voters have sanctioned the issue ; and third, of the legal effect to be given the special act which is relied on in part as authorizing the plan of payments set out in the ordinance and notice.

1. Before proceeding to a consideration of the constitutional provisions which relate to the issuance of bonds by a municipal corporation, it may not be amiss to remark that at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and for some years prior thereto, there were but few solvent municipal corporations in the State; that is to say, that payment of the principal and interest of the bonded debt of such corporations could not be met by the imposition of a reasonable tax on property situated and contained within the corporate limits; that municipal taxes had, as a rule, grown to be not only onerous, but burdensome; that this condition of affairs was the result of the improvident exercise, by municipal authorities, of the power [362]*362conferred to create debts. The mischief which was believed to exist was the indiscriminate use of that easily to be acquired power,, so that a high rate of taxation was found to be insufficient to meet current expenses and pay outstanding obligations. The stringent-provisions found in our constitution are the remedies which the-people sought to apply to the existing evil, and indicate a settled public policy, applicable alike to all municipal corporations in this-State. The framers of the constitution made,and intended to make,, the creation of a new debt by a municipality a matter not altogether easy of accomplishment, by placing upon the citizens residing within the limits of such municipality the responsibility for the creation of a debt. The condition annexed to the right to issue, as to the-levy of an annual tax to pay off the debt, was seemingly considered to be a guaranty of prompt payment at maturity, and protection against municipal extravagance would be found in the provision that only when two thirds of the qualified voters had expressed a (Jesire that the municipality should create a debt, such might be-done. The provisions limiting the power to create a debt and issue bonds are found in paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 7, article 7 of the constitution of 1877. In the former of these paragraphs it is declared that an election to ascertain whether two' thirds of the citizens of the municipality would assent to the creation of a new debt-should be held as might thereafter be prescribed by law. By the second it is expressly declared that any municipal corporation which might incur any bonded debt should, before or at the time of doing so,provide for the assessment and collection of an annual tax sufficientiu amount to pay the principal and interest of said debt within thirty years from the date of incurring the same. The manner of raising funds to meet the obligation about to be assumed is not left in doubt, but in plain terms it is declared that it shall be by the assessment and collection of an annual tax. There is, however, no-requirement that payments of either interest or any part of the principal shall be made annually. .The question of the maturity of the debt is, within stated limits, left to the people concerned, who,, it was to be presumed, would look to their interests in determining it.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
42 S.E. 767, 116 Ga. 359, 1902 Ga. LEXIS 103, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilkins-v-city-of-waynesboro-ga-1902.