Wilchfort v. Knight
Opinion
b. Breach of contract
Under Virginia law, "[t]he elements of a breach of contract action are (1) a legally enforceable obligation of a defendant to a plaintiff; (2) the defendant's violation or breach of that obligation; and (3) injury or damage to the plaintiff caused by the breach of obligation."9 Ramos v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA ,
i. Enforceable obligation
Plaintiff argues that the Forms S-3 provide enforceable obligations on which their contract claims are based. (See generally Compl.) Defendants do not argue that the Forms S-3 cannot form the basis of an enforceable obligation or contract.11 Indeed, Defendants do not dispute the holding in Moses v. Apple Hospitality REIT Inc. , No. 14-CV-3131,
ii. Breach of enforceable obligation
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants breached the obligations provided in the Forms *72S-3 and other public filings in two ways: (1) "fail[ure] to reprice DRIP units following purchases by unrelated persons for prices far lower than $11.00," and (2) "fail[ure] to determine the fair market value and price of DRIP units from time-to-time in good faith." (Pl. Opp'n 6.)
"A material breach is a failure to do something that is so fundamental to the contract that the failure to perform that obligation defeats an essential purpose of the contract." Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Bransen Energy, Inc. ,
1. Failure to reprice based on sales to unrelated persons
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a breach only as to A-7 and A-8 based on Defendants' failure to reprice DRIP units following purchases by unrelated persons. This theory of breach has already been addressed in Moses ,
AHR Defendants attempt to distinguish Plaintiff's claims from those in Moses by arguing that the Complaint's references to tender offers of A-7 and A-8 shares are only "offered as support" for the allegation that eleven dollars per share was not reflective *73of fair market value. (AHR Mem. 10.) In other words, AHR Defendants assert that Plaintiff does not allege claims for breach of contract for failure to reprice the shares following tender offers of units at prices lower than eleven dollars per unit. Defendants contend that this "construction" of the Complaint is "consistent" with the asserted class period commencing July 17, 2007, "rather than on the dates of the tender offers, [which occurred] years later." (Id. )
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b. Breach of contract
Under Virginia law, "[t]he elements of a breach of contract action are (1) a legally enforceable obligation of a defendant to a plaintiff; (2) the defendant's violation or breach of that obligation; and (3) injury or damage to the plaintiff caused by the breach of obligation."9 Ramos v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA ,
i. Enforceable obligation
Plaintiff argues that the Forms S-3 provide enforceable obligations on which their contract claims are based. (See generally Compl.) Defendants do not argue that the Forms S-3 cannot form the basis of an enforceable obligation or contract.11 Indeed, Defendants do not dispute the holding in Moses v. Apple Hospitality REIT Inc. , No. 14-CV-3131,
ii. Breach of enforceable obligation
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants breached the obligations provided in the Forms *72S-3 and other public filings in two ways: (1) "fail[ure] to reprice DRIP units following purchases by unrelated persons for prices far lower than $11.00," and (2) "fail[ure] to determine the fair market value and price of DRIP units from time-to-time in good faith." (Pl. Opp'n 6.)
