Wilder v. Gibson

440 S.W.2d 711, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 2847
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 24, 1969
DocketNo. 15457
StatusPublished

This text of 440 S.W.2d 711 (Wilder v. Gibson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilder v. Gibson, 440 S.W.2d 711, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 2847 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969).

Opinion

BELL, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a take nothing judgment in a case where Mrs. Wilder, who was a passenger in a station wagon, was allegedly injured when the vehicle in which she was riding was hit from the rear by an automobile driven by appellee.

In a jury trial the jury found appellee failed to keep a proper lookout and this was a proximate cause of the collision. The jury, however, found in answer to Special Issue No. 5 that William R. Wilder, the son of Mrs. Wilder who was driving the Wilder vehicle, “failed to give such a signal of his intention to stop as would have been given by a person of ordinary prudence in the exercise of ordinary care.” In answer to Special Issue No. 6, the jury found this omission to be a proximate cause. In answer to Special Issue No. 7, the jury found Mrs. Wilder did not sustain physical injury as a result of the collision.

Appellants, for reversal, assert that the jury’s answers to Special Issues Nos. 5, 6 and 7 are contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence.

The collision occurred on the Eastex Freeway on the morning of February 3, 1966, between 6:45 and 7:00 o’clock. The Freeway is heavily traveled. All testimony shows that the traffic on this morning was fairly heavy, as usual. The Freeway is a divided one, there being a concrete esplanade. The parties were traveling south toward Houston. There were three lanes for traffic leading into Houston. Wilder and Gibson were both in the left lane next to the esplanade. Wilder was driving his mother to the cafeteria where she worked and was then going to his work. Gibson was driving to his work. Gibson intended to turn off of the Eastex Freeway and on to Interstate 610. To do this would necessitate his crossing from the lane in which he was traveling to the outside or third lane. The traffic in the center and outside lanes was fairly heavy as usual. Immediately prior to the collision appellee looked briefly to his right to see if he could move to his right. He could not, and when he looked back saw that the traffic in the inside lane had stopped or was stopping. He put on the brakes, pulled to his left partially on the esplanade, but was unable to avoid the collision. The right front part of his vehicle hit the right rear of the Wilder car and knocked it into the vehicle that had stopped in front of the Wilders. The Wilder vehicle received substantial damage and could not be moved except by being towed away by a wrecker.

The argument of appellee is that William Wilder was slowing down or stopping his car and gave no signal evidencing his intention to do so, though he could have done so. He contends the evidence sufficiently shows that Wilder had time to give a hand signal, and that he could have but did not. If he had done so, Gibson urges he (Gibson) would have seen it in time to have stopped. Appellee cites Article 6701d, Section 68(c), Vernon’s Ann.Tex.St., as placing on Wilder the duty to give an appropriate signal so a driver to the rear can [713]*713learn of the intention of the driver of the forward vehicle.

Appellants’ position is that when an overtaken vehicle is making a required stop while it remains in its lane of traffic, the driver is under no duty to keep a lookout to the rear. Appellants, under the facts of this case, find no duty on the part of Wilder to give a hand signal because he was making such a required stop. Too, they urge that even if there was a duty, the failure to do so, under the facts of this case, was not a cause in fact of the collision because the Wilder brake lights gave notice to appellee and appellee had previously noticed the traffic slowing. Appellants’ approach is not that the answers to Special Issues Nos. 5, 6 and 7 are wholly without evidence to support them, but rather that the answers are contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence. In determining this question, we must consider all of the evidence, both that which supports the answers and that which militates against them. We may not merely substitute our judgment for that of the jury. We may reverse only if we conclude on a basis of the whole record that the answers are so contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and thus shocking to the judicial conscience. Continental Bus System v. Biggers, 322 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Civ.App.), ref., n.r.e.

William R. Wilder testified by deposition as he was in the United States Navy and could not be present at trial. He was 19 years of age. He stated that on the morning of the collision the traffic was fairly heavy. There was a truck in front of his vehicle. About a block or so before the point of the collision he was driving about SO miles per hour. He was not expecting the traffic in his lane to stop. He could not tell what was making the traffic come to a stop. He slowed down from 50 miles per hour directly to the stop he made. He did not give a hand signal because it was cold and the car windows were up. So far as he knew the rear signal lights were working properly. Farther back down the road he had looked back and there was no traffic. The traffic “did come to a stop and” he “would close down and stop.” He then heard the brakes behind him and then looked in the mirror and then his vehicle was hit. All he could tell was he “stopped from SO miles per hour to a stop” and his car was hit. The brake lights on the vehicle ahead of him came on. He stopped four or five feet behind this car. He was knocked into the car ahead of him. If his window had been down it would have been better to give a hand signal. His stop was gradual and not sudden. There was plenty of time to stop. He had a good hundred yards in which to stop. He had' been on the Freeway approximately three miles. He stayed behind the car in front of him about four car lengths. Everyone was driving about 50 miles per hour and was keeping roughly a three or four-car length interval. It was unusual that traffic would stop that far out. The stopping of the traffic was something he wasn’t looking for. Gibson, as he remembers, said he was changing lanes and the traffic stopped and he pulled over into the witness’ lane. Gibson also said it was Gibson’s fault and he was sorry. Gibson’s car, after the accident, was partially on the esplanade.

Mrs. Wilder testified the weather was cold and the windows on the car were up. It wasn’t raining. It was daylight. Her son was driving around 45 or 50 miles per hour. She and her son were coming up to some traffic. She saw the traffic ahead was beginning to slow. She could see it slowing and coming to a stop. They could see a good little distance ahead that traffic was slowing and people began putting on their brakes. They could see the brake lights. Her son gradually slowed and stopped as the other cars were coming to a stop. There was no hill on the Freeway. A person could see pretty good. The Wilder car was stationary waiting for the traffic to start when it was hit. The traf[714]*714fic in the other two lanes was moving. The impact knocked her under the seat.

Appellants took appellee’s deposition, a part of which was used on trial, and appel-lee personally testified at the trial. In the deposition he testified that on the day of the collision the weather was normal. He didn’t think it was cold. The streets were dry. The traffic was fairly heavy. He was driving in the inside lane. He got on the Freeway a mile and a half or two miles north of the point of the collision. He followed behind the Wilder car for a distance of several hundred yards.

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Related

McNutt v. Qualls
433 S.W.2d 521 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1968)
Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Biggers
322 S.W.2d 1 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1959)
Morris v. Long
410 S.W.2d 308 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1966)
Ussery v. Ewell Hodges, Inc.
417 S.W.2d 332 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1967)
Dobson v. GULF SUPPLY COMPANY
399 S.W.2d 882 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1966)

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Bluebook (online)
440 S.W.2d 711, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 2847, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilder-v-gibson-texapp-1969.