Wilcox v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: 44, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JASON WILCOX, § § Defendant Below, § No. 44, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below: Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 2405010892 (S) § Appellee. § §

Submitted: November 12, 2025 Decided: February 6, 2026

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

The Court, having considered the briefs and the record below, rules as follows:

(1) While driving over the speed limit on Delaware Route 9, Jason Wilcox

crashed into a minivan driven by Jason Wright with his six family members. Wilcox

fled the scene. Three people in the minivan were killed and four others injured. A

grand jury indicted Wilcox for crimes related to the collision. A jury found him

guilty of all charges. The Superior Court sentenced Wilcox to lengthy incarceration

followed by decreasing level of probation.

(2) Wilcox has appealed his convictions, claiming that the Superior Court:

(a) erred in denying his motion to compel Brady material, (b) erred by admitting into evidence data from his car’s electronic data recorder (“EDR”), and (c) under plain

error review, erroneously instructed the jury as a matter of law. We affirm.

(3) On December 24, 2022, around 8 p.m., Wilcox was driving his 2016

Range Rover Sport westbound on Lewes-Georgetown Highway (“Route 9”) in a 50

mile an hour speed limit zone. The two-lane road was dry, the weather clear. Cars

on Route 9 have the right-of-way and a clear view of the intersection where the

collision occurred. After stopping at a stop sign at the intersection of

Minos/Conaway Road and Route 9, Wright entered the Route 9 westbound lane

(Wilcox’s lane) in his Honda Odyssey minivan with six family members. He

intended to turn left onto eastbound Route 9. The cars collided. The Range Rover’s

EDR showed that, five seconds before the crash, Wilcox accelerated from 73.50

miles per hour to 82.34 miles per hour. The EDR recorded the Range Rover impact

speed at 81.16 miles per hour.1

(4) Three minivan occupants were killed, and four others seriously injured.

Wilcox fled the scene. A grand jury indicted Wilcox for three counts of

Manslaughter, four counts of Assault First Degree, one count of Speeding, one count

of Leaving the Scene of a Collision Resulting in Death, one count of Failure to

1 App. to Appellant’s Am. Opening Br. at A18-19, A274, A282, A437, A440-42, A614-16, A747- 48, A763-64, A785-86, A810-11 [hereinafter A___].

2 Report a Collision Resulting in Injury or Death, one count of Assault Second Degree,

and one count of Assault Third Degree.2

(5) Prior to trial, Wilcox filed a motion to compel disclosure of grand jury

proceedings related to Wright and the collision. Wilcox speculated that the State had

attempted to indict Wright for collision-related charges because he had some

culpability for the collision. Thus, according to Wilcox, he was entitled to the basis

for the State’s decision to attempt to indict Wright. The court denied the motion,

ruling that grand jury proceedings are confidential, and no exception applied.3

(6) Wilcox followed the denial of his motion to compel with a non-

specific motion to compel Brady4 material. Wilcox argued that “logic would dictate”

that Wright’s driving “likely violated” several motor vehicle laws.5 According to

Wilcox, none of the State’s evidence shared with Wilcox showed that Wright was at

fault. Therefore, he speculated, there must be more evidence that was not shared

with the defense. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the State represented

2 A3, A606-08. 3 A5, A117-125, A131-32, A167-68. 4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 5 A144-45.

3 that it had provided all non-privileged materials related to the collision and was not

required to disclose its theory or possible charges against Wright.6

(7) During trial, Wilcox objected to the admissibility of data from the

Range Rover’s EDR and an RCM Readout Report that analyzed the car’s actions

just before the collision.7 The court excluded the RCM Readout Report as hearsay

but relied on Delaware Rule of Evidence 901(a) to admit into evidence the data from

the EDR.8

(8) The parties attended two prayer conferences which, in part, addressed

a foreseeability jury instruction. Wilcox did not object to the following instruction

addressing the foreseeability of actions by other drivers: “If you find that the

Defendant could not have reasonably anticipated or foreseen or was not aware that

the other driver’s motor vehicle would enter the intersection, you must find that

Defendant’s actions were not reckless [or criminally negligent].”9 After closing

statements, the jury found Wilcox guilty of all charges. He was sentenced to 156

6 A167-68. 7 A156-65, A528-39, A542-54, A662-63. The RCM Readout Report contained information regarding occupant status, acceleration, speed, brake usage, steering wheel usage, safety device deployment. A156-65. 8 A658-63. 9 A1017-18, A1161-62.

4 years at Level V suspended after 17 years and 6 months for decreasing levels of

supervision.10

(9) As noted earlier, Wilcox raises three errors on appeal. First, he contends

that the State did not disclose all exculpatory material in its possession related to the

State’s alleged failed attempt to indict Wright for offenses related to the collision.

According to Wilcox, the information would be exculpatory to rebut the inference

that Wilcox was the sole cause of the crash. Second, Wilcox argues that the court

erred by admitting data from the Range Rover’s RCM Readout Report because it

was not self-authenticating, and chain of custody was not proven. And finally, in a

new argument on appeal, Wilcox claims that the court’s foreseeability jury

instruction was erroneous as matter of law because it implied that Wilcox had a duty

to anticipate the negligent acts of other drivers.

