Wilden v. Fields

510 F. Supp. 1295, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10855
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMarch 2, 1981
Docket79-C-347
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 510 F. Supp. 1295 (Wilden v. Fields) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilden v. Fields, 510 F. Supp. 1295, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10855 (W.D. Wis. 1981).

Opinion

ORDER

CRABB, Chief Judge.

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which petitioner, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution at Oxford, Wisconsin, challenges the validity of the guidelines under which the United States Parole Commission determines the length of custody of inmates sentenced to federal institutions. The importance of this issue and the frequency with which it is raised by federal prisoners warrant extensive analysis of the source of the parole commission’s authority to promulgate and observe standardized guidelines in the parole decision process.

In his petition, petitioner alleges that on September 14, 1970, he was sentenced, in Canada, to life imprisonment; that on October 13, 1978, petitioner was transferred from Canada to the United States pursuant to a treaty; that on December 2, 1978, petitioner was served with a “Notice of Hearing” in which it was stated only that petitioner would meet with the parole commission in “the month of January, 1979”; that the vagueness of the notice concerning *1297 the time petitioner’s hearing was to be held prevented petitioner from retaining counsel to represent him at his hearing; that approximately three months after he was received into federal custody, in January, 1979, petitioner appeared before the parole commission; that he was denied parole and continued “for a four-year reconsideration hearing in January, 1983”; that in formulating its decision to deny him parole, the commission failed to consider petitioner’s exceptional institutional behavior; that the commission used a police report of the crime and a “post-sentence” report prepared by American authorities nine years after the date of petitioner’s offense in deciding petitioner’s eligibility for release on parole; that the reports contained contradictory information; that it appears that the commission relied on some or all portions of the contradictory reports which disfavored petitioner; and that its reliance on false information affected the offense severity category within which the parole commission placed petitioner.

Petitioner further alleges that the reasons given him for denial of parole were set out in “boilerplate language”; that the parole guidelines are contrary to the Parole Commission Reorganization Act and are unlawful for a number of reasons enumerated in the petition.

Finally, petitioner alleges that following his January, 1979, hearing, on the same day the hearing was held, he requested a copy of the recording of his hearing so that he could prepare an administrative appeal; that the Privacy Act requires such requests to be honored within 40 working days; that petitioner did not receive a copy of the tape of his hearing within the time period prescribed; that inmates are provided with little more than 40 working days within which to appeal a decision of the parole board or effectively waive their chance to appeal; that because petitioner did not timely receive the record of his hearing, he wrote to the National Appeals Board Analyst to request an enlargement of time in which to appeal; that because a grant of his request for an enlargement of time was not given petitioner until after the time for appeal had run, petitioner was compelled to prepare and submit an appeal without the benefit of the record of his hearing; and that, on appeal, the Regional Commission deemed petitioner’s case an “original jurisdiction” case and did not notify petitioner of its designation until after the decision had been made.

Respondent has moved for summary judgment, based upon a stipulation of fact prepared by counsel for both parties. From that stipulation, I find that there is no genuine issue with respect to any of the following material facts.

FACTS

Petitioner was sentenced on September 14,1970, by the Provincial Court of Ontario, Canada, to a life sentence for murder. He was part of the prisoner exchange treaty and has been in the custody of the Attorney General since October 13,1978.

Petitioner had his initial parole hearing at the Federal Correctional Institution, Oxford, Wisconsin, on January 17,1979, before a panel of commission hearing examiners. During the hearing the examiner panel discussed with petitioner his offense behavior, allowing him to inform the panel of the details of the offense, his prior criminal record, institutional adjustment and social history items such as education, employment record, marital and family status, and drug/alcohol dependence. The panel relied upon a Canadian crime report dated December 4, 1970, a postsentence report dated November 13, 1978, and a report prepared by institutional staff dated January 12, 1979, for the official information on the above issues.

At the hearing the panel evaluated petitioner’s case under the paroling policy guidelines found at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979). 1 The panel rated petitioner’s offense behav *1298 ior as greatest II severity because he participated in a robbery which resulted in the death of a person by beating. Petitioner’s parole prognosis (the likelihood of remaining at liberty without violating the terms of his release) was evaluated by utilizing the salient factor scoring device also set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20. Petitioner was given a score of 5 which indicated he was a “fair” parole risk. At the time of the hearing petitioner had been in custody approximately 100 months. With his offense severity rating and parole prognosis the suggested guideline range of months to be served before release, with good institutional adjustment and program performance, was determined to be in excess of 85 months.

During the hearing the panel also noted that petitioner had incurred a disciplinary infraction during his period of confinement for fashioning a metal knife in the metal shop. On the positive side, petitioner’s overall institutional adjustment was described as excellent, petitioner having completed some college courses, receiving a certificate for completing a welding course and receiving excellent work reports.

At the conclusion of the hearing the examiner panel informed petitioner that his case was being referred to the Regional Commissioner for original jurisdiction consideration along with a recommendation to continue for a four-year reconsideration hearing in January, 1983. As noted in the recording of the January 17, 1979, hearing, petitioner was also informed by the examiner panel that its recommendation was not intended to depreciate his good institutional adjustment but was being made to hold him accountable for a very serious offense.

By notice of action dated January 31, 1979, petitioner was informed that his case had been .designated as original jurisdiction and had been referred to the National Commissioners for a decision. This action was taken pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 2.17(b)(4).

Subsequent to consideration of all relevant factors by the National Commissioners, petitioner’s case was continued for a four-year reconsideration hearing in January, 1983.

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Bluebook (online)
510 F. Supp. 1295, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10855, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilden-v-fields-wiwd-1981.