Wildblood v. Continental Casualty Co.

161 So. 584, 182 La. 202
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedApril 29, 1935
DocketNo. 32889.
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 161 So. 584 (Wildblood v. Continental Casualty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wildblood v. Continental Casualty Co., 161 So. 584, 182 La. 202 (La. 1935).

Opinion

LAND, Justice.

Plaintiff, as beneficiary, sues for the payment of the face of an accident and health policy, on the ground that her husband, Walter' P.. Wildblood, had been killed as a result of an accident. The demand was resisted by defendant company, the defense being that Wildblood was killed, not accidentally, but as the result of an intentional act of a third person, whose identity is unknown; and further, that when he was killed he was under the influence of an intoxicant, and, because of the provisions of the policy to that effect, there was no liability under the policy.

Judgment was rendered in the court below m favor of plaintiff, and defendant company has appealed.

As the case involves questions of fact, and the testimony is conflicting, the preponderance of the evidence is dependent upon the credibility of the witnesses, whom the trial judge saw and heard on the trial of the case.

As the judge of the lower court was in much better position to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, who appeared before him, than are the members of this court, we have decided to adopt as our own the following well-considered opinion handed down in the case:

“The plaintiff sues, as beneficiary of a policy of insurance issued to her husband, Walter P. Wildblood, on May 26, 1929. The policy provides indemnity for accidental injury or death and for loss of time by reason of illness. It includes certain restrictions as to the cause of injury, those germane to this case being the following:
“‘This policy does not cover any loss * * * (2) if the injury * * * causing it is received * * * while under the influence of any intoxicant; (3) if the injury causing it results from the intentional act of the Insured or of any other person excepting, however, assaults committed upon the Insured for the sole purpose of burglary or robbery.’
“On February 23, 1932, while the policy was in force, Mr. Wildblood met his death at the hands of an unknown assassin. The theory of the plaintiff is that the assassin did not intend to murder her husband, but *205 mistook him for .another man whom he did intend to murder, and therefore the death was not the intentional act of any person, within the .meaning of the policy. The defense is that the assassin did exactly what he intended to do; and the further defense is made that the insured was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time he met his death.

“Murder is an intentional act; and ordinarily an insured losing his life by such an act comes within the exception of the policy sued on here; for the intention of the insured and of a third person need not / concur to comply with the exception. Joyce, Vol. 4, p. 4347; Colley, Vol. 6, p. 5364.

“But there is divergence of opinion when the insured is shot under the mistaken belief that he is another person. In our own State, in Brooks v. Continental Casualty Co., 13 La. App. 502, 128 So. 183, 185, it was held that when an officer intended to shoot a fleeing man in the legs, in order to capture him, but actually shot him in the back and killed him, the killing was not intentional, and the insurance company was not relieved of liability under the policy. The Court reviews Louisiana cases, and remarks, ‘The criterion of responsibility is based * * * on the unintentional result.’ And Judge Elliott, concurring, says: ‘The insured is entitled to recover, where the injury was not specifically and particularly directed at him, because, if it was not, then he was not the intentional recipient of the act.’

“Couch, Vol. 6, § 1240, is very clear on the point, citing numerous authorities. See, also, Mah See v. North American Ace.' Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421, 213 P. 42, 26 A. L. R. 123, where the reported case is fully annotated, with the almost unanimous opinion of the authorities supporting the proposition. The same rule is supported by authorities annotated in 14 R. C. L. 371-437.

“The interpretation thus placed upon the provisions of the policy not only appears reasonable, but in event the provisions should be considered of doubtful meaning, the interpretation is justified by the principle that doubtful provisions of the policy are construed favorably to the insured. Moreover, a just consideration of the intention of the contracting parties, drawn from the policy as a whole, leads to the conclusion that in framing the exception they did not have in mind nor intend to include the rare instance of the murder of the insured by one intending the murder of another. Doubtless the reason of the exception is to exempt the insurer from liability for such cases as the intentional death of an insured who is predisposed to brawls or whose associates are of the turbulent type, or who is likely to be the victim of vengeance for his own misconduct. The much more rare ease of death by reason of mistaken identity, or where improper habits or associates have no effect in increasing the hazard, was not contemplated by the parties. This is illustrated by the exception to the exception, which provides that the insurer shall be liable in case of intentional murder committed solely for the purpose of robbery or burglary — a murder with which the habits or character of the insured could have no causal connection.

“Under this view of law, the question becomes one of fact — Whether the assassin of *207 Mr. Wildblood intended his death, or the death of another for whom he mistook his victim. And from the nature of the case, the fact can be found only by a search for circumstances, and a consideration of inferences drawn from them; for guilt has sealed the lips of the assassin and death the lips of his victim.

“A primary election was being held in a small building near Dido, Vernon Parish. It is situated at a cross-roads, about twenty five feet from Gravel Highway No. 22 on the north and twelve feet from a dirt road on the east. The dirt road extends southward 40 or 50 yards to a railway crossing, and beyond, passing near a small depot building and the home of Charles Gibson, a deputy sheriff, claimed by plaintiff to have been the intended victim of the assassination. To the southeast of the building, and within 30 or 40 feet, is a group of three oak trees, set in the edge of a brushy area bordering the clearing within which stands the small building. In front of the building, near the intersection of the roads, a small fire was maintained during the day for the brewing of coffee.

“Mr. Wildblood was a section foreman on the railroad. On the day he met his death, his crew was at work near the polling place. They came in a railway motor car in the morning, and left it on the side track near the depot building, some 50 or 60 yards from the building in which the election was being held. During the day, Mr. Wildblood made several trips between these two points. While he was not a voter in Vernon Parish, he knew and was known by many of those who were. He appears to have been of a jovial disposition, enjoying the rough give and take of an idling country crowd; but in his cups he was inclined to lose his joviality in a somewhat ill-tempered belligerency.

“Considerable drinking occurred among the crowd during the day. Mr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Mitchell v. State National Life Insurance
406 So. 2d 777 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1981)
Curtain v. Aldrich
589 S.W.2d 61 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1979)
Culotta v. Security Industrial Insurance
325 So. 2d 863 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1976)
Tornabene v. Atlas Life Insurance Company, Inc.
295 So. 2d 10 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1974)
Chambers v. FIRST NATIONAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW ORLEANS
253 So. 2d 636 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1971)
Briley v. Union National Life Insurance
215 So. 2d 532 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1968)
Denies v. First National Life Insurance Company
144 So. 2d 570 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1962)
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Brown
164 S.W.2d 190 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1942)
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones
45 F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Michigan, 1942)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
161 So. 584, 182 La. 202, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wildblood-v-continental-casualty-co-la-1935.