Wilbert A. Theodore v. B.D. Walker, Warden

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedMarch 24, 2026
Docket1:25-cv-00678
StatusUnknown

This text of Wilbert A. Theodore v. B.D. Walker, Warden (Wilbert A. Theodore v. B.D. Walker, Warden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilbert A. Theodore v. B.D. Walker, Warden, (N.D. Ala. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION

WILBERT A THEODORE, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-00678-MHH-HNJ ) B.D. WALKER, ) Warden ) ) Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In the habeas petition he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Wilbert A. Theodore challenges the Bureau of Prisons’ calculation of First Step Act credits towards his federal sentence. (Doc. 1). On January 23, 2026, the Magistrate Judge entered a report in which he recommended that the Court dismiss Mr. Theodore’s petition with prejudice. (Doc. 19). The Magistrate Judge stated that the parties could file objections within 14 days of the entry of the report. (Doc. 19, p. 19). Mr. Theodore has objected to the report. (Doc. 20).1

1 The Court docketed Mr. Theodore’s petition on February 20, 2026, but Mr. Theodore has indicated that he placed his written objections in the prison mailing system on February 5, 2026. (Doc. 20, p. 2). Therefore, Mr. Theodore’s objections are timely. See Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a prisoner’s pro se filing “is deemed filed the date [the document] are delivered to prison authorities for mailing”) (brackets added). A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A

district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.

667, 673 (1980) (quoting § 636(b)(1)); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(3) (“The district judge must consider de novo any objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.”). A district court’s obligation to “‘make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to

which objection is made,’” 447 U.S. at 673 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)), requires a district judge to “‘give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party,’” 447 U.S. at 675 (quoting House Report No.

94-1609, p. 3 (1976)). Mr. Theodore contends that BOP should provide FSA time credits during two time periods: the time between the date on which he was sentenced in the Western District of Arkansas (November 17, 2022) and his initial designation at FCI

Talladega (April 24, 2023), (Doc. 1, pp. 6, 38; see also Doc. 12-1, p. 1; Doc. 12-4, pp. 1–2, ¶¶ 5–6), and the time during which he was in United States Marshal custody at FCI Englewood (July 17, 2023, through January 6, 2025), (Doc. 1, pp. 6, 33–34;

see also Doc. 12-4, p. 2, ¶ 6). As the Magistrate Judge explained, by statute, federal 2 prisoners who successfully participate in or complete “evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities” earn FSA time credits that may

reduce a prisoner’s term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (C); see Doc. 19, p. 9 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (C)). The statute does not define the phrase “successfully complete,” but a regulation concerning the statute states that an

inmate cannot be “successfully participating” in recidivism reduction programming or productive activities while the inmate is in “the custody of another Federal or non- Federal government agency (e.g., on state or Federal writ, transfer to state custody for service of sentence, etc.).” 28 C.F.R. § 523.41(c)(4); see Doc. 19, pp. 10–11

(quoting 28 C.F.R. § 523.41(c)(4). 2 The Magistrate Judge determined that Mr. Theodore is not entitled to additional FSA credits because Mr. Theodore did not participate in EBRR

programming or PAs during the two periods at issue. (Doc. 19, p. 8). The Magistrate Judge determined that Mr. Theodore did not earn FSA credits between November 17, 2022, and April 24, 2023, because the Individualized Needs Plan that Mr.

2 Courts differ as to the force of the regulation. Compare Sharma v. Peters, 756 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1283–84 (M.D. Ala. 2024) (explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(B) does not preclude a prisoner from receiving FSA credits for which he is eligible simply because he was housed outside of his facility and that the BOP may not administratively impose such requirement on prisoners), with Stevens v. Jacquez, No. 3:23-CV-01482-AA, 2024 WL 3200546, at *5 (D. Or. June 25, 2024) (recognizing that several courts have found that “BOP reasonably interpreted the FSA in determining that eligible [prisoners] are not ‘successfully participating’ in EBRR programming when in transit to or in ‘the custody of another Federal or non-Federal government agency’”). 3 Theodore attached to his petition does not identify recidivism programming or productive activities in which Mr. Theodore participated during that five-month

period. (Doc. 19, p. 15) (citing Doc. 1, p. 35) (January 17, 2025, Individualized Needs Plan – Program Review). The Magistrate Judge found that Mr. Theodore was not entitled to FSA credits while he was housed at FCI-Englewood between July 17,

2023, and January 6, 2025 on a federal writ because the FDC Plant Kingdom class Mr. Theodore completed at FCI Englewood does not qualify as an approved recidivism program or productive activity. (Doc. 19, pp. 16–18). Mr. Theodore contends that he has been eligible for FSA time credits since he

was sentenced in Arkansas. (Doc. 20, pp. 1–2). Mr. Theodore is correct; he became eligible to earn FSA time credits when the judgment was entered in his Arkansas case. But eligibility is different from earned credit. As the Magistrate Judge

explained, by statute, Mr. Theodore must earn credits by participating in evidence- based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities. (Doc. 19, p. 8); 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). In his objections, Mr. Theodore has not identified recidivism programs in which he participated other than the one for which he

received credit. Mr. Theodore argues that the FDC Plant Kingdom course that he took at FCI- Englewood should qualify as a productive activity. (Doc. 20, p. 2). The FSA defines

a productive activity as “either a group or individual activity that is designed to allow 4 prisoners determined as having a minimum or low risk of recidivating to remain productive and thereby maintain a minimum or low risk of recidivating . . ..” 18

U.S.C. § 3635(5).3 Mr. Theodore bears the burden “to establish his right to habeas relief and he must prove all facts necessary to show a constitutional violation.” Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2008). Mr. Theodore’s

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Related

Blankenship v. Hall
542 F.3d 1253 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
United States v. Raddatz
447 U.S. 667 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Ronald Washington, A.K.A. Boo Washington v. United States
243 F.3d 1299 (Eleventh Circuit, 2001)

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