"A material breach is a failure to do something that is so fundamental to the contract that the failure to perform that obligation defeats an essential purpose of the contract." Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Bransen Energy, Inc. ,
1. Failure to reprice based on sales to unrelated persons
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a breach only as to A-7 and A-8 based on Defendants' failure to reprice DRIP units following purchases by unrelated persons. This theory of breach has already been addressed in Moses ,
AHR Defendants attempt to distinguish Plaintiff's claims from those in Moses by arguing that the Complaint's references to tender offers of A-7 and A-8 shares are only "offered as support" for the allegation that eleven dollars per share was not reflective *73of fair market value. (AHR Mem. 10.) In other words, AHR Defendants assert that Plaintiff does not allege claims for breach of contract for failure to reprice the shares following tender offers of units at prices lower than eleven dollars per unit. Defendants contend that this "construction" of the Complaint is "consistent" with the asserted class period commencing July 17, 2007, "rather than on the dates of the tender offers, [which occurred] years later." (Id. )
The Court disagrees with AHR Defendants' construction of Plaintiff's claims as to this theory of breach. Although the Complaint is not entirely clear, the section on breach of contract does incorporate earlier allegations that encompass the theories of breach as clarified in the opposition submission. For example, the Complaint states that "[a]s part of the contract, A-6, A-7, and A-8 agreed to value the units at 'fair market value' deemed to be the last arms-length transaction in the units and further agreed to re-evaluate the worth of the units in good faith and adjust same to be equal to fair market value." (Compl. ¶ 2 (emphasis added).) The Complaint also separately notes the failure of A-7 and A-8 to reprice the shares after the tender offers. (Id. ¶¶ 66-69.) Moreover, even the allegation in paragraph eighty-three of the Complaint, on which AHR Defendants rely, can be read to support either theory of liability. The allegation explains that Defendants breached their contracts "by failing to change the price of units ... when the arbitrary [eleven dollars] per unit price was no longer indicative of the actual fair market value of the units, as required by the contracts ." (Id. ¶ 83 (emphasis added).) Even under this theory of breach, eleven dollars per unit could be considered "arbitrary" and "no longer indicative of actual fair market value" because of a failure to reprice "as required by the contracts" following the tender offers. Read as a whole, the Complaint sufficiently states a claim for breach of contract based on a failure to reprice the shares after the tender offers to unrelated persons.14
2. Failure to determine fair market value from time to time
Plaintiff's second theory of breach as to all Defendants is without merit. Under this theory, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were expressly required to revalue the shares in good faith from "time to time." (Pl. Opp'n 10.) This argument has already been raised and rejected in Wenzel v. Knight , No. 14-CV-432,
*74Id. ; see also Ward's Equip., Inc. v. New Holland N. Am., Inc. ,
The Court agrees with the reasoning in Wenzel and finds no enforceable obligations to revalue the shares from time to time. See
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Wenzel by asserting that dismissal in that action was premised on a theory that "was not grounded in any contractual language or factual statements made by the defendants." (Pl. Opp'n 10.) Plaintiff asserts that the theory asserted in Wenzel was "that the [eleven dollars per share] price was ... based on the underlying value of the assets in the real estate investment trust." (
The Court finds Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish the holding in Wenzel unpersuasive. As discussed above, the Wenzel court rejected both theories of breach, including this "new" theory of liability. While Plaintiff in this action has worded her claims slightly differently from those presented in Wenzel , both actions articulate fundamentally the same theories of liability.17 The Court is also aware that Wenzel and this action not only share the same claims and theories of liability but also the same counsel.18 Attempts to manufacture multiple bites at the same apple will not be rewarded. See also Pharr v. Evergreen Garden, Inc. ,
*75Sondel v. Nw. Airlines, Inc. ,
The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled breach of obligations to price the shares at fair market value, defined as the most recent price an unrelated person has purchased Defendants' units, as to A-7 and A-8 but not A-6. (See Compl. ¶¶ 2, 66-69.) Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a failure to re-price A-7 and A-8, but not A-6, following tender offers of units at less than eleven dollars per unit. Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged breach of contract claims against Defendants AHR but not BRE.
iii. Injury
Defendant BRE argues that the claims as to A-6 also fail for lack of injury.20 In 2012, as part of a merger agreement, outstanding A-6 shares were converted at eleven dollars and ten cents per unit. Accordingly, Defendant BRE asserts that Plaintiff received "ten cents more than the value she pleads was too high" and thus suffered no damages. (BRE Mem. 5; 2012 A-6 Form 10-K, annexed to BRE Mot. as Ex. B, Docket Entry No. 28-4.) Plaintiff asserts that she suffered damages in the form of "fewer shares" received given the alleged overvaluation of the DRIP shares. (Pl. Opp'n 12 (citing Compl. ¶ 86).)
