Wilcox Electric, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration and United States of America, Hughes Aircraft Company, Intervenor on Appeal

119 F.3d 724
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 16, 1997
Docket96-4111
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 119 F.3d 724 (Wilcox Electric, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration and United States of America, Hughes Aircraft Company, Intervenor on Appeal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilcox Electric, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration and United States of America, Hughes Aircraft Company, Intervenor on Appeal, 119 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 1997).

Opinion

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

After a government agency terminated a multimillion-dollar contract with the appel *726 lant due to performance problems, the agency awarded the contract to another firm. The appellant protested the manner in which the agency awarded the second contract, but not the termination of the first, in an administrative adjudication. After the agency denied the protest, the appellant sought review from this court. We dismiss the appeal for lack of standing.

I.

In August, 1995, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) awarded a multimillion-dollar contract to Wilcox Electric, Inc. (“Wilcox”), to develop and install a navigational system known as the Wide Area Augmentation System (“WAAS”). The aim of the project was to modify and upgrade a satellite-based navigational system currently used by the military so that it could serve as the nation’s primary flight-control system for civil aircraft. The FAA awarded the WAAS contract to Wilcox after issuing a request for proposals and evaluating the five proposals that it received. Wilcox’s proposal, which included Hughes Aircraft Company (“Hughes”) as a subcontractor who would be the primary software developer, outscored each of the other proposals and, in particular, received excellent scores for its software development capabilities.

Although the parties dispute the cause of the subsequent problems, they agree that Wilcox encountered numerous and significant difficulties in performing the WAAS contract almost immediately after it was agreed to. As early as September, 1995, for example, the FAA notified Wilcox of its dissatisfaction with Wilcox’s ability to meet initial goals. From the beginning, one of the FAA’s main concerns was with software development. The FAA employee responsible for software development attributed the problems not to Hughes, but rather to Wilcox, which, he believed, would not give Hughes the authority to correct problems that arose.

Wilcox’s difficulties increased, and late in January, 1996, the FAA met with Wilcox to discuss them. As a result of this meeting, the FAA convened a second meeting in February, 1996, to evaluate the options available to it if Wilcox’s performance difficulties persisted. From that meeting, ten options emerged, but the FAA did not investigate them further at that time because review of an important contract milestone was scheduled for the next.month. Although Wilcox had already delayed this review for three months (it had originally been scheduled for December, 1995), it was unable to pass the review when it occurred. Wilcox’s score was so low, moreover, that out of a possible “award fee” of over $5 million that the contract provided for, it received nothing.

The FAA therefore sent Wilcox a letter notifying it of deficiencies in ten areas, including cost and schedule reporting, systems engineering, hardware selection and approval, software, and several aspects of management. The letter also specified the corrective action required of Wilcox for each deficiency, and set a deadline for compliance. After the FAA found Wilcox’s response to its notice unacceptable in a number of major ways, it decided to terminate the contract. At that point, eight months into thé contract, the FAA projected that there would be a ten-month delay in the completion date and that Wilcox would spend an estimated $100 million over budget if it continued as contractor.

After the FAA terminated the contract, it reviewed the options discussed at the February meeting, re-evaluated the original five bidders, and explored new alternatives. The FAA then decided to award a second, similar contract to Hughes, based on its familiarity with the project, its performance in the past eight months on the software development for the WAAS, and its success in developing a somewhat similar project for the Air Force. This contract was awarded on a single-source basis, that is, without open bidding.

Unhappy with these events, Wilcox filed a protest of the award to Hughes with the FAA’s Office of Dispute Resolution (“ODR”), claiming that the award of a single-source contract violated the FAA’s new Acquisition Management System (“AMS”), was not in the best interests of the FAA, and was not supported by a rational basis. The AMS, which took effect on April 1, 1996, is a new regulatory procurement system for the FAA. Al *727 though the AMS evidences a strong preference for competitive procurements, it allows single-source contracts in certain circumstances.

The ODR selected an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) to serve as a special master and to make a recommendation to the FAA administrator. The ALJ held that the FAA’s award of a single-source contract to Hughes did not violate the AMS, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Based on this recommendation, the FAA denied Wilcox’s protest, and Wilcox now petitions for review of that order. It is important to note that Wilcox did not protest, nor did the ALJ consider, the merits of the FAA’s decision to terminate Wilcox’s contract.

II.

The phrase “cases and controversies” in Article III of the United States Constitution requires that, in order to have standing to pursue a lawsuit in federal court, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered a judicially cognizable and redressable injury. The standing requirement in federal courts has, moreover, both constitutional and prudential dimensions. See Bennett v. Spear, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1161, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997), and Oehrleins v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir.1997). A plaintiff must, as an “irreducible constitutional minimum,” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), demonstrate three things: That he or she has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, and not merely conjectural or hypothetical; that a causal connection exists between the injury and the challenged conduct; and that a decision favorable to the plaintiff will likely redress the injury. See id. at 560-61, 112.S-Ct. at 2136-37 and Oehrleins, 115 F.3d at 1378. Once a plaintiff has done this, he or she must also satisfy certain judicially imposed, prudential requirements, for example, that a plaintiff seeking to enforce a statute be within the zone of interests that the statute protects. See Bennett, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1161. Although Congress may modify these prudential requirements (for example, by expanding the zone of interests of a statute to allow any aggrieved citizen to sue), Congress may not, of course, change or undermine Article III. See id. and Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-78, 112 S.Ct. at 2144-46. Congress, for instance, may not grant standing to an individual who has not suffered an injury in fact. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-78, 112 S.Ct. at 2144-46.

Our first task, therefore, is to determine whether Wilcox has suffered an injury in fact that satisfies the requirements of Article III.

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119 F.3d 724, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilcox-electric-inc-v-federal-aviation-administration-and-united-states-ca8-1997.