Wilkens v. Iowa Insurance Commissioner

457 N.W.2d 1, 1990 Iowa App. LEXIS 34, 1990 WL 74603
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedFebruary 22, 1990
Docket89-471
StatusPublished

This text of 457 N.W.2d 1 (Wilkens v. Iowa Insurance Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilkens v. Iowa Insurance Commissioner, 457 N.W.2d 1, 1990 Iowa App. LEXIS 34, 1990 WL 74603 (iowactapp 1990).

Opinion

SACKETT, Judge.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee Allstate Insurance Company. Plaintiffs-appellants Ronald Wilkens, Kenneth B. Thoma, and George McDowell, representatives of Allstate, sued Allstate for themselves and others similarly situated, contending it did not comply with certain Iowa statutes on insurance policies written for Iowa residents. The Insurance Commissioner, with permission, filed an amicus curiae brief. We have considered that brief. We affirm as modified the trial *2 court’s order sustaining the motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs were agents of Allstate. They sued Allstate, contending it had violated Iowa law in failing to write certain policies in accordance with section 515 of the Iowa Code. Plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory relief, and money damages for commissions on policies written. The district court transferred the case to the Iowa Insurance Commission for interpretation of the code sections in question. Plaintiffs filed another suit 1 against the commission, which was consolidated with the present action. Ultimately the case came before the trial court on Allstate’s motion for summary judgment. The sustaining of that motion has led to this appeal.

Appellants’ first argument is the trial court erred in finding no factual dispute existed. Appellants make some general references to a factual dispute and argue Allstate has not shown there is not a fact issue. The standard by which we review the granting of a motion for summary judgment is clearly established. See Knapp v. Simmons, 345 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Iowa 1984); First Nat’l Bank v. Mackey, 338 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Iowa 1983). We find no factual dispute exists.

Plaintiffs’ next contention is Allstate did not comply with Iowa Code sections 515.52 through 515.56 (1989). 2 These sections deal generally with the requirement that insurance in this state be written by a licensed Iowa agent. Allstate is an Illinois-based insurance company, licensed to do business in Iowa. It is regulated under Iowa Code chapter 515. Allstate has a number of what are called unrepresented policies. This means these policies do not have an assigned agent. “Allstate” becomes the assigned agent. For many years Allstate spread these policies to agents closest to the insured’s interest. The local agent countersigned the policy and received commission.

In the mid-1980s Allstate took the policies from local agents. The local agents lost their countersigning commission. One agent, Larry Hertel, now countersigns all these policies through a computer-generated typewritten name. Plaintiffs contend these actions violate the statutes because:

1. There is failure to obtain direct physical countersigning as required under section 515.52;
2. There is failure to have resident agents who are countersigning out- *3 of-state policies maintain records of all countersignatures within the State of Iowa, in violation of Iowa Code section 515.57;
3. There is a failure to pay resident agents the required commission, in violation of Iowa Code section 515.54.

The commissioner determined the computer-generated signatures were permissible to meet the requirements of a signature for purposes of the applicable statute. Appellants contend they were not. Iowa Code section 4.1(17) (1989) provides:

Written — in writing — signature. The words “written” and “in writing” may include any mode of representing words or letters in general use. A signature, when required by law, must be made by the writing or markings of the person whose signature is required. If a person is unable due to a physical handicap to make a written signature or mark, that person may [make substitutions] in lieu of a signature required by law....

In Cummings v. Landes, 140 Iowa 80, 82-83, 117 N.W. 22, 23 (1908), the Iowa court addressed the meaning of the word “signature” in the context of a statute requiring that notice of service be signed by a plaintiff or his or her attorney. The court discussed how the word “signature” is generally considered to be nearly synonymous with autograph, but allowed the name to be attached by any known method of impressing a name. See also Ferguson v. Stilwill, 224 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Iowa 1974) (in absence of statute prescribing method of affixing signature, it may be handwritten or printed).

We find the fact that the signature is computer-generated rather than hand-signed does not defeat the purpose of the act. The issue is not how the name is placed on a sheet of paper; rather, the issue is whether the person whose name is affixed intends to be bound. No one argues that the agent whose name was affixed did not intend to be bound. We find the signature requirements of the statute were met.

The next, and more important, issue is whether the signatures are in violation of the statute because they are, in essence, signed in blank. Plaintiffs argue one agent cannot and does not have sufficient knowledge of premiums and risks on over 4,500 policies. To decide this question we need to determine the section’s purpose.

Allstate and the commissioner argue the underlying legislative intent is to ensure the collection of premium tax. Plaintiffs argue it is to assure their commission as agents. While the applicable sections address both issues, we determine the primary purpose of the section is to assure the Iowa consumer an acceptable product and to require that agents licensed in Iowa have input in the writing of policies sold in Iowa. The legislature has provided for the consumer purchasing insurance in Iowa to have the benefit of the expertise of a resident agent who has passed the required tests showing knowledge of local law and who knows the policy, the coverage, the risk, and the premiums. The payment of the commission is not for the presence of a signature but for the expertise in writing and placing the policy. We modify the findings of the trial court in this respect only.

However, there is no basis for plaintiffs to claim commissions on policies written. It is clear they performed no services with reference to any of the policies. The trial court was correct in dismissing their claim for damages.

Appellants next contend Allstate’s record-keeping does not comply with the statute. Iowa Code section 515.57 (1989) provides:

It shall be the duty of every resident countersigning agent for business originating without this state but covering property or business transactions within this state, and the insurance companies issuing such policies, to keep a written record of each such transaction which shall contain [specific information], and such records shall be subject to the inspection of the commissioner of insurance for the purpose of verifying the amount of premium tax payable by such company....

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Related

Ferguson v. Stilwill
224 N.W.2d 11 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1974)
Knapp v. Simmons
345 N.W.2d 118 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1984)
First National Bank of Dubuque v. MacKey
338 N.W.2d 361 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1983)
Cummings v. Landes
117 N.W. 22 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1908)

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Bluebook (online)
457 N.W.2d 1, 1990 Iowa App. LEXIS 34, 1990 WL 74603, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilkens-v-iowa-insurance-commissioner-iowactapp-1990.