(10) We review questions of law de novo, including whether the State failed

to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence.11 We review a court’s decision to

admit evidence to determine whether the court exceeded its discretion.12 We review

10 A10; Exhibit A to Am. Opening Br. 11 Mobley v. State, 346 A.3d 1127, 2024 WL 5316320, at *6 (Del. Dec. 5, 2024) (TABLE); McGuiness v. State, 312 A.3d 1156, 1179 (Del. 2024). 12 Burrell v. Delaware, 332 A.3d 412, 424 (Del. 2024).

5 a court’s decision to issue challenged jury instructions de novo.13 This Court will

review forfeited arguments for plain error.14

(11) Under Brady v. Maryland, prosecutors must disclose exculpatory

evidence in their possession that might be material to the outcome of the case.15 To

establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove: “(1) evidence exists that is

favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that

evidence is suppressed by the State; and (3) its suppression prejudices the

defendant.”16

(12) Wilcox contends that he learned before trial that the State attempted to

indict Wright for collision-related charges but failed to secure an indictment.

According to Wilcox, there must have been more undisclosed evidence regarding

Wright’s fault. Wilcox says that the State’s failure to disclose the unidentified

exculpatory material violated Brady.

(13) Wilcox, however, stumbles on his assumption – that the State has Brady

material that it did not share with the defense. As an initial matter, we note that

13 Ford v. State, 341 A.3d 454, 465 (Del. 2025). 14 Suber v. State, __A.3d__, 2026 WL 184867, at *4-5 (Del. Jan. 15, 2026). 15 373 U.S. at 91. 16 Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 988 (Del. 2014) (quoting Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005)).

6 Wilcox did not appeal the Superior Court’s denial of his access to grand jury

materials.17 He is limited, therefore, to his speculation that the State must have more

exculpatory information related to the crash that it has not disclosed. But the State

represented that it had an “open file” policy and disclosed all the facts and materials

related to the crash.18 We take the State at its word that all non-privileged or non-

confidential exculpatory materials were disclosed to Wilcox before trial.19 Thus,

Brady was not violated.

(14) Next, Wilcox argues that the court erred by admitting into evidence the

Range Rover’s EDR data under Delaware Rule of Evidence 901(a). By way of

background, modern cars are equipped with EDRs, also known as crash data

recorders or airbag control modules.20 EDRs record data such as speed, acceleration,

accelerator and brake use, and steering wheel use.21 Following a crash, an EDR will

preserve the data leading up to the accident.22

17 Grand jury proceedings are confidential under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 6. 18 A126-27. 19 Del. Prof. Cond. R. 3.3(a)(1) (“(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer[.]”). 20 A589-95. 21 A590. 22 A590-93.

7 (15) Delaware State Police have a Data Collection System used to extract

EDR data and create a report.23 But the EDRs in the cars involved in the collision

were incompatible with Delaware’s system.24 Corporal Kenneth Argo mailed the

Range Rover’s EDR to the manufacturer in France to extract the data.25 The

manufacturer returned a RCM Readout Report with occupant status, acceleration,

speed, brake usage, steering wheel usage, and safety device deployment.26 EDR data

from the Range Rover showed that five seconds before collision, Wilcox accelerated

from 73.50 to 82.34 miles per hour without braking or attempting to avoid

collision.27 The impact speed was 81.16 miles per hour.28

(16) Rule 901(a) states: “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or

identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to

support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Under the Rule,

23 A513-14. 24 A511-12.

A513-14. Corporal Argo testified that he did not send the minivan’s EDR for data extraction. 25

As he explained, “[b]ased on the year of the Honda of 2008 when it said that it was unsupported, we just surmised that it was unsupported because there was no data.” A795-801. 26 A156-65. 27 A763-64. 28 A764.

8 the proponent “need only ‘establish a rational basis from which the jury could

conclude that the evidence is connected with the defendant.’”29

(17) Wilcox contends the State could not authenticate the EDR data without

testimony about its chain of custody and extraction. He argues that the police officer

authenticating the data, Corporal Argo, did not confirm the chain of custody and was

unfamiliar with the extraction system used. This Court has held, however, that a

witness is not needed to authenticate evidence if the jury can infer the data’s source.

For instance, in Moss v. State, our Court found that text messages can be properly

authenticated through evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the

defendant was the author of the messages.30

(18) Wilcox tried to distinguish Moss, arguing that the EDR data lacked

testimony from all necessary custodians to establish chain of custody and prove that

the data came from the Range Rover’s EDR. He contends that, without a custodian

to testify about the procedures, the data’s reliability cannot be verified. But the State

is not required to produce evidence of every link in the chain of custody; rather, it

“must simply demonstrate an orderly process from which the trier of fact can

29 White v. State, 258 A.3d 147, 155 (Del. 2021) (quoting Cabrera v. State, 840 A.2d 1256, 1265 (Del. 2004)). 30 166 A.3d 937, 2017 WL 2806269, at *3-4 (Del. June 28, 2017) (TABLE).

