Wilfredo Segarra Miranda, as trustee for the estate of José Rovira Santiago v. Banco de Desarollo Economico Para Puerto Rico, Marjorie Rivera Pugh, Rachael Stewart Collazo and RS Gift Sales Inc.

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJuly 11, 2008
Docket06-00241
StatusUnknown

This text of Wilfredo Segarra Miranda, as trustee for the estate of José Rovira Santiago v. Banco de Desarollo Economico Para Puerto Rico, Marjorie Rivera Pugh, Rachael Stewart Collazo and RS Gift Sales Inc. (Wilfredo Segarra Miranda, as trustee for the estate of José Rovira Santiago v. Banco de Desarollo Economico Para Puerto Rico, Marjorie Rivera Pugh, Rachael Stewart Collazo and RS Gift Sales Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Wilfredo Segarra Miranda, as trustee for the estate of José Rovira Santiago v. Banco de Desarollo Economico Para Puerto Rico, Marjorie Rivera Pugh, Rachael Stewart Collazo and RS Gift Sales Inc., (prb 2008).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

IN THE MATTER OF : JOSE ROVIRA SANTIAGO, : CASE NO. 05-08295 (SEK) DEBTOR oo : CHAPTER 7

WILFREDO SEGARRA MIRANDA, as: trustee for the estate of José Rovira Santiago, : PLAINTIFF : ADV. NO. 06-00241 Vv. : BANCO DE DESAROLLO ECONOMICO □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ PARA PUERTO RICO, MARJORIE : FILED & ENTERED | RIVERA PUGH, RACHAEL STEWART COLLAZO AND RS GIFT SALES INC.: 1 lan DEFENDANTS | MUL TT 2008 □ I eee COURT | OPINION AND ORDER We hereby deny the Trustee’s motion for partial summary judgment for the following reasons. First, we agree with Banco de Desarollo Econémico Para Puerto Rico’s (“the Bank”) position that there is a material fact in controversy preventing us from ruling summarily. That is, whether Rachael Stewart Collazo has an interest in the real property located in Gurabo, P.R. subject to the Bank’s mortgage lien. We adopt the Bank’s position found at pp. 1-5 as our own. Next, we also agree with the Bank that this loan, granted to the co defendant RS sige Sales, Inc., is a commercial loan. The

existence of cause in a commercial loan is adjudicated by applying 19 Laws of P.R. Ann. § 603(a) (3), and not the Civil Code of Puerto Rico. Under this section, we agree that the Bank granted the loan to RS Gift Sales, Inc. for cause, and its repayment was guaranteed by a mortgage on the Gurabo realty. We base this conclusion on the arguments raised py the Bank in its opposition at p. 7 ,which we adopt as our own. We attach the opposition as Exhibit A, incorporating its relevant parts mentioned above, SO ORDERED, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on July 9, 2008.

SARA DE JxSuS U.S4 Bankruptoy Judge

FDB- ECRase:06-00241-SEK Doc#:62 Filed:03/19/2008 Page 1 of 7 Leg file 07-0919 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO IN RE: Exhibit A. JOSE ROVIRA SANTIAGO Case no. 05 - 08295 SEK Debtor

CHAPTER 7

WILFREDO SEGARRA MIRANDA Adv. No. 06 - 00241 as Chapter 7 Trustee, for the estate of José Rovira Santiago Plaintiff AVOIDANCE OF PREFERENTIAL TRANSFER UNDER sc. 547; AVOIDANCE OF LIEN UNDER sc. 544: vs. AND TURNOVER OF PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE Banco de Desarrollo Econémico para Puerto Rico; Marjorie Vanesa Rivera Pugh; Raquel Stewart Collado, and R $ Gift Sales, inc. Defendants

REPLY TO TRUSTEE’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT To the Honorable Court: Comes now the Economic Development Bank for Puerto Rico, (EDB) a public corporation of the Commonweaith of Puerto Rico, enacted by Act Number 22, of July 24", 1985 as subsequently amended, and through its undersigned legal counsel, very much respectfully reply to the Trustee’s motion for partial summary judgment:

1- The Trustee’s motion for partial summary judgment relies exclusively on the allegation that EDB’s opposition to the Third Cause of Action to Avoid Lien Pursuant 11 U.S.C. sc. 544(b) admits that the debtor had bought the real estate property at Urbanizacién Horizontes, C -10 Aurora St., Gurabo, P. R. alone. Such an allegation is based and implies the validity of Public Deed No. 54 on January 28"., 1999 before Notary Public Isabel Rivera Lopez between the debtor and codefendant Raquel Stewart Collado as the buyers, and Domingo Diaz Arroyo and Sonia Gonzalez Carrién as the sellers, whereby the buyers acquired the hereinbefore referenced real estate, that was clarified afterwards by Public Deed No. 85 executed on February 4" | 1999 before the same Notary Public, between

IN RE: JOSE SEBO aa K Doc#:62 Filed:03/1 9/2008 Page2of7 Bktcy. Case no. 05 - 08295 SEK; CHAPTER 7 UNITED §: Tai TES BANKRUPTCY COURT REPLY TO TRUSTEE’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; page -2-

same parties to establish that no matter the contents of the former, the debtor had bought the property alone. □□□ nonetheless, on March the 3, 1999 the debtor and codefendant Raquel Stewart Collado executed Public Deed No. 4 about Antenuptial Agreement before Notary Public Octavio Malavé Torres wherein the parties expressly recognized Raquel Stewart Collado’s interest in this real estate at Gurabo. This fact _ shows clearly enough that somehow Raquel Stewart Collado is the holder of not less than an equitable interest in the property.

2- The execution of Public Deed No. 85 executed on February 1999 before Notary Public Isabel Rivera Lopez is a fact, but its validity is a matter of law, that’s precisely the marrow point in controversy; that is: if no matter this admission, legal reality is no other than, no matter the title of the property be under the name of the Debtor, codefendant Raquel Stewart Collado is the co owner in at least a 50% of the excess of the $33,000.00 initial investment; or that at a minimum, she holds an equitable interest of in the property.

This controversy requires not less than Raquel Stewart Collado”s testimony as minimum proof in order to be adjudicated.

3- Rule 56 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure orders in pertinent:

(¢) “Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shail be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”........

The very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to asses the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial. See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 2069 (2d. ed 1953); 3 Barron & Holtzof. Federal Practice & Procedure sc 1235.1.

IN RE: JOSESO © Doc#:62 Filed:03/1 9/2008 Page 3of7 Bktcy. Case no. 05 - 08295 SEK; CHAPTER 7 Adv. No.08- 00241 REPLY TO TRUSTEE’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT: page -3-

Where an issue as to a material fact cannot be resolved without observation of the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Notes of Advisory Committee of 1963 Amendments to Rules.

it is adequate to use a motion for summary judgment to resolve a dispute involving the interpretation of an unambiquous contract, See Howard vs. Russell Siover Candies Inc. 649 F. 2d 620, 623 (1981); Hanson vs. Mc Caw Cellular Comm. Inc. 77 F. 3 663, 667 (1996).

A summary judgment is to be granted against a party that after adequate opportunity for discovery “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of P{roof at trial.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317, 322 (1986).

When the adjudication of a case requires a determination of intention, the courts shouid cautious as to the granting of a motion for summary judgment, since its adjudication depends mostly on witness credibility, that should be determined after observing their demeanor in the direct and cross examination. This is particularly true where the issue over intention is about an ambiguous contract, where intention is a matter of fact, not suitable for resolution by way of summary judgment. See Morrison vs. Nissan Co. Ltd. 601 F2d169, 141 (1979); Brobeck Phieger’s Alamson v. Telex Corp. 602 F2d 369 (1979); Radix Organization, Inc. v. Mack Trucks Inc. 602 F. 2d 45 (1979); Gertner v. Hospital Affiliates Intern Inc, 602 F. 2d685 (1979); Cedillo v. International Ass’n of Bridge and [ron Workers, Local 1, 603F. 2d 7 (1979); Lyteil v. Vautrin 604 f. 2d 18 (1979); Landtec Corp. v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., etc. 605 F, 2d 75 (1979); Central Nat. Life Ins. Co. v.

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