Wiley v. Lu

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 9, 2025
• Docket: 24-3647
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD HOWARD WILEY, No. 24-3647 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:24-cv-01934-JLS-BFM v. MEMORANDUM* QUINN LU, Doctor,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 19, 2025**

Before: SILVERMAN, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Edward Howard Wiley appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action alleging medical malpractice. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Seismic Reservoir

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2020, Inc. v. Paulsson, 785 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Wiley’s action because Wiley failed to

establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d

409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the plaintiff has the burden of establishing

subject matter jurisdiction); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523

U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (explaining that an action may be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction where the alleged federal claim is “wholly insubstantial and

frivolous” or “otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal

controversy” (citations omitted)); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)

(holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 applies only when “the citizenship of each plaintiff

is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Wiley’s motion for

default judgment because Wiley failed to establish any ground for default

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (providing that a default can be entered

against a party only where that party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend”);

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of

review and factors to consider before entering default judgment).

We reject as unsupported by the record Wiley’s contentions that the district

judge was biased against him.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

2 24-3647 appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

The motion (Docket Entry No. 8) requesting “that all damages for relief . . .

be determined by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals” is denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-3647