9 conclude that it is improbable that the original item has been tampered with or

exchanged.”31

(19) In White v. State, this Court held that there are no “hard-and-fast rules”

regarding how the State must meet the authentication requirement if the evidence

supports a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.32 In White, a law

enforcement officer retrieved a phone from the defendant’s bedroom. The phone

contained messages from the defendant’s significant other that named the

defendant.33 The officer also testified regarding how the technician generated the

text message reports.34 The State sought to authenticate text messages downloaded

from the defendant’s cellphone without introducing subscriber information.35

Based on the circumstantial evidence, we agreed that the State established a rational

basis for inferring that the defendant owned the phone and wrote the messages.36

(20) Here, the State’s evidence was sufficient “to clear the low bar for

authentication.”37 The VIN number confirmed that the data matched the Range

31 Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Del. 1997). 32 258 A.3d at 155. 33 Id. at 155-56. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. at 156. 37 Id. at 155.

10 Rover’s EDR.38 The report included photos of the device and its label.39 The data

is consistent with evidence from the collision scene, including the absence of braking

data and skid marks.40 The data showed only one airbag deployed and one seatbelt

in use, consistent with surveillance video showing one occupant fleeing the scene.41

Finally, the data recorded high speeds consistent with the extensive damage to the

Range Rover and the minivan from a high-speed collision.42 Based on the foregoing

evidence, the jury could connect the EDR data to the Range Rover. There was

sufficient evidence to authenticate the data under D.R.E 901(a).43

(21) Finally, for the first time on appeal, Wilcox argues that the court gave

an improper jury instruction addressing the foreseeability of the negligent conduct

of others. The argument is a bit hard to follow but we think it goes like this: first, 11

Del. C. § 263 states that “[t]he element of reckless or negligent causation is not

38 A660. 39 Id. 40 A661, A748, A750-55, A817-18, A847. 41 A633, A750-51. 42 A747-48, A763. 43 Wilcox argues that admitting the EDR data violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. But the data admitted (and not the report) was nontestimonial and therefore did not raise confrontation concerns. See Arizona v. Aragon, 555 P.3d 571, 574 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024) (finding a technician’s retrieval by downloading the EDR data involves no testimonial statements); Pennsylvania v. Thompson, 314 A.3d 922, 928 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024) (explaining EDR data is not testimonial because an EDR cannot be a witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause).

11 established if the actual result is outside the risk of which the defendant is aware or,

in the case of negligence, of which the defendant should be aware . . .”; second,

according to Bullock v. State,44 drivers do not have a duty to anticipate the negligence

of other drivers; and third, therefore, even if the court instructed the jury following

§ 263, Wilcox was entitled to “a proper jury instruction plainly instructing [the jury]

that Mr. Wilcox had no duty to foresee or anticipate another driver’s negligence.”45

(22) Under Supreme Court Rule 8, only questions that are fairly presented

to the trial court may be presented for review on appeal.46 Wilcox did not raise the

argument in the Superior Court. As a result, the argument is forfeited. Rule 8,

however, “offer[s] an escape hatch that allows the Court to review an unpreserved

argument ‘when the interests of justice so require.’”47 But the interests of justice

exception “is extremely limited and reserved only for plain errors that affect a party’s

substantial rights.”48 To meet his plain error burden, Wilcox must demonstrate that

“(1) the record is adequate to review his claim, (2) an error occurred, (3) the error is

44 775 A.2d 1043 (Del. 2001). 45 Opening Br. at 32. 46 Suber, 2026 WL 184867, at *4. 47 Id. 48 Id. Plain errors are “defects which are apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.” Id. at *5 (quoting Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)).

12 plain, and (4) the error adversely affected his substantial rights by jeopardizing the

fairness and integrity of the trial process.”49

(23) Here, Wilcox has not demonstrated that an error occurred. The court

instructed the jury under § 263 that reckless and negligent conduct does not result in

criminal culpability if “the actual result is outside the risk of which the defendant is

aware or, in the case of negligence, of which the defendant should be aware.”50 In

other words, the jury understood that if Wright’s conduct posed a risk outside a risk

that Wilcox was aware of or should have been aware of, the jury should not find that

Wilcox caused the collision. Wilcox got the jury instruction he wanted.

(24) If Wilcox is arguing that, after Bullock, he was entitled to a jury

instruction drawing a bright-line rule that he had no duty to anticipate the negligent

acts of others, that is an incorrect statement of the law. In Bullock, our Court held

that the failure to instruct the jury under § 263 was plain error because, under the

facts of that case, Bullock had no duty to anticipate another driver violating a traffic

signal and entering the intersection before the collision.51 Here, the jury was

instructed under § 263. And as § 263 contemplates, it is up to the jury to decide

whether the other person’s negligence was “outside the risk of which the defendant

49 Id. at *6. 50 A1037-41. 51 775 A.2d at 1045.

13 is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which the defendant should be aware.”

There was no error here.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the

Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice