Wilkie v. City of Chicago

58 N.E. 1004, 188 Ill. 444
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 20, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by41 cases

This text of 58 N.E. 1004 (Wilkie v. City of Chicago) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilkie v. City of Chicago, 58 N.E. 1004, 188 Ill. 444 (Ill. 1900).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Cartwright

delivered the opinion of the court:

William Wilkie and seventy-eight others, as complainants, filed their bill in this case in the circuit court of Cook county against the city of Chicago, appellee, alleging that they were master plumbers engaged in the business of plumbing in the said city, and praying for an injunction against the enforcement of section 1415 of the Revised Code of said city, requiring each master plumber to obtain a license and pay a fee of $30 per year therefor, and section 1421 of such code, imposing a penalty of not less than $50 nor more than $100 for each and every offense of performing any plumbing work without having first obtained such license. The circuit court overruled a general demurrer of the defendant to the said bill and granted the injunction asked for. The defendant was ruled to answer the amended bill within five days, and it was ordered that in the event of failure to answer, the injunction should be made perpetual and the decree stand as a final decree in the cause. The defendant did not answer according to the terms of the order, and the injunction, became perpetual and the decree final. From that decree the defendant appealed. The appeal was heard in the Branch Appellate Court for the First District, and the decree of the circuit court was reversed and the cause remanded, with a direction to dismiss the bill for want of equity. This appeal is prosecuted from that judgment of the Appellate Court.

The first question raised is whether the circuit court had jurisdiction, as a court of equity,_ over the subject matter of the bill. Th at jurisdiction was invoked upon the following facts averred in the bill and admitted by the demurrer: The seventy-nine complainants are master plumbers in the city of Chicago, and sue on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. There are in the city of Chicago nine hundred or more master plumbers, whose interests in the questions involved are identical and each of whom is liable to prosecution under the provisions which are alleged to be void. The city has made demands upon complainants to take out licenses under said section, and threatens them with arrest if such licenses are not procured. If they continue to engage in their avocation the city will put its threat into execution and they will be arrested for violation of the ordinance. Bach prosecution would involve the same right claimed by the city against each of them. The city would not be civilly liable nor held responsible for damages to complainants. The authorities of the city making arrests are not financially responsible or able to respond in damages. If the master plumbers should pay the license fee and bring suits to recover it, there would be required nine hundred or more suits to recover money illegally obtained. Complainants are threatened with arrest as often as they enter any premises for the purpose of plying their trade, and their business would thereby be practically destroyed.

The mere allegation that an ordinance is illegal will not confer jurisdiction upon a court of equity to restrain its enforcement, but the averments of the bill bring this case within the rule recognized in City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445. The complainants are entitled to join in a suit in equity for the purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of suits and having the controversy settled in one hearing.

The conditions upon which the legality of the proposed exaction by the city depends, as alleged in the bill and admitted by the demurrer, are substantially as follows: The Revised Code of the city of Chicago went into effect in April, 1897. The provisions claimed to be invalid, under which the city demands that complainants take out a license and pay a fee of $30 therefor, are as follows:

“Sec. 1415. Any person desiring to engage in or work at the business of plumbing in the city of Chicago as a master plumber shall first, obtain a license so to do for each establishment or place of business to be maintained by him, and shall pay for such a license a fee of thirty ($30) dollars per year, said license fee to be paid for during the month of May of each and every year.”

“Sec. 1421. Mo person shall perform any plumbing work without having first obtained the license herein provided for, under penalty of a fine, upon conviction, of not less than fifty ($50) dollars nor more than one hundred ($100) dollars for each and every offense.”

Shortly after said Revised Code took effect the legislature passed the following act (Laws of 1897, p. 279): “An act to provide for the licensing of plumbers and to supervise and inspect plumbing.

“Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly: That any person now or hereafter engaging in or working at the business of plumbing in cities or towns of 5000 inhabitants or more, in this State, either as a master plumber or employing plumber or as a journeyman plumber, shall first receive a certificate thereof in accordance with the provisions of this act.

“Sec. 2. Any person desiring to engage in or work at the business of plumbing, either as a master plumber or employing plumber, or as a journeyman plumber, shall make application to a board of examiners hereinafter provided for, and shall, at such time and place as said board may designate, be compelled to pass such examination as to his qualifications, as said board may direct; said examination may be made in whole or in part in writing, and shall be of a practical and elementary character but sufficiently strict to test the qualifications, of the applicant.

“Sec. 3. That there shall be in every city, town or village of 10,000 inhabitants or more a board of examiners of plumbers, consisting of three members, one of which shall be the chairman of the board of health, who shall be office (ex officio) chairman of said board of examiners; a second member, who shall be a master plumber, and a third member, who shall be a journeyman plumber. Said second and third members shall be appointed by the mayor and approved by the council or by the board of trustees of said town or village within three months after the passage of this act for the term of one year from the first day of May in the year of appointment, and thereafter annually before the first day of May, and shall be paid from the treasury of said city, town or village the same as other officers in such sums as the authorities may designate.

“Sec. 4. Said board of examiners shall, as soon as may be after the appointment, meet and shall then designate the times and places for the examination of all applicants desiring to eng'age in, or work at, the business of plumbing, within their respective jurisdiction. Said board shall examine said applicants as to their practical knowledge of plumbing, house drainage and plumbing ventilation, and, if satisfied of the competency of such applicants, shall thereupon issue a certificate to such applicant, authorizing him to engage in, or work at, the business of plumbing, whether as master plumber, or employing plumber, or as a journeyman plumber. The fee for a certificate for a master plumber, or employing plumber, shall be five dollars; for a journeyman plumber it shall be one dollar. Said certificate shall be valid and have force throughout the State, and all fees received for said certificates shall be paid into the treasury of the city, town or village where said certificates are issued.

“Sec. 5.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Wiggins
2016 IL App (1st) 153163 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2016)
United Private Detective & Security Ass'n v. City of Chicago
343 N.E.2d 453 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1976)
UNITED PRIV. DET. & SEC. ASS'N v. Chicago
343 N.E.2d 453 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1976)
(1974)
63 Op. Att'y Gen. 586 (Wisconsin Attorney General Reports, 1974)
Oppelt v. Mayo
223 A.2d 47 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1966)
Minnetonka Electric Co. v. Village of Golden Valley
141 N.W.2d 138 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1966)
People Ex Rel. Mayfield v. City of Springfield
158 N.E.2d 582 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1959)
Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins
160 P.2d 37 (California Court of Appeal, 1945)
Aliotta v. City of Chicago
59 N.E.2d 829 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1945)
Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc. v. City of Chicago
122 F.2d 132 (Seventh Circuit, 1941)
State Ex Rel. Baker v. McCarthy
166 So. 280 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1936)
City of Morgantown v. Pauley
176 S.E. 857 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1934)
Gramling v. Maxwell
52 F.2d 256 (W.D. North Carolina, 1931)
City of Chicago v. Jensen
162 N.E. 115 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1928)
Wright v. Baird
249 Ill. App. 90 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1928)
Klever Shampay Karpet Kleaners, Inc. v. City of Chicago
154 N.E. 131 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1926)
State ex rel. Grantham v. City of Memphis
151 Tenn. 1 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1924)
Arms v. City of Chicago
145 N.E. 407 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1924)
Linehan v. City of Chicago
227 Ill. App. 255 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1922)
R. R. Kitchen & Co. v. Local Union No. 141 Int. Bro.
112 S.E. 198 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1922)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
58 N.E. 1004, 188 Ill. 444, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilkie-v-city-of-chicago-ill-1900.