Under Virginia law, "[t]he general rule is that damages are to be determined at the time of breach of a contract." United Virginia Bank of Fairfax v. Dick Herriman Ford, Inc. ,
Here, the alleged injury is that Plaintiff received DRIP units that were not equivalent in value to the dividends for which they were exchanged. (See Compl. ¶ 86.) Under Virginia law, Plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to the difference between the dividends she exchanged and the value of the units at the price they should have been priced at the time of breach. See United Virginia Bank of Fairfax ,
c. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
Plaintiff's allegations are not clear as to the theories of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff appears to assert the following bases for liability: (1) Defendants were dishonest in failing to price the units at actual fair market value,22 including the failure to reprice upon sales to unrelated persons, (Compl. ¶¶ 105, 107); (2) Defendants acted arbitrarily and unfairly by declining to amend the price of the shares solely for their benefit, despite knowledge of overvaluation, (id. ); and (3) Defendants acted arbitrarily and unfairly "by failing to establish any procedures to re-evaluate the price of the DRIP unit," (id. ¶ 107).
Defendants contend that the good faith claim fails for three reasons: (1) Virginia law only recognizes such causes of action under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"); (2) even under the UCC, good faith claims give rise to a breach of contract, not an independent, stand-alone cause of action; and (3) the allegations are duplicative of the contract claims or any implied duties cannot contradict express contractual terms. (AHR Mem. 2, 15-16; BRE Mem. 18-20.)
"Under Virginia law, 'every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; however, a breach of those duties only gives rise to a breach of contract claim, not a separate cause of action.' " Moses ,
The Court finds unviable two of Plaintiff's theories of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing: (1) that Defendants dishonestly failed to price the units at fair market value and (2) that Defendants failed to establish any re-evaluation procedures. The first theory effectively duplicates the arguments made in support of Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. As discussed supra , the Complaint sets forth sufficient allegations of breach of contract claims arising out of a failure to reprice the units upon sales to unrelated *77persons. Thus, the Court finds it unnecessary and duplicative to determine whether the failure to reprice can be characterized as "dishonest." See Rogers v. Deane ,
However, the Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the theory that Defendants declined to re-price the shares, despite knowledge of their overvaluation, solely out of self-interest. (Compl. ¶¶ 105, 107.) Under the Forms S-3, Defendant had the initial contractual right to price the shares at eleven dollars per unit, based on the last sale to an unrelated person, while retaining sole contractual discretion to reassess the price and methods of valuation. Consistent with this understanding, Defendants are not liable for breach of contract for merely declining to exercise such discretion. (See supra pp. 71-73.) However, Defendants may be liable for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if their refusal to do so was arbitrary or unfair. See Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Connecticut ,
As at least one court has acknowledged, "Virginia law on the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is not exceptionally clear." Stoney Glen, LLC v. S. Bank & Tr. Co. ,
As in Virginia Vermiculite , Defendants retained the "sole discretion" to act or not act to reassess the price of units, impacting *78the benefits conferred to the other party to the contract. In addition, in both cases, defendants refused to exercise such discretion. Moreover, defendants in both cases allegedly declined to exercise such discretion purely out of self-interest, without consideration of the interests and welfare of the other parties to the contract, working effectively to directly injure the interests of the other parties.24 (See Compl. ¶¶ 10, 38 59-64); Virginia Vermiculite ,
Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant declined to exercise their discretion,25 despite knowledge of a lower valuation, solely for self-benefit. In support of this argument, Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Defendants had knowledge of the lower valuation, (see Compl. ¶¶ 59-64), and Defendants' financial difficulties as a potential motive to act in bad faith, (see id. ¶¶ 10, 38). Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Indeed, the implied covenant may be particularly important, in circumstances as here, where plaintiffs must "necessarily leave the decisionmaking process to the expertise" of defendants with specialized knowledge in a relevant field.26
*79Virginia Vermiculite ,
d. Statute of limitations
Defendants argue in their motions to dismiss that, absent some form of tolling, Plaintiff's claims in their entirety are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. (See AHR Mem. 18, 20; BRE Mem. 9, 10.) AHR Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' claims accrued either when (1) the value of the DRIP units were set in 2007 or 2008 or (2) when the DRIP unit value prices were no longer indicative of fair market value-a time period ranging between late 2008 to 2011. (AHR Mem. 18.) Defendant BRE asserts that Plaintiff's claims as to BRE accrued on May 14, 2009, when the 2006 A-3 Form S expired through amendment. Plaintiff contends that A-6, A-7, and A-8 DRIPs are best understood as divisible contracts, with a new breach occurring at each dividend distribution date. Therefore, accrual began anew and separately for each breach. (Pl. Opp'n 16.) Plaintiff argues that, as a result, the statute of limitations does not bar claims based on dividend reinstatements made after February 24, 2012-five years prior to the filing of this action. (Id. at 19.)
In diversity actions, "a federal court sitting in New York must apply the New York choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations." Stuart v. Am. Cyanamid Co. ,
Under New York law, Plaintiff's claims accrued in Florida where she resides and sustained economic injury. See Muto ,
*80By contrast, New York enforces a six-year limitations period. CPLR § 213(2). Thus, Florida's shorter five-year period applies. See Stuart ,
i. The Forms S-3 are divisible contracts
Contract claims accrue at the time of breach. See Tech. Packaging, Inc. v. Hanchett ,
Under either Virginia or Florida law, the Forms S-3 are best viewed as divisible contracts, giving rise to a separate breach each time dividends were exchanged for an inadequate number of shares.29 Each exchange of dividends for shares occurs and is completed independently from the others. Thus, the statute of limitations accrues separately for each exchange or breach. As a result, because *81this action was filed on February 24, 2017, Plaintiff's claims based on the exchange of dividends for units that occurred after February 24, 2012-five years prior to filing-are not time-barred.30
ii. Equitable tolling
Plaintiff argues that her breach of contract claim as to A-7 was tolled by the Moses action. Plaintiff relies on American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah ,
In diversity actions, the Second Circuit evaluates the timeliness of state law claims by looking to the law of the relevant state, including state tolling rules.
*82Vincent v. Money Store ,
As an initial matter, Florida Statutes § 95.051, the Florida state statute on tolling, "appears to preclude the application of class action tolling." Dineen ,
Despite the language of Florida Statutes § 95.051, the Florida Supreme Court has allowed putative class members to file individual state law claims shortly after the dissolution of a previously filed class action. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motions to dismiss. As to the breach of contract claims, the Court denies the motion to dismiss as to Defendant AHR, but grants the motion without prejudice as to the Defendant BRE, based on the failure to re-price the units following tender offers below eleven dollars per unit. As to the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, the Court denies the motion to dismiss as to all Defendants based on the theory that they declined to exercise their discretion to re-price the shares solely for their own benefit. All claims are limited in time to events occurring on or after February 24, 2012.
SO ORDERED:
Footnotes
The Complaint sets forth the required elements of a legally enforceable agreement. Through their Forms S-3 and other public filings, Defendants "offer[ed] [their] Dividend Reinvestment Plans to ... shareholders." (2006 A-6 Form S-3; 2007 A-7 Form S-3; 2008 A-8 Form S-3; see also AHR Mem. 3 ("The Apple REITS offered their investors the option ....") (emphasis added).) Plaintiff accepted the offers by participating in the DRIPs. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff also provided valuable consideration by passing up the opportunity to receive dividends in exchange for more shares of A-6, A-7, and A-8. (Id. ¶ 13, 80); see also Moses ,
To the extent required to predict the direction of Florida law, this Court finds it more likely that Florida courts will not allow cross-jurisdictional tolling given their limited willingness to deviate from the clear statutory language of Florida Statutes § 95.051. Consistent with this understanding, most, if not all, courts to have considered the issue have concluded that cross-jurisdictional tolling does not exist under Florida law. See, e.g., Adams ,
307 F. Supp. 3d 64 (Wilchfort v. Knight) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.