Wilbur Lafayette Thompson,III vRoberta F. Thompson
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Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank
WILBUR LAFAYETTE THOMPSON, III MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1779-99-2 PER CURIAM FEBRUARY 8, 2000 ROBERTA FRENCH THOMPSON
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge
(Alexandra D. Bowen; Bowen, Bryant, Champlin & Carr, on brief), for appellant.
(Graham T. Jennings, Jr.; Graham T. Jennings, Jr., P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Wilbur Lafayette Thompson, III (husband) appeals from the
final decree of divorce entered by the circuit court. Husband
contends that the trial court erred when valuing the marital
estate by admitting into evidence the testimony of an expert
witness called by Roberta French Thompson (wife) as to the value
of Cavalier Vending Corporation (Cavalier). Upon reviewing the
record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is
without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of
the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
"The admission of expert testimony is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will reverse
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. a trial court's ruling only where that court has abused its
discretion." Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Dungee, 258 Va. 235,
258, 520 S.E.2d 164, 177 (1999). "Where experts offer
conflicting testimony, it is within the discretion of the trial
court to select either opinion." Rowe v. Rowe, 24 Va. App. 123,
140, 480 S.E.2d 760, 768 (1997) (citing Reid v. Reid, 7 Va. App.
553, 563, 375 S.E.2d 533, 539 (1989)). "It is well established
that the trier of fact ascertains [an expert] witness'
credibility, determines the weight to be given to their
testimony, and has the discretion to accept or reject any of the
witness' testimony." Street v. Street, 25 Va. App. 380, 387,
488 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1997) (en banc) (citation omitted). "We
will not disturb a trial court's finding of the value of an
asset unless the finding is plainly wrong or unsupported by the
evidence." Shooltz v. Shooltz, 27 Va. App. 264, 275, 498 S.E.2d
437, 442 (1998).
Citing Code § 8.01-401.3(B), husband contends that the
testimony of wife's expert witness, Carlson Woo, was
inadmissible because it was speculative and not based upon facts
or sound methodology. Husband further contends that the trial
court erred by considering Woo's determination of a
"liquidation" value of Cavalier despite the fact that there was
no indication that Cavalier was to be liquidated. We find no
merit in these contentions.
- 2 - Husband's expert witness, Stephen Ragland, prepared a
written report based upon the financial records of Cavalier and
certain assumptions. Ragland opined that Cavalier had a fair
market value of $150,000, using a capitalized future return
method and asset based approach. Ragland noted that his report
contained certain limitations and departures from generally
accepted accounting principles. Wife's expert reviewed and
critiqued Ragland's written report and the assumptions on which
it was based, noting with specificity assets which Woo believed
were undervalued or otherwise inaccurately reported. Neither
Woo nor Ragland physically examined the assets of Cavalier and
both relied upon certain representations made by husband.
Nothing in Code § 8.01-401.3(B) barred the introduction by
wife of the testimony of an expert witness designed to impeach
the valuation testimony of husband's witness. Woo's testimony
addressed only questions of fact and drew no conclusions of law.
The facts upon which Woo relied were those set out in Ragland's
report. Using the data set out in Ragland's report, Woo found
that Cavalier had a net asset based or "liquidation" value of
$500,918. Woo noted that Ragland's report was ambiguous
concerning the ongoing viability of Cavalier. While there was
no evidence that husband intended to liquidate Cavalier, we find
no error in the trial court's consideration of Woo's testimony
concerning the company's value.
- 3 - The trial court was entitled to weigh the testimony of the
respective expert witnesses and assign a value to Cavalier based
upon the evidence and its determination of the witnesses'
credibility. The trial court's finding that the business was
worth $300,000 was within the range of values supported by the
evidence. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court's
determination was clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
- 4 -
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