Wilkin Hale State Bank v. Tucker

4 Pelt. 128, 1920 La. App. LEXIS 93
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 22, 1920
DocketNo. 7872
StatusPublished

This text of 4 Pelt. 128 (Wilkin Hale State Bank v. Tucker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilkin Hale State Bank v. Tucker, 4 Pelt. 128, 1920 La. App. LEXIS 93 (La. Ct. App. 1920).

Opinion

[129]*129WILKIN HALE STATE BANK VS A. S. TUCKER et al. Appellants.

No. 7872

Appeal from Civil District Court, Hon. E. K. Skinner, Judge.

CHARLES F. CLAIBORNE, JUDGE.

This is a suit upon three promissory notes of which the following is a copy:

"$500.00 Oklahoma City, Okla. Feby. 24, 1917.
On the 24 day of August 1917 for value received, I, we, or either of us promise to pay to the Order of Pruiett, Day & Sniggs at the State National Bank of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Five Hundred Dollars with interest at the rate of 10 per cent -per annum after maturity until paid, interest payable annually. In case this note is placed-in the hands of an attorney for collection, we agree to pay $25 additional attorney's fees. The endorsers, guarantors, and assignors, severally waive presentment for payment, protest, and notice of protest thereof for nonpayment of this note, and consent that time of payment may be extended without notice.
"Signed" A. S. Tucker
Joseph St.Mary
Endorsed:
Pay to the order of Wilkin Hale State Bank.
"Signed" Pruiett, Day & Sniggs
by Moman Pruiett

The second and third notes are payable on the 24th day of September, 1917 and 24th day of October, 1917, respectively, and are similar in other respects.

Plaintiff alleged that it was the holder for value in good faith before maturity of the above mentioned three notes; for the payment of which they had made amioable demand upon the defendants; and it prayed for judgnent against them in soljiáb [130]*130for $1500 with ten per cent per annum interest from the maturity of the notes and $75 attorney's fees, and all costs of suit. •

The defendant Tucker admitted his signature to the three notes, but denied any indebtedness on said notes; he denied all the allegations of the plaintiff above set forth. He further alleged that at the request of Joseph St. Mary he nroceeded to Oklahoma City to engage counsel to defend a case in a criminal charge; that be engaged Pruiett, Day & Sniggs who, on February 34th, 1917, agreed to render all legal services in the case, and to pay all expenses incident thereto; that for said services and costs said firm charged $2500, of which $1000 was paid cash, and for the balance, say $1500, defendant signed the three notes aforesaid until they coOIld receive the signature of Josenh St. Mary; therefore he denies any individual liability as co-maker of said notes; he further adopts all the defendes urged by Joseph St.Mary in his answer; and in accordance therewith he denies that the plaintiff is an innocent holder for value before maturity within the meaning of the Negotiable Instrument Act.

Joseph St. Mary, like Tucker, admitted his signature to the three notes, but denied any indebtedness on the notes; he denied all plaintiff's allegations, but admitted amicable demand and refusal to pay. He repeated the occasion of the employment of Pruiett, Day and Sniggs, and the signing of the contract and of the three notes by A. S. Tucker, who acted as his agent; that he proceeded to Oklahoma City a few days before the trial of the case, when at the request of Moman Pruiett on Kay 26th, 1917, he advanced him $500 for the purposes of the case; that also at his request he again advanced Pruiett the following additional sums, viz:

On June 6th, 1917.17.50
" " " " 75.00
" * " " 212.50
" " " " 500.00
which with 600.00
made a total of $1405.00
and he advanced Yictor A.Sniggs 130.QQ
making a total of $1535.00;

[131]*131that the above amount so advanced by defendant became legally applicable to the extinguishment of said notes, but that defendant did not. require their production to write the proper credits thereon, relying upon the integrity of the attorneys;

"that since said notes had been paid in their entirety, long before the maturity of any one of them, their negotiation, if in fact such had been made, was manifestly a fraud upon the rights of this respondent, and since such transfer was not legally possible, your respondent specially denies that plaintiff is a holder in due course of said notes".

The defendants prayed for a jury. There wa3 a verdict and judgment against them. From thi3 judgment they prayed for a new trial upon the following grounds, viz:

"lo That no proof was offered of the indorsement of the payees, Pruiett, Day & Sniggs, of the notes made payable to their order; that upon objection being made to admissibility of the notes, it devolved on the holder under the issue raised by the pleadings, to show title by proving the genuineness of the signatures of the indorsers, in order to obtain judgment against the makers;
2o That the plaintiff, Bank, according to the testimony of its two officers, acquired the notes sued on as collateral to secure the individual indebtedness of llorman Pruiett, a .member of the law firm of Pruiett, Day & Snigis, without any showing of authority in said Pruiett from his co-partners to consent to or acquiesce in a loan to said Prúiett, and which loan was placed by the bank to the credit of an oil and gas company in which plaintiff's witnesses testified the firm of Pruiett, Day & Sniggs had no interest or concern whatsoever;
3o That there is no implied authority in a member of a law firm to indorse the paper payable to the firm for his own use, so that even if it can be inferred from the testimony which however is denied, that Pruiett himself indorsed the paper sued on in the name of the firm, [132]*132such indorsement could not pass title;
4o That the evidence adduced does not disclose that the plaintiff Bank was an innocent holder in due course of the notes 3ued on, without the meaning and intendment of the law relating thereto".

The new trial was refused and defendants have appealed.

■The three notes were dated February 34th, 1917; the first was payable August 24th, 1917 and the two others^ one and two months later; the plaintiff came in possession of them on March 12th, 1917; on that date no payment had been made on account of them; all payments are shown to have been.made later in May and June 1917 to Pruiett after he had parted with the possession of the notes and after they had gone in the possession of the plaintiff. The only circumstance to connect the plaintiff with the several payments made by St. Mary on those notes is the fact that all the paymmnts made by him were by drafts; a draft for $1000 to the order of Pruiett, Day & Sniggs to cover the cash payment^, and two drafts of$17.50 and $500 to the order of Morman Pruiett, all three of which were collected through the plaintiff bank.

This ms not sufficient to fasten upon the plaintiff knowledge that those last two payments were on account of the notes.

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Bluebook (online)
4 Pelt. 128, 1920 La. App. LEXIS 93, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilkin-hale-state-bank-v-tucker-lactapp-1920.