Wiley v. City of Aberdeen

212 P. 1049, 123 Wash. 539, 1923 Wash. LEXIS 783
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 10, 1923
DocketNo. 17602
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 212 P. 1049 (Wiley v. City of Aberdeen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wiley v. City of Aberdeen, 212 P. 1049, 123 Wash. 539, 1923 Wash. LEXIS 783 (Wash. 1923).

Opinion

Tolman, J.

This is an action to set aside and cancel municipal local assessments. From a judgment granting the relief prayed for, this appeal is prosecuted.

It appears that Wilson creek is a natural water course about a mile in length, running through private property, crossing public streets and alleys, and emptying into Grays Harbor, all within the limits of the city of Aberdeen. The testimony shows that, for more than thirty years last past, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, this stream has followed its [540]*540natural open channel without material change, and that the lands through which it flows have been platted without reference to its channel. In places, the owners of the lands through which it flows have planked its banks to prevent erosion, and in a few instances have erected buildings covering the channel, but permitting the passage of the stream underneath without interruption.

Some years ago, the owners of lots 9 and 10, block 5, Town of Wishkak (within the city of Aberdeen), through which the creek flows, constructed a wooden culvert substantially upon the boundary line between the lots mentioned, through which they conducted the stream, thereby perhaps slightly changing its natural course across their property, but permitting it to continue in its natural bed, both before entering and after leaving the boundaries of their lands. Earth was filled in over this culvert so that the surface thereafter was used by the owners as though no stream there existed. In the course of time, this wooden culvert decayed, gave way, and the broken planks with the earth above fell into the stream, blocked its passage, caused the waters to back up into the street at the upper end of the culvert, and perhaps in some degree to flood private property above.

At this time and under these conditions, the city undertook to, and did, build a concrete culvert on the site of the wooden culvert which had given away, by means of which the stream was conducted from Summit street on the north across this private property along the boundary line between the lots as indicated, across the alley to the south, and thence in its natural channel as an open stream, except as it passed through culverts in public streets, to the bay into which it empties; the whole improvement being on private property, except as to aprons which project into Summit street, and also [541]*541excepting the public alley at the south, twenty feet in width, across which the culvert extends.

The city passed the usual resolution providing for the construction of this culvert, therein providing that the cost should be assessed against all of the property within the local assessment district to be established, and describing the property to be so included. Thereafter in due course, and after proper notice, the city passed an ordinance providing for the construction of the improvement, and establishing a local assessment district. The matter then proceeded regularly, the contract was awarded, the work completed and accepted, the assessment-roll prepared, notice thereof duly given, and a hearing had. No objections or protests were filed or made, and the roll was duly confirmed by ordinance.

Appellants seem to rely chiefly upon the regularity of these proceedings, and upon § 9375, Rem. Comp. Stat., which reads:

“Whenever any assessment-roll for local improvements shall háve been confirmed by the council or other legislative body of such city or town as herein provided, the regularity, validity and correctness of the proceedings relating to such improvement, and to the assessment therefor, including the action of the council upon such assessment-roll and the confirmation thereof, shall be conclusive in all things upon all parties, and cannot in any manner be contested or questioned in any proceeding whatsoever by any person not filing written objections to such roll in the manner and within the time provided in this act, and not appealing from the action of the council in confirming such assessment-roll in the manner and within the time in this act provided. No proceeding of any kind shall be commenced or prosecuted for the purpose of defeating or contesting any such assessment, or the sale of any property to pay such assessment, or any certificate of delinquency issued therefor, or the foreclosure of any lien issued therefor: Provided, that this section shail [542]*542not be construed as prohibiting the bringing of injunction proceedings to prevent the sale of any real estate upon the grounds (1) that the property about to be sold does not appear upon the assessment-roll, or (2) that said assessment has been paid.”-

If the city had power to make this improvement and direct that the cost thereof be raised by local assessment, then we think the statute controlling. If it had no jurisdiction or power to initiate the proceedings, then the statute does not apply.

Aberdeen is a city of the second class, and as such its rights, privileges and powers are enumerated and defined in Rem. Comp. Stat., § 9006 et seq. It is there provided:

“Every municipal corporation of the second class shall be entitled, the city of- (naming it), and by such name shall have perpetual succession, may sue and be sued in all courts and places and in all proceedings whatever; and shall have and use a common seal, and alter the same at pleasure; may purchase, receive, have, take, hold, lease, use and enjoy property of every name or description, and control and dispose of the same for the common benefit. ’ ’

Every other provision of the statute law relating to the powers of such cities, so far as our investigation has gone, either presupposes or expressly states that the powers granted are to be exercised only for the “common benefit,” “the use and benefit of the city,” and other like terms. Indeed, in the nature of things, the legislature can only, and would only, empower cities to act in the interest of public order and welfare. So when we come to consider the chapter on local improvements, there must be read into the law which grants the power to make such improvements the limitation that it shall be exercised only for a public and never for a private purpose. Take Rem. Comp. Stat., § 9355, under which and succeeding subdivisions the [543]*543city row claims it derives the power to act in this matter. That section reads:

“Any city or town shall have power to provide for the protection of such city or town, or any part thereof, from overflow, and to establish, construct and maintain dikes, levees, embankments or other structures and works, or to open, deepen, straighten or otherwise enlarge natural watercourses, waterways and other channels, including the acquisition or damaging of lands, rights of way, rights and property therefor, within or without the corporate limits of such city or town, and to manage, regulate and control the same.”

Clearly the power there granted is only to be used for a public purpose, and any other construction would permit the city to take private property for a private use in contravention of the expressed terms of our constitution.

If this be the law, and we are convinced that it is, we must now consider whether or not the improvement here under consideration was for a public purpose and a public benefit, or strictly for a private purpose and a private benefit to the owners of lots 9 and 10 through whose property it conducted the stream.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Tiffany Family Trust Corp. v. City of Kent
119 P.3d 325 (Washington Supreme Court, 2005)
Patchell v. City of Puyallup
682 P.2d 913 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1984)
Sado v. City of Spokane
588 P.2d 1231 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1979)
City of Des Moines v. Hemenway
437 P.2d 171 (Washington Supreme Court, 1968)
Papac v. City of Montesano
303 P.2d 654 (Washington Supreme Court, 1956)
Sigurdson v. City of Seattle
292 P.2d 214 (Washington Supreme Court, 1956)
City of Yakima v. Snively
248 P. 788 (Washington Supreme Court, 1926)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
212 P. 1049, 123 Wash. 539, 1923 Wash. LEXIS 783, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wiley-v-city-of-aberdeen-wash